Contemporary Authors

• The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified - 2016 Columbia University Press, New York, NY
• Zen and the Art of Running: The Path to Making Peace with Your Pace - 2009 Adams Media, Avon, MA
• The Mind Incarnate - 2005 MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
• Embodied Cognition (New Problems of Philosophy) - 2010 Routledge, New York, NY
• (Editor, with Brie Gertler) Arguing About the Mind - 2007 Routledge, New York, NY
• (Editor) The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition - 2014 Routledge, New York, NY
• (With Thomas W. Polger) The Multiple Realization Book - 2016 Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom

• Larry Shapiro Home Page - https://sites.google.com/site/lshapiro911/

  I am a professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. My research interests are mainly in philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind. Currently my research focuses on issues concerning multiple realization and embodied cognition, however I have just completed a book on the topic of miracles called The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural is Unjustified. I teach courses in philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind. I also enjoy teaching introduction to philosophy.

  My mailing address:

  5185 HC White Hall
  Department of Philosophy
  University of Wisconsin -- Madison
  Madison, WI 53706

  Office: 5111 HC White Hall
  (608) 263-3700
  Email: lshapiro (at) wisc (dot) edu

• Author C.V. - https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxsc2hhcGlybzkxMXxneDozOGNkOGMyZWYzYzk2NjAw

  Curriculum Vitae

  Lawrence A. Shapiro

  http://sites.google.com/site/lshapiro911

  Birth: September 11, 1962

  New York, New York

  Academic Address:

  Department of Philosophy

  University of Wisconsin – Madison

  5185 Helen C. White Hall

  Madison, WI 53706

  (608) 263-3700

  fax: (608) 265-3701

  email: lshapiro@wisc.edu

  Education:

  Dickinson College B.A., philosophy, with honors

  summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa 1984

  University of Pennsylvania M.A., philosophy 1988

  Ph.D., philosophy 1992

  Academic Employment:

  Full Professor, University of Wisconsin – Madison Fall 2003-

  Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin 2002-2006

  Associate Professor, University of Wisconsin – Madison 1999-2003

  Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin – Madison 1993-1999

  Lecturer, University of Pennsylvania Spring, 1993

  Part-time lecturer, University of Pennsylvania 1987-1989, 1992

  Honors and Awards:

  President, Phi Beta Kappa, UW Alpha Chapter 2011-2014

  Vice President, Phi Beta Kappa, UW Alpha Chapter, 2010-2011

  The American Philosophical Association’s Joseph P. Gittler Award for an outstanding contribution

  in the field of the philosophy of the social sciences for Embodied Cognition, 2013

  Honored Instructor Award, Fall 2008, Spring 2013, Fall 2014, Spring 2014

  Kellett Mid-Career Award, Spring 2012

  Resident Fellow, Institute for Research in the Humanities, University of Wisconsin, Spring 2012

  Fellow, Centre for the Foundations of Science, Sydney University, Spring 2008

  Vilas Associate Award, 2005-2007

  Teaching Academy Fellow, starting 2000

  IN TIME (Instructor Network for Teaching in a Multimedia Environment) Fellow, 1998-1999

  Lilly Teaching Fellow, 1997-1998

  Philosophy of Science Association Young Scholar Prize, 1996

  Mellon Dissertation Fellowship, 1989-1990

  Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Summer Grant, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2005,

  2008, 2009, 2010, 2012

  2

  Books:

  7. The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified (Columbia University

  Press, 2016).

  6. The Multiple Realization Book, with Thomas Polger (Oxford University Press, 2016).

  5. The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition (ed., Routledge Press: London, 2014).

  4. Embodied Cognition (Routledge Press, 2011).

  3. Arguing about the Mind (ed., with Brie Gertler. Routledge Press: London, 2007).

  2. The Mind Incarnate (MIT Press: Cambridge, 2004).

  Nonacademic Books:

  1. Zen and the Art of Running (Adams Media: 2009).

  Articles:

  41. “Embodied Cognition and Sport,” with Shannon Spaulding, forthcoming in Cappuccio, M. (ed.),

  Handbook Of Embodied Cognition and Sport Psychology (Cambridge: MIT Press).

  40. “In Defense of Interventionist Solutions to Exclusion,” with Thomas Polger and Reuben Stern,

  forthcoming, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.

  39. “Reduction Redux,” forthcoming, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.

  38. “Mechanism or Bust? Explanation in Psychology,” forthcoming, The British Journal for the

  Philosophy of Science.

  37. “The Irrationality of Belief in Miracles,” Slate Magazine, 2015

  (http://www.slate.com/bigideas/are-miracles-possible/essays-and-opinions/larry-shapiro-opinion)

  36. “Miracles and Justification,” forthcoming in Reason and Responsibility, J. Feinberg and R. Shafer-
  Landau (eds.). (Boston: Wadsworth).

  35. “Don’t Believe in Miracles,” Aeon Magazine, 2013 (http://aeon.co/magazine/altered-states/dont-
  believe-in-miracles/).

  34. “When is Cognition Embodied?,” in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, U. Kriegel (ed.)

  (New York: Routledge, pp. 73-90, 2014).

  33. “Embodied Cognition: Lessons from Linguistic Determinism,” Philosophical Topics 39: 121-140,

  2013.

  32. “Dynamics and Cognition,” Minds & Machines 23: 353-375, 2013.

  31. “What’s New about Embodied Cognition?,” Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2-supplement): 214-224, 2012.

  30. “Identity, Variability, and Multiple Realization in the Special Sciences,” with Thomas Polger, in

  New Perspectives on Type Identity, Christopher Hill and Simone Gozzano (eds). (Cambridge: Cambridge

  University Press, pp. 264-287, 2012).

  3

  29. “Against Proportionality,” with Elliott Sober, Analysis 72: 89-93, 2012.

  28. “Embodied Cognition,” in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, E. Margolis, R.

  Samuels, and S. Stich (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 118-147, 2012).

  27. “Mental Manipulations and the Problem of Causal Exclusion,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 0:

  1-18, 2011. Translated into Portuguese in Controvérsia, a journal of UNISINOS.

  26. “Lessons from Causal Exclusion,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81: 594-604, 2010.

  25. “James Bond and the Barking Dog: Evolution and Extended Cognition” Philosophy of Science 77:

  400-418, 2010.

  24. “Making Sense of Mirror Neurons,” Synthese 167: 439-456, 2008.

  23. “How to Test for Multiple Realization,” Philosophy of Science 75: 514-525, 2008.

  22. “Understanding the Dimensions of Realization,” with Thomas Polger, The Journal of Philosophy

  105: 213-222, 2008.

  21. “Evolutionary Psychology,” in the online Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

  20. “Functionalism and Mental Boundaries,” Cognitive Systems Research 9: 5-14, 2008.

  19. “Symbolism, Embodied Cognition, and the Broader Debate,” in M. de Vega, A. Glenberg & A.

  Graesser (eds) Symbols and Embodiment: Debates on Meaning and Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University

  Press, pp. 57-74, 2008).

  18. “The Embodied Cognition Research Programme,” Philosophy Compass 2: 338-346, 2008.

  17. “Epiphenomenalism – The Dos and Don'ts,” with Elliott Sober, in G. Wolters and P. Machamer

  (eds.), Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics (Pittsburgh: University of

  Pittsburgh Press, pp. 253-264, 2007).

  16. “Reductionism, Embodiment, and the Generality of Psychology,” in H. Looren de Jong & M.

  Schouten (eds.), The Matter of the Mind (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 101-120, 2006).

  15. “Can Psychology Be a Unified Science?” Philosophy of Science 72: 953-963, 2005.

  14. “Adapted Minds,” in J. McIntosh (ed.), Naturalism, Evolution, and Intentionality: Canadian Journal of

  Philosophy Supplementary vol. 27 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2001: 85-101).

  13. “Mind the Adaptation,” in D. Walsh (ed.), Naturalism, Evolution, and Mind (Cambridge:

  Cambridge University Press, 2001: 23-41).

  12. “Multiple Realizations,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 97, no. 12, pp. 635-654, 2000.

  4

  11. “Presence of Mind,” in V. Hardcastle (ed.), Biology Meets Psychology: Constraints, Connections,

  Conjectures (Cambridge: MIT Press: 83-98, 1999).

  10. “Evolutionary Theory Meets Cognitive Psychology: A More Selective Perspective,” (with

  William Epstein) Mind and Language vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 171-194, 1998.

  9. “Do’s and Don’ts for Darwinizing Psychology,” in C. Allen and D. Cummins (eds.), The Evolution

  of Mind (New York: Oxford University Press: 243-259, 1998).

  8. “The Nature of Nature: Rethinking Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality,” Philosophical Psychology,

  vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 309-322, 1997.

  7. “Junk Representations,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 345-361,

  1997.

  6. “A Clearer Vision,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 131-153, 1997.

  5. “Representation from Bottom and Top,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 523-542,

  1996.

  4. “What is Psychophysics?,” in D. Hull, M. Forbes, and R. M. Burian (eds.), PSA 1994, vol. 2 (East

  Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association: 47-57).

  3. “Behavior, ISO Functionalism, and Psychology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 25,

  no. 2, pp. 191-209, 1994.

  2. “Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr’s Theory of Vision,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 102,

  no. 4, pp. 489-513, 1993.

  1. “Darwin and Disjunction: Foraging Theory and Univocal Assignments of Content,” in D. Hull,

  M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik (eds.), PSA 1992, vol. 1 (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science

  Association: 469-480).

  Reviews and Comments:

  15. Hutto, D. and Myin, E. Radical Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content (Cambridge: MIT Press,

  2012), Mind 123: 213-220, 2014.

  14. Hatfield, G. Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology (Oxford: Oxford

  University Press, 2009), Mind 119: 789-794, 2010.

  13. Pylyshyn, Z. Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007),

  Mind 118: 1168-1174, 2009.

  12. Richardson, R. Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), in

  Metascience 18: 319-323, 2009.

  5

  11. (With Shannon Spaulding) Clark, A. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive

  Extension (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2009.

  10. Adams, F. and Aizawa, K. The Bounds of Cognition (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), Phenomenology and the

  Cognitive Sciences 8: 267-273, 2009.

  9. Heidelberger, M. Nature From Within: Gustav Theodor Fechner and His Psychophysical Worldview

  (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), in Mind, 114: 739-743, 2005.

  8. Wilson, R. Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Cognition (New York:

  Cambridge University Press, 2004) in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005.

  7. “On Having One's Data Shared,” with Postle, B. and Biesanz, J., in Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

  14:6, pp. 838-840, 2002.

  6. Fodor, J. The Mind Doesn't Work That Way (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), in The Quarterly Review of

  Biology, 3: 2001, p. 76.

  5. “Prediction and Accommodation in Evolutionary Psychology,” with Malcolm Forster, Psychological

  Inquiry vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 31-33, p. 2000.

  4. Dawson, M. Understanding Cognitive Science (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), in Minds and Machines 10:

  440-444, 2000.

  3. Allen, C. and Bekoff, M. Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology (Cambridge:

  MIT Press, 1997), in Minds and Machines 10: 149-152, 2000.

  2. “Saving the Phenomenal,” Commentary on Peter Carruther's article “Natural Theories of

  Consciousness,” Psyche, vol. 5, 1999.

  1. Rollins, M. Mental Imagery: On the Limits of Cognitive Science and Michael Tye The Imagery

  Debate, Minds and Machines 5: 288-297, 1995.

  Meetings and Colloquia:

  88. “Multiple Realization and the Autonomy of the Special Sciences,” to the Durham Emergence

  Project Concluding Conference (Durham, UK, April 2016).

  87. “Things to Think About When You’re Thinking About Multiple Realization,” to the Southern

  Society of Philosophy and Psychology (Louisville, March 2016).

  86. “More on Multiple Realization,” to the Fordham-Rutgers Metaphysics of Mind Conference

  (New York City, February 2016).

  85. “What’s Embodied About our Psychology?,” to the Department of Philosophy, Northwestern

  University (Evanston, January 2016).

  6

  84. “Matters of the Flesh: The Role(s) of Body in Cognition,” to the Explanations of Cognition

  Workshop (Stirling, July 2015).

  83. “Mechanism or Bust? Explanation in Psychology,” to The Aims of Brain Research: Scientific

  and Philosophical Perspectives, The 28th Annual International Workshop on the History and Philosophy of

  Science (Jerusalem, December 2014).

  82. “Mechanistic Explanation and Mental Causation,” to the Mental Causation Workshop (Leuven,

  November 2014).

  81. “Mechanism or Bust? Explanation in Psychology,” to the Philosophy of Science Association

  Meeting (Chicago, November 2014).

  80. “Mechanism or Bust? Explanation in Psychology,” to the Department of Philosophy, University

  of Missouri (Columbia, November 2014)

  79. “Reduction Redux,” to the Department of Philosophy, Mississippi State University (Starkville,

  October 2014).

  78. “Reduction Redux,” Keynote Lecture, to the Mind and Body conference (Hebrew University,

  Jerusalem, June 2014).

  77. “Reduction Redux,” to the Realizability and the Levels of Reality Workshop (IHPST, Paris, June

  2014).

  76. “The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in Miracles is Unjustified,” Philosophers Tackle Contemporary

  Issues (Madison, March 2014).

  75. “Embodied Cognition: Lessons from Linguistic Determinism,” to the Department of

  Philosophy, College of Lewis and Clark (Portland, March 2014)

  74. “Explanation in Psychology and Neuroscience, Mechanism or Bust?” to the Southern Society of

  Philosophy and Psychology (Charleston, February 2014).

  73. “Embodied Cognition,” Author meets Critic, Eastern Division of the APA (Baltimore,

  December 2013).

  72. “Explanation in Psychology and Neuroscience, Mechanism or Bust?” to the Mind and

  Mechanism Workshop (Cologne, September 2013).

  71. “The Body in Mind, But Whence the Mind?,” to the Department of Kinesiology (Madison, April

  2013).

  70. “Embodied Cognition: Lessons from Linguistic Determinism,” to the Department of

  Philosophy, University of Connecticut (Storrs, March 2013).

  69. “What’s New about Embodied Cognition?,” to the Holtz Center for Science and Technology

  7

  (Madison, March 2013).

  68. “Wonder of Wonders: A Philosopher’s Guide to Thinking about Miracles,” the Inaugural Phi

  Beta Kappa Presidential Address (Madison, March 2013).

  67. “In Defense of Interventionist Solutions to Exclusion,” (with Tom Polger) to the Central

  American Philosophical Association Meeting (New Orleans, February 2013).

  66. “To Find a Mark of the Mental, Trust Your Gut,” to the Kayden Symposium on Robert Rupert’s

  Cognitive Systems and The Extended Mind (Boulder, October 2012).

  65. “Embodiment and Neural Reuse,” to The Metaphysics of Mind and Brain: Realization,

  Mechanisms, and Embodiment (Humboldt University, Berlin, July 2012).

  64. “The Body in Mind, But Whence the Mind?” Keynote address to the North American Society

  for the Psychology of Sport and Physical Activity (Waikiki, May 2012).

  63. “Wonder of Wonders: A Philosopher’s Guide to Thinking about Miracles,” to the Institute for

  Research in the Humanities (Madison, April 2012).

  62. “What’s New about Embodied Cognition?” to UNAM Institute for Philosophy (Mexico City,

  March 2012).

  61. “Dynamics and Cognition,” to UNAM Institute for Philosophy (Mexico City, March 2012).

  60. “Dynamics and Cognition,” to HAMLET, University of Wisconsin (Madison, December 2011).

  59. “Dynamics and Cognition,” to the conference in honor of Gary Hatfield, University of

  Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, November 2011).

  58. “Mental Manipulation and the Problem of Causal Exclusion,” to the Unisinos Department of

  Philosophy (Brazil, October 2011).

  57. “Embodied Cognition,” to the Embodied Cognition Workshop, Unisinos (Brazil, October

  2011).

  56. “Dynamics and Cognition,” to the Metaphysics of Science Workshop, University of Delaware

  (Newark, September 2011).

  55. “Realization Of and By,” to the Philosophy and the Brain: Computation, Realization,

  Representation Conference, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (May 2011).

  54. “Embodied Cognition: Lessons from Linguistic Determinism,” to the Embodiment and

  Adaptation Workshop, University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, March 2011).

  53. “Mental Manipulation and the Failure of Exclusion,” to University of San Diego Department of

  Philosophy (San Diego, November 2010).

  8

  52. “Mental Manipulation and the Failure of Exclusion,” to the Metaphysics of Science Workshop

  (Birmingham, AL, February 2010).

  51. “Embodied Cognition: Lessons from Linguistic Determinism,” to the conference The

  Extended Mind Thesis in Theory and Applications (Bielefeld, November 2009).

  50. “James Bond and the Barking Dog: Evolution and Extended Cognition,” to the European

  Philosophy of Science Association (Amsterdam, October 2009).

  49. “James Bond and the Barking Dog: Evolution and Extended Minds,” to the Metaphysics of

  Science Workshop (Cincinnati, November 2008).

  48. “Making Sense of Mirror Neurons,” to the University of Wollongong Department of Philosophy

  (Wollongong, June 2008).

  47. “Embodied Cognition,” to the Embodied in the Gong Workshop, University of Wollongong

  (Wollongong, June 2008).

  46. “Embodied Cognition,” to the Current Projects Seminar at the Sydney University Department of

  Philosophy (Sydney, May 2008).

  45. “The Science Behind Multiple Realization,” to the Cognitive Science Conference, Macquarie

  University (Sydney, April 2008).

  44. “The Science Behind Multiple Realization,” to the Sydney University Department of Philosophy

  (Sydney, March 2008).

  44. “The Science Behind Multiple Realization,” to The Australian National University Department

  of Philosophy (Canberra, January 2008).

  43. “The Science Behind Multiple Realization,” to the Washington University Department of

  Philosophy (St. Louis, December 2007)

  42. “Understanding the Dimensions of Realization,” (with Tom Polger) to the European Philosophy

  of Science Association (Madrid, November 2007).

  41. “Making Sense of Mirror Neurons,” to the University of Cincinnati Department of Philosophy

  (November 2007).

  40. “Functionalism and Mental Boundaries,” to the Perception, Action, and Cognition Group at the

  University of Cincinnati (Cincinnati, November 2007).

  39. “Functionalism and Mental Boundaries,” to the Cognitive Development Brown Bag (Madison,

  October 2007).

  38. “Functionalism and Mental Boundaries,” to the University of Illinois Department of Philosophy

  9

  (Chicago, October 2007).

  37. “On Sensing,” to the Metaphysics of Science Workshop (Shreveport, October 2007).

  36. “Representation and Philosophy of Science,” to the Annual Summer Interdisciplinary

  Conference (Kalymnos, GR, June 2007).

  35. “How to Test for Multiple Realization,” to the Ohio State-Croatia Epistemology and

  Metaphysics meeting (Dubrovnik, May 2007)

  34. “How to Test for Multiple Realization,” to the biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science

  Association (Vancouver, BC, November 2006)

  33. “Multiple Realizability, Seriously,” to the Mind, Body, and Realization Conference (Lafayette

  College, October, 2006).

  32. “Flat and Happy,” to the Metaphysics of Science Workshop (Madison, August 2006).

  31. Author Meets Critics session on The Mind Incarnate (Chicago, April 2006).

  30. “Lessons from Causal Exclusion,” to the Central Division meeting of the American

  Philosophical Association (Chicago, April 2006).

  29. “Special Special Science Laws,” to the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology

  (Charleston, April 2006).

  28. “Symbolism, Embodied Cognition, and What's Really at Stake,” to the Garachico Workshop on

  Symbols, Embodiment, and Meaning (Tenerife, December 2005).

  27. “Epiphenomenalism – The Do's and Don'ts,” (with Elliott Sober), to the joint meeting of

  University of Pittsburgh and University of Konstanz (Konstanz, May 2005).

  26. “Is Content Essential to Computational States?,” a response to Gualtiero Piccinini at the Eastern

  Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (Boston, December 2004).

  25. “Special Special Science Laws,” University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee (Milwaukee, December

  2004).

  24. “Can Psychology Be A Unified Science,” to the biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science

  Association (Austin, November 2004).

  23. “Special Special Science Laws,” to the Fortieth Annual University of Cincinnati Philosophy

  Colloquium Nature, Normativity and the Autonomy of the Mind (Cincinnati, May 2004).

  22. “The Metaphysics of Multiple Realizability: It's Like Apples and Oranges,” Keynote Address to

  the Marquette Graduate Student Philosophy Conference (Milwaukee, March 2002).

  10

  21. “Behavior as an Emergent Phenomenon,” Chaos and Complex Systems Seminar, University of

  Wisconsin – Madison (Madison, September 2002).

  20. “Neural Plasticity and Multiple Realizability,” to the annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy and

  Psychology (Edmonton, June 2002).

  19. “Mind-Body Reduction With Embodiment in Mind,” Northern Illinois University (DeKalb,

  October 2001).

  18. “Multiple Realizations,” University of Wisconsin – Stevens Point (Stevens Point, April 2000).

  17. “Mind the Adaptation,” to the Royal Institute for Philosophy conference Naturalism, Evolution,

  and Mind (Edinburgh, July 1999).

  16. “Mind the Adaptation,” to the History and Philosophy of Science Group, Northwestern

  University (Evanston, April 1999).

  15. “Avoiding Harms' Way” a response to William Harms at the Eastern Division Meeting of the

  American Philosophical Association (Washington D. C., December 1998).

  14. “Can Knowledge of Evolutionary History Help the Psychologist?” to Symposium: Multidisciplinary

  Perspectives on Evolutionary Reasoning, CogSci98 (Madison, August 1998).

  13. “Adapted Minds” to the conference Naturalism, Evolution, and Intentionality (Western Ontario,

  April 1998).

  12. “Change of Mind” to the Institute for Research in Cognitive Science of the University of Pennsylvania

  (Philadelphia, November 1997).

  11. “Presence of Mind” to the biennial meeting of the International Society for the History,

  Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology (Seattle, July 1997).

  10. Response to Irene Pepperberg at the Animal Minds meeting (Boulder, April 1996).

  9. “What is Psychophysics?” to the biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (New

  Orleans, October 1994).

  8. “Indication, Cognitive Science, and Lego Naturalism,” to the conference Complex Representations:

  The Place of Indicator Semantics in Cognitive Science (Blacksburg, March 1994).

  7. “Discrimination in Perceptual Psychology,” to the Proseminar in Experimental Psychology at the

  University of Wisconsin – Madison (Madison, October 1993).

  6. “Taking it from the Top: A Criticism of Dretske's Bottom Up Strategy for Naturalizing

  Representational Content,” to the annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology

  (Vancouver, June 1993).

  11

  5. “Naturalizing Representation,” to Central Connecticut State University (New Britain, May 1993).

  4. Revised version of the above to the University of Pennsylvania Ecology and Evolution Group

  (Philadelphia, March 1993).

  3. “Darwin and Disjunction: Foraging Theory and Univocal Assignments of Content,” to the annual

  meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (Montreal, June 1992).

  2. Revised version of the above to the biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

  (Chicago, October 1992).

  1. “Darwin, Disjunction, and Univocal Assignments of Intentional Content,” to the Pacific Division

  meeting of the American Philosophical Association (Portland, March 1992).

  Interviews:

  5. Esty Dinur, A Public Affair, WORT, Artificial Intelligence, May 2014.

  4. Dan Barker and Annie Laurie Gaynor, FreeThought Radio, Miracles, 2013.

  (http://ffrf.org/news/radio/show-items/item/18236-freethought-radio-broadcast-

  %E2%80%94-july-27-2013)

  3. Norman Gilliland and Emily Auerbach, University of the Air, Wonder of Wonders: A Philosopher’s

  Guide to Thinking about Miracles, 2013. (http://www.wpr.org/listen/293116)

  2. Katrin Weigman, EMBO reports, “Does Intelligence Require a Body?,” 2012.

  1. Ginger Campbell, Brain Science Podcast, 2011:

  http://www.brainsciencepodcast.com/bsp/embodied-cognition-with-lawrence-shapiro-bsp-73.html

  Professional Activities:

  Referee for: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Philosophical

  Psychology, Erkenntnis, Mind and Language, Nous, Synthese, Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Studies,

  Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Trends in Cognitive Science, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Mind,

  WIREs Cognitive Science, Journal of Philosophical Research, TOPOI, Society for Philosophy and

  Psychology, Southern Society for Philosophy of Psychology, Metaphysics of Science Society

  Manuscript Consultant for: Blackwell Press, MIT Press, Oxford University Press, Wadsworth Pub.

  Co., Routledge Press

  Application Reviewer for the National Endowment of the Humanities (April 2016: Washington,

  DC)

  Proposal Referee for National Science Foundation

  Organizer for the symposium Philosophy of Psychology as Philosophy of Science held at the Philosophy of

  Science Association biennial meeting (New Orleans, October 1994).

  Promotion Reviews for University of Arkansas, University of Cincinnati, University of Pittsburgh,

  Georgia State University, Rutgers University – Newark, University of Iowa, Northern Illinois

  University, Youngstown State University, Lafayette College, Fordham University, Villanova

  University

  12

  Outreach:

  Belleville High School National Honors Society Induction Speech, 2012

  The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in Miracles is Unjustified, Philosophers Tackle Contemporary Issues series,

  March 2014 (http://wpt.org/University-Place/why-belief-miracles-unjustified)

  Abortion Debate, sponsored by UW Christians Organization, April 2014

  Service:

  Placement Director, 2015-2017

  Graduate Faculty Executive Committee, 2010, 2011

  Member, Ad Hoc Committee to review Spanish and Portuguese, 2011

  Member, Ad Hoc Committee to review Languages and Cultures of Asia, 2010

  Divisional Committee, Spring 2007; 2012-2014

  Chair, Ad Hoc Committee to review the Department of Mathematics, 2006-2007

  Chair, Department of Philosophy, 2002-2006

  Chair, Graduate Student Admissions Committee, 2000-2001; 2001-2002; 2010-2011

  Search Committee, 2000-2001; 2001-2002; 2006-2007, as Chair: 2009-2010; 2011-2012, 2012-2013,

  2013-2014

  Budget Committee, 2000-2001; 2009-10; 2010-11, 2011-2012, 2012-2013, 2015-2016

  College of Letters and Science Undergraduate Advising, 1996-1997; 1997-1998; 1998-1999; 2001-

  2002

  Undergraduate Planning Committee, 1998-1999

  Undergraduate Student/Faculty Conference Committee, 1998-1999

  Lectures and Colloquia, 1999 Sem I; 2000 Sem I

  Oliver Prize Committee, 1995; 1997, 2012

  TA Policies and Procedures Committee, 1994-1995; 1995-1996; 1996-1997

  Teaching Assistant Review Committee, 1994-1995; 1995-1996; 1996-1997

  Library Committee, 1994-1995

  Doctorates Overseen:

  Danielle Wylie

  Michael Roche

  Shannon Spaulding

  Deborah Mower

  Laura Sizer

  Stephen Schmid

  Current Doctoral Students:

  Jason Leardi

  Greg Nirshberg

  Michael Schon

• University of Wisconsin-Madison - http://philosophy.wisc.edu/people/

  Lawrence Shapiro
  Professor (University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. 1992)
  Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology
  Phone: 608-265-3700
  Email: lshapiro@wisc.edu
  Office: 5111 HC White Hall
  Professor Shapiro’s research spans philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology. Within philosophy of mind he has focused on issues related to reduction, especially concerning the thesis of multiple realization. His books The Mind Incarnate (MIT, 2004) and The Multiple Realization Book (co-authored with Professor Thomas Polger at U. of Cincinnati, Oxford University Press, 2016) as well as articles in The Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research examine these issues. His interests in philosophy of psychology include topics in computational theories of vision, evolutionary psychology, and embodied cognition. He’s published numerous articles on these topics in journals such as The Philosophical Review, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, and Philosophy of Science. His book, Embodied Cognition (Routledge Press, 2011), received the American Philosophical Association's Joseph B. Gittler Award for best book in philosophy of the social sciences (2013). His recent interest in philosophy of religion resulted in The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural is Unjustified (Columbia University Press, 2016).

• Slate - http://www.slate.com/bigideas/are-miracles-possible/essays-and-opinions/larry-shapiro-opinion

  THE IRRATIONALITY OF BELIEF IN MIRACLES

  Larry Shapiro is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin.
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  Consider one of the “big” miracles, by which I mean those that require divine intervention. Events that are simply awe-inspiring or marvelous—like the “miracle” of childbirth or the Miracle on Ice—don’t count. Instead, consider examples such as Jesus rising from the dead or turning water into wine; Moses parting the Red Sea; a trace of oil burning for eight nights. Events like these require divine intervention because, presumably, without such intervention the natural laws according to which the universe marches would have prevented them from happening.
  Take Jesus’ resurrection. Given how nature works, dead people stay that way. It didn’t have to be that way. Just as the freezing temperature of water might have been 34º F rather than 32º F, maybe one in ten dead could have “naturally” come back to life. But, water does freeze at 32º F, and dead people stay dead (barring unforeseen medical advances that certainly were not available 2000 years ago). That’s why, if Jesus really did return to life, something must have intervened to block the otherwise inevitable march of natural laws.
  Now ask yourself whether you should believe in the miracle you’ve chosen. “Should believe,” is ambiguous, and in the present context I have in mind something specific. The “should” is the one of rationality. Should you, insofar as you’re sensitive to reasoning and evidence, believe it? Other kinds of “should” don’t interest me. So, should you believe in the miracle because you have faith that such a thing occurred? Or, should you believe in the miracle because doing so makes you a respected member of your religious community or increases your chance of going to heaven? These are not my questions. Rather, my question is: does the available evidence make your belief in the miracle rational?
  Back to Jesus’ resurrection. Here’s a framework for evaluating whether belief in such a miracle is rational, which I steal shamelessly from the great Scottish polymath David Hume (1711-1776). You must ask which of the two following propositions to believe:
  (1) The sources that describe the miracle told the truth and the miracle really happened;
  (2) The sources that describe the miracle erred and the miracle did not really happen.
  My claim is that, for any miracle you think about, (2) will always have a higher probability than (1). This means that what you’re justified in believing—what it’s rational for you to believe—is that the miracle did not occur. But how is one to decide between these two propositions? Interestingly, a rational decision depends on a rather surprising and often neglected fact. A parallel case will help illuminate this fact.
  Suppose there is a public health campaign to screen the entire American population for a very serious disease. You submit to the test, and your blood work indicates that you have the condition. The bad news is that, untreated, the disease is almost always fatal. The good news is that the cure is always successful, but it could cause debilitating side effects. Do you want the cure?
  An obvious question to ask your doctor is: “How reliable is the test that indicated the presence of the disease?” Before making your decision, you want to know which of the two following propositions to believe:
  (1) The test told the truth, and you really have the disease;
  (2) The test erred, and you don’t really have the disease.
  Understanding your concern, your doctor tells you that the test has never failed to detect the disease in those patients who have had it. As far as anyone knows, it’s perfect in that respect. (Epidemiologists would say that the test has a sensitivity of 100%.) However, it does sometimes give a false positive result. That is, about once in a thousand cases, it misdiagnoses a healthy person as being sick. (Epidemiologists would say that the test has a specificity of 99.9%.) Do you take the cure?
  Now for the surprising and neglected fact: You still don’t have all the information you need to make a choice. The missing piece concerns the prevalence of the disease, which is the proportion of the disease in the general population. Suppose that the illness occurs in only 1 in 10,000 members of the population. This means that of 300 million Americans, only 30,000 have the disease. Because the test always detects the disease in those who actually have it, the test would give a positive result in each of these 30,000 people and no false negatives.
  However, the test errs once in a thousand times with respect to healthy people. Of the 299,970,000 healthy Americans, it will correctly identify 299,670,030 as being healthy, but it will also provide false positives for 299,970 people. These people don’t actually have the disease, but the test incorrectly said they did. (See diagram.)
  Sick PeoplePredictive ValuePredictive ValueTest: Positive30,000299,9709.1%Test: Negative0299,670,030Totals30,000299,970,000

  As shown, if every American were tested, we would find that the predictive value of a positive test is merely 9.1%. In other words, a positive test result means you have roughly a 1 in 10 chance of actually having the disease. It is much more likely that the test erred, and you don’t really have the disease.
  Back to miracles. Even granting the tremendous reliability of the witnesses to Jesus’ resurrection, the case for accepting their account is very weak. How many people return from the dead? It must be very low, far less than the number of people who have the serious disease in our analogy. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that God resurrects one in a billion people. This means that even if the witnesses to the resurrection were incredibly reliable (perhaps they misidentify non-miraculous events as miraculous only one in a million times), the chance that they were correct about Jesus’ resurrection would be only one in a thousand.
  To summarize, the extreme rarity of divine interventions works against the rationality of believing in them. What about other very rare events, such as winning lottery tickets or perfect bridge hands? Are we never justified in believing in these things? Of course we are, but this is because, in the case of the lottery, we know independently that one ticket or another must win; in the case of the perfect bridge hand, we know that it is no less likely than any other bridge hand. And, in both cases, we might ask for corroborating evidence. Miracles differ from other rare events in each of these respects.
  However, my argument does not show that belief in miracles is never rational. Just as receiving numerous positive test results for a disease would raise the probability that you really are sick, numerous independent witnesses testifying to the same miracle would increase the probability that it really occurred. Alas, we lack numerous independent accounts in the case of biblical miracles. Therefore, though miracles might be possible, belief in them is irrational.
  Larry Shapiro is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin.

Shapiro, Larry. The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified
James Wetherbee
Library Journal. 141.16 (Oct. 1, 2016): p84.
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Shapiro, Larry. The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified. Columbia Univ. Sept. 2016.208p. notes, index. ISBN 9780231178402. $27.95; ebk. ISBN 9780231542142. PHIL

Shapiro's (philosophy, Univ. Wisconsin-Madison; The Mind Incarnate) aim here is quite precise. It is not to show that miracles never happened, or that we do not know that they ever occurred, but that we are not justified in believing there has ever been a miracle. He begins by defining miracles (a highly improbable event caused by supernatural agency) and justification (something that increases the probability that a belief is true) and then proceeds to argue that the existence of highly improbable occasions cannot be used to point to any supernatural agency because any natural explanation is at least as good. Shapiro follows this with an argument reminiscent of David Hume's, that the evidence for anything that might count as a miracle must be all but overwhelming in order to justify its assent. Finally, the author makes the case that the evidence for miracles (in particular the Resurrection of Jesus) is not only not overwhelming but dubious. Because he does not handle the New Testament material as carefully as he might, Shapiro needlessly overstates this final point. VERDICT Shapiro makes a clear argument, which allows us--believers or not--to examine critically our own positions.--James Wetherbee, Wingate Univ. Libs., NC

• Publishers Weekly
  http://www.publishersweekly.com/978-0-231-17840-2
  Word count: 242

  The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified

  Lawrence Shapiro. Columbia Univ., $27.95 (208p) ISBN 978-0-231-17840-2

  The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified
  BUY THIS BOOK
  Shapiro (Embodied Cognition), a philosophy professor at University of Wisconsin-Madison, argues that there are not sufficient reasons for anyone to believe in miracles. Defining miracles as extremely improbable events with a supernatural cause, he lays out two trajectories of careful logic to refute faith in them. First, he shows briefly that seeing supernatural causes requires assumptions that cannot rule out other nondivine interventions. Second, the improbable nature of miracles heightens the requirements for proof. He builds these arguments through stories of improbable events that he claims most people view as absurd (a talking frog in India, alien abductions, and the revelation of the Book of Mormon) before applying the same scrutiny to Jesus’s resurrection. Shapiro admits that miracles might have occurred, but he seems convinced that his work will cause even the firmest believers to doubt and reorganize their lives along more rational lines. His self-satisfaction might alienate some readers, but the explanations for his claims (especially on the nature of historical proof) are clear and readable. For those opposed to miracles, he offers a logically consistent line of argument. For believers, his reliance on purely logical approaches is unlikely to shake conviction. (Sept.)

• Metapsychology
  http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=3555
  Word count: 2327

  Review - The Mind Incarnate
  by Lawrence A. Shapiro
  MIT Press, 2005
  Review by Elisabetta Sirgiovanni, Ph.D.
  Mar 20th 2007 (Volume 11, Issue 12)
  In this book, Lawrence Shapiro confronts an issue that is commonly acknowledged as one of the most significant metaphysical question in philosophy: the mind-body problem.

  In an agreement with contemporary naturalistic approaches, he does not share the famous Cartesian dogma on mind that Gilbert Ryle labelled as the "Ghost in the Machine". Nevertheless, by testing two of the main approaches about the mind-brain relationship (the multiple realizability thesis and the separability thesis), he aims to show that the "ghost" dualist conception survives in these apparently physicalist conceptions.

  The two hypotheses are treated as empirical and evaluated in terms of relative likelihood. In fact, Shapiro joins scientific works to philosophical analysis to tighten the tether between minds and bodies in order to test the degree of support the evidence provides for each hypothesis. Each hypothesis is then tested against a competitor. The multiple realizability thesis (MRT) is analysed against what he calls mental constraints thesis (MCT), which states that there are few ways to realize the mind. The separability thesis (ST) is tested against the embodied mind thesis (EMT), which states that bodies are more thoroughly integrated with minds than is typically acknowledged.

  The basic idea of this book is that hypotheses on mind make predictions about what we can predict about the brain (the mind's realizer) and the body (the mind's container). Shapiro tries to show that, if MRT and ST are true, it is not possible to predict, from a description of the mind's capacities, what properties the mind's realizer and container must possess. But if MCT and EMT are true, as he thinks, there will be few ways to realize a humanlike mind.

  The first chapter is dedicated to multiple realizability and considers why philosophers have invested in this thesis, its scope, and conceptual and empirical arguments in its support. A general introduction to the discussion that will take place in other chapters is given.

  MRT for minds is "the thesis that a mind with this uniquely human psychological profile can be built in distinct ways" (p.1). This is an obvious idea, according to Shapiro, for things other than minds (watches, corkscrews).

  Shapiro describes the origin of such a thesis as ideological in a certain sense. First, some philosophers claim that MRT has profound implications for the relationship between biology and physics (Kitcher, Rosenberg). Second, MRT introduces the token-identity theory as a theory in the middle between extreme dualism and radical-type identity theory. Third, it is conceived as offering salvation from the possibility of intertheoretic reduction, thus allowing the autonomy of psychology (Fodor). But except for these ideological reasons, no theoretical reasons seem to arise from Shapiro's reflections.

  Shapiro explores the possibilities of building a humanlike mind: the nomological or physical possibility (laws of nature), the logical possibility (logical truth) and the circumstantial or historical possibility (that is, the importance of initial conditions in predictions of what can happen). From Shapiro's analysis it emerges that the circumstantial or historical possibility is the most interesting amongst them.

  He examines conceptual arguments for MRT, the Turing Machine Functionalism and the Functional Analysis Functionalism.

  In the first case, he thinks that the popular analogy traced by Putnam between human minds and Turing machines is not an empirical hypothesis, as Putnam thinks. It is impossible to imagine evidence that might bear on this question. Moreover, this analogy suffers from at least two shortcomings: first, it might not to be testable within our lifetimes and maybe ever, and second, our experience with such systems suggests that it is false.

  The emergent idea is that MRT arose first as an objection to strict materialism and radical identity theory. Nevertheless, firstly, functionalism is not incompatible with dualism in its own right. Secondly, Putnam's concept of functional isomorphism (correspondence between the states of one system and the states of the other that preserves functional relations) is an unlikely hypothesis because all systems functionally isomorphic to mind would be classified as minds.

  The Functional Analysis Functionalism, offered by Fodor, is intended as much richer in a teleological sense: functions are contributions towards a goal that becomes apparent in the course of a functional analysis of a system. MRT is conceived in this case as a consequence: if various physical kinds can all exhibit the same characteristic activity, then mind as a goal-directed system is likely to be multiply realizable. Nevertheless Shapiro finds a gap. He shows that there are cases in which a functional description may apply only to a single kind of physical object. And, furthermore, that Fodorian Functionalism seems to explore only the logical possibility of MRT, which is the less interesting.

  Among empirical arguments for MRT, Shapiro examines Putnam's empirical argument about pain, which induced him to refuse type-identity theory, and general empirical considerations proposed by Block and Fodor. Putnam's argument seems likely. It is obviously ambitious to affirm that pain has one and the same physical correlate in terrestrial and (conceivable) extraterrestrial brains. Nevertheless, even though it is a good argument against type-identity theory, it supports all kinds of functionalism. Moreover Shapiro thinks that the argument is not as strong. We don't know if brains of mammals, reptiles and so on are or not relevantly different. What we need is empirical investigation.

  Shapiro is right in thinking that at present empirical considerations are not conclusive. We have a plastic structure of the brain and convergent evolution of traits in distinct species, but we do not share a definition of "realized" or a distinction between sameness and difference in realization. And we have to admit, following Shapiro, that in thirty years AI could not build a machine psychologically similar but physiologically different.

  The second chapter examines philosophical ideas on realization by the means of an accurate philosophical analysis of concepts used in the debate. Shapiro proposes his own conception to distinguish how two structures can be conceived as the same or distinct realizations of a single kind.

  An interesting distinction between realization and causation is proposed. Realization is a synchronic relation between the realized kind and its realizer, while causation is a diachronic relation. The realizer, he says, determines that which it realizes.

  Two standard views of realization are examined and rejected because they cannot accommodate illustrations of realization that appear in the sciences.

  What Shapiro suggests is the use of R-properties to decide whether two realizations of a kind ought to count as two different kinds of realization. R-properties is a label for those properties of realizations whose differences suffice to explain realizations. In his opinion, R-properties are those that make a causal contribution to relevant functional capacities, assuming a weak conception of function that he takes from Cummins (1975). The R-properties of a realization are those in virtue of which the realization is able to achieve that capacity which makes it realize the functional kind that it does.

  What Shapiro tries to show in this chapter is that, if this idea of R-properties is reasonable, then the empirical evidence for MRT (as neural plasticity) are not decisive.

  Chapter three deals with constraints on the mind, nervous system and body. The importance of a discussion on constraints is in how they impose themselves on a system and limit the variation that the system can exhibit. The thesis explored in this chapter is the thesis that competes with MRT, MCT, namely the possibility to infer facts about nervous systems from facts about psychology. By the use of the mathematical construct of morphospace, Shapiro remarks that MRT and MCT (the mental constraint thesis, according to which minds are not multiply realizable) must be intended not as precise doctrines, but as different ends on a continuum.

  The main question is what kind of structures are needed for the performance of a function. The presence of constraints, in fact, allows predictions from structure to function.

  The constraints Shapiro suggests as common properties of humanlike mind are historical constraints. The distinction between universal and historical constraints corresponds to the distinction traced in the first chapter between nomological and circumstantial possibility. That is, the distinction between laws of nature versus features acquired by evolution. Again here the main focus is the plausibility of terrestrial MRT and therefore Shapiro is interested in constraints that explain what must have happened for things to be as they are now (even if in some occasions some universal constraints of humanlike minds are suggested). As examples of how universal and historical constraints impose a limit on the number of structures that can possibly produce some function Shapiro proposes mammalian homeostasis and image-forming eyes. At the end, he shows how some traits in various species are convergent, that is, the fact that selection has caused unrelated species to converge on a similar solution to some problem. Convergence makes the multiple realizability thesis less likely than alternatives.

  The fourth chapter musters evidence from neuroscience and brain evolution in order to compare the

  likelihoods of the multiple realizability thesis and the mental constraint thesis. In this chapter, Shapiro considers various constraints on the brain design. The presence of brain constraints seems to support the claim for MCT. Again, he uses evolutionary convergence as a source of evidence. He discusses sensory systems, sensory topographical organisation, brain wiring, brain components, myelin and trends in brain evolution. He tries to show that constraints, against MRT, allows predictions about the properties of the organs that realizes a humanlike mind.

  The fifth chapter challenges the possibility of multiple realization for the prospect of intertheoretic reduction and tries to show that the issues of autonomy of mental is not so strictly linked to realizability thesis as many philosophers claim. He presents Fodor's argument against the tenability of both bridge laws and laws from which higher-level laws can be derived. The argument, according to Shapiro, displays an exegetical misunderstanding of positions that propose reduction. Shapiro thinks that unitary science is a more attractive prospect and that reduction does not necessarily conflict with autonomy of the special sciences.

  In the sixth chapter, Shapiro considers the separability thesis via two trends in cognitive science: body neutrality and envatment. ST is the thesis according to which "from knowledge of mental properties it is impossible to predict properties of the body" (p. 167). He shows how evidence about body neutrality and envatment might present a difficulty for ST and support for EMT. He then concludes that investigation of the mind would reveal much about the body.

  In the seventh chapter, he illustrates the various forms of embodiment and its three main claims (embodied thought, embodied conceptualization and extended mind). What he aims to show is that the body is profoundly involved in mental operations. This claim concerns not only how the mind does what it does (how it perceives, attends, recognizes, reasons, and so on), but also the content of what is thought. To explain how the body influences what we think he proposes a broad section on three branches of research. He discusses the Turing test, metaphor and language. In the end, he suggests that mind conception is extended beyond brains and body. Therefore, he seems to say that, if it is possible to predict properties of the brain and mind from the knowledge of mental properties, it is also possible to predict properties of the world.

  In the last short chapter the author offers conclusions and suggestions. He concludes that the questions he has been considering, which remain open, might be answered by further empirical research.

  To conclude, The Mind Incarnate is a very complex and technical philosophical text. It explores in detail metaphysical and epistemological issues from conceptual and empirical perspectives, by the means of a careful philosophical discussion. This heavily theoretical book is surely not for a general public, but it is directed to scientists and philosophers. It is perfectly in line with the contemporary popular approach of embodiment in cognition and it is directed to thinkers who accept the challenge of reconsidering pervasive assumptions about mind as naturalized descendants of the Cartesian dogma of the "Ghost in the Machine".

  Each chapter is significantly rich of philosophical arguments, references, and makes much use of empirical data. Nevertheless, although the book is rich in its explanations, it seems obscure in some passages. Moreover, although it uses a lot of empirical data, the discussion often appears more evocative than convincing. Firstly, the link between MRT and ST is not clear. He claims the former entails the latter, but nowhere offers any clear argument for this. Secondly, Shapiro seems to treat ST as a metaphysical thesis, while it is only a claim on how the mind should be described. The claim that the properties of the mind can be investigated in isolation from those of the body does not coincide with the claim that the mind is like the occupant of a house. That is, the disembodied description of mind does not entail the disembodied conception of mind. The former is an epistemological claim, while the latter is a metaphysical one.

  However, even though this book is not conclusive and seems to have these faults, it is a critical contribution to the contemporary debate on mind-body problem. It scours a variety of fields and its strength is in exploring the question as an empirical matter. What is surely remarkable is Shapiro's effort to link body and mind in a much closer way than classical cognitive science has done so far.

  © 2007 Elisabetta Sirgiovanni

  Elisabetta Sirgiovanni, Ph.D. in Cognitive Science, University of Siena, Siena, Italy.

• Essays in Philosophy
  http://commons.pacificu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1178&context=eip
  Word count: 3041

  1-2005Review of “The Mind Incarnate”Gregory D. GilsonUniversity of Texas-Pan AmericanFollow this and additional works at:http://commons.pacificu.edu/eipPart of thePhilosophy CommonsEssays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 |http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/Recommended CitationGilson, Gregory D. (2005) "Review of “The Mind Incarnate”,"Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 8.
  Essays in Philosophyfile:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/gilsonrev.html[9/18/2009 5:08:02 PM]Essays in PhilosophyA Biannual JournalVol. 6, No. 1, January 2005Book ReviewThe Mind Incarnate, by Lawrence ShapiroMIT Press, 2004 253 Total Pages, Preface 8 pages, Index. ISBN 0-262-19496-1.Lawrence Shapiro begins his book The Mind Incarnate by lamenting the fact that Ryle’s ‘ghost in themachine’ has survived the naturalist transformation that has occurred in the philosophy of mind. Despitethe general abandonment of traditional Cartesian dualism, philosophers of mind continue to investigateproperties of the mind and the mental without regard to the physical realization of those properties in thebrain. According to Shapiro, the ghost conception of the mind survives the death of dualism via themultiple realizability thesis (MRT) and the separability thesis (ST). The MRT is the claim that thevarious cognitive capacities of the human mind might be realized in any number of physical kinds ofbrains. The ST is not a synchronic claim about realizability but a claim about the diachronic relation thatexists between the mind and the body. Specifically, it’s the claim that the mind or the brain that realizesthe mind can be partitioned off (causally) from the rest of the body. As a result of this alleged causalseparation, ST maintains that virtually any physiology might accommodate any brain type. In oppositionto MRT and ST, Shapiro offers the mental constraint thesis (MCT) and the embodied mind thesis(EMT). The MCT maintains that because of physical and historical constraints on evolution, brains thatrealize the capacities of human minds are not likely to be multiply realizable. Further, the EMT claimsthat minds with humanlike capacities are causally related to bodies in multifarious ways and thereforelargely determine the anatomy and physiology of the bodies they inhabit. Science fiction notwithstanding,any organism with the mental capacities of a human is very likely to have a humanlike brain and ahumanlike body.Strictly speaking, MCT does not logically entail EMT nor does MRT entail ST. Nevertheless it isalmost certainly true that if the MCT is true ST is false and if MRT is true EMT is false. If thereare many types of brains that might realize a human mind, it is unlikely that there will only be onetype of human body that could accommodate those brains. Likewise, if it turns out that theconstraints on how a brain that can give rise to human consciousness might evolve are so severethat we can predict significant brain structure based solely on mental function, it seems likely thatsimilar constraints will determine the body’s physiology more generally. As a result I shall followShapiro’s lead and proceed as though the pairs of theories (MRT/ST and MCT/EMT) go togetherand compete with one another.The point of departure for Shapiro is that MRT/ST is an empirical rather than logical claim. Theclaim is not merely the logical possibility of MRT/ST but rather that it is nomonologically possiblefor a mind with human capacities to be realized in any number of physical kinds of brains and
  Essays in Philosophyfile:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/gilsonrev.html[9/18/2009 5:08:02 PM]housed in many different kinds of anatomical bodies. Shapiro’s empirical argument is stated interms of likelihood. Specifically, he claims that the observation of evolutionary convergence showsit to be more likely that MCT/EMT is true rather than MRT /ST. All this requires some explanationbecause evolutionary convergence has been taken by Ned Block, Jerry Fodor and others to supportMRT. Likelihood is the degree to which an observation supports a specific thesis. Thus likelihood,unlike probability, is based on the relation between a particular observation and an explanation ofthe observation.Specifically, the hypothesis that provides a better explanation of the observation is more likely true.In this case, the observation is evolutionary convergence and the two competing hypothesis areMRT/ST and MCT/EMT. Evolutionary convergence occurs when two distinct species, fromindependent lineages, evolve a similar trait. In other words, the same trait evolves independently,multiple times. A famous example of convergence is vision. Vision has evolved independently in anumber of different species. Now if one takes each instance of an independently evolved trait to bea distinct realization, the fact of convergence seems to suggest MRT/ST over MCT/EMT. HoweverShapiro shows this line of thinking to be a mistake. In order to explain why this is a mistake I firstneed to explain Shapiro’s account of multiple realizability. One of the significant accomplishmentsof The Mind Incarnate is to provide a way of distinguishing significant from trivial cases ofmultiple realizability. According to Shapiro, a functional kind is multiply realized in a significantsense if its various realizations differ with respect to those properties that make a causalcontribution to its being classified as being a member of that kind. Thus silver and gold watches aretrivial whereas digital and analogue are significant cases of multiple realization of the functionalkind watch. Whereas the former difference has nothing to do with being classified as a watch,quartz crystals and gear–spring mechanisms are significantly different ways of accomplishing thesame task or achieving the same function of ‘portable timepiece’. Shapiro refers to the propertiesthat play a causal role in the realization of an object’s function as R-properties.A realization is distinct only when it differs with regard to its R-properties. Thus compound andcamera eyes count as different realizations of vision, whereas camera eyes that differ merely in theirmolecular or chemical properties do not. It should now be clear why Shapiro thinks it is a mistaketo think that each instance of an independently evolved trait is a distinct realization of that trait.Take a very simple example of evolutionary convergence: the torpedo shape of the shark and thedolphin. It is true that the torpedo shape of these animals is not the result of a common ancestor butrather the result of independent evolution in response to similar selection pressure. Nevertheless thisdoes not count as a significant case of multiple realizability because the only difference between therealizations of the torpedo shape in the two animals is the material—cartilage in the shark and bonein the dolphin—that supports this shape. The convergence on the torpedo shape is thus betterexplained by the constraints on any evolutionary solution to selection pressure rather than themultiple-realizability of a particular trait. In this case it’s the fact that only the torpedo shape canaccommodate the hydrodynamics of quick and efficient swimming that explains why both the sharkand the dolphin have independently evolved the same shape.Shapiro shows that many cases of convergence are not, in fact, significant cases of multiplerealizability but rather cases where evolutionary constraints have produced traits that are identical interms of their R-properties. As a result, the observation of convergence in these cases shows theMCT to be a better explanation (and therefore more likely true) than the MRT. After all, it would
  Essays in Philosophyfile:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/gilsonrev.html[9/18/2009 5:08:02 PM]be surprising if different species independently evolved the same realizations of a given trait (thesame R-properties) if that trait were vastly multiply realizable. On the other hand, convergence isnot at all surprising if universal and historical constraints explain why traits are realized in particularways. Shapiro further shows that even in the cases of genuine multiple realizability, it is often thecase that the number of realizations is fixed (and thus can be predicted) by the physical andhistorical constraints of the situation. Again, vision is a prime example. The science of opticspredicts that there are roughly five solutions to the problem of forming an image of light reflectingobjects—exactly the number of significantly different realizations of vision found in nature.We are now ready to turn to the case of the humanlike mind; to ask whether the human mind ismultiply realizable. One thing the torpedo shape of the shark and the dolphin show is that a brainsimply made of different material—say silicone—would not automatically count as a differentrealization. To count as a different realization, the brain would have to differ in regard to its R-properties—in this case the mechanisms whereby human cognitive capacities are realized. Thus inorder to determine this, one ought to look at the different (independently evolved) realizations ofthe humanlike mind and determine whether they differ in regard to their R-properties. The problemwith this, of course, is that we only have the one case—the human brain. Thus Shapiro suggeststhat we look to features of the human brain that are shared by other kinds of independently evolvedbrains. He then looks to see whether these convergences are better explained by MCT or MRT.In his evaluation of whether the human mind is multiply realizable, Shapiro focuses on whether oursensory and perceptual capacities significantly determine brain structure. He focuses on these lowerlevel mental capacities for two reasons. First, it is these capacities that are shared by otherorganisms. Second, not enough is known about how the brain realizes propositional attitudes suchas beliefs and desires. Shapiro’s strategy is to look for examples of convergence in the brains ofdifferent independently evolved organisms that realize these perceptual capacities. He then examineswhether these convergences are better explained by MRT or MCT. Specifically, Shapiro examinesour capacity to determine the intensity and detail of visual, tactile and auditory stimuli. He discoversthat all brains capable of humanlike sensible discrimination must have very specific types ofreceptor fields that significantly determine brain structure. Brain structure is further determined byuniversal constraints that require specific topographical maps to accommodate these receptor fields.Further constraints on the relation between conductivity and diameter of cables place severeconstraints on brain wiring. These constraints in turn lead to the necessary modularity of any brainthat realizes humanlike perceptual capacities.All of this strongly supports MCT over MRT. Shapiro has demonstrated how our particularperceptual capacities determine significant structural features of the brain. This allows us to predictthat any organism with humanlike perceptual capacities will have a brain that is significantly similarin structure to a human brain. MRT says that mental function tells us nothing about brain structure.MCT claims the opposite. The fact that we can predict brain structure from mental function showsMCT to be a better explanation (more likely true) than MRT in regard to humanlike mentalcapacities.Shapiro’s argument for MRT/EMT is remarkably clear, convincing and well articulated. Still, itseems to me that at least some advocates of MRT in the context of the human mind will be leftfeeling cold, as though the spirit of their proposal is left untouched. My first comment may seem tobe little more than a quibble, but I think it ultimately leads to an important objection to Shapiro’s
  Essays in Philosophyfile:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/gilsonrev.html[9/18/2009 5:08:02 PM]main claim—his complaint about the survival of Ryle’s ghost in the philosophy of mind. In thesection entitled: Conceptual Arguments for the Multiple Realizability Thesis, Shapiro suggests thatMRT is the conclusion that has been (in his view, incorrectly) drawn from the functional stateidentity theory of the mind.“Multiple realizability seems to follow quite naturally and immediately from the suggestionthat mental states are Turing Machine functional states” (Shapiro; The Mind Incarnate, 15).“Multiple Realizability follows as a consequence of the fact that structures that differ inphysical description may play the same contributing role in systems of which they are parts.”(Shapiro; The Mind Incarnate, 21)But this seems to get things the wrong way round. Its not that multiple realizability follows fromthe suggestion that mental states are functional states (Turing machine states or not) but rather thatthe possibility (plausibility?) of multiple realizability of at least some mental states motivates theresearch strategy of adopting topic neutral versions of functionalism. As long as multiplerealizability remains plausible, there is no reason to limit mental models (functional or otherwise) tothose that parallel human brain physiology. Consider what Block and Fodor say in summary of thereasons to reject both physicalism and behaviorism and to adopt functionalism as a researchstrategy:“What these arguments seem to show is that the conditions that behaviorism and physicalismseek to place upon the type identity of psychological states of organisms are, in a relevantsense, insufficiently abstract. ...Of course it is possible that the type-to-type correspondences,required by behaviorism and physicalism should turn out to obtain. The present point is thateven if behavioral or physical states are in a one-to-one correspondence with psychologicalstates, we have no current evidence that this is so; hence we have no warrant for adoptingphilosophical theories which require that it be so.” (Block and Fodor; “What PsychologicalStates are Not” Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology Vol. 1, 238).One might surmise that Shapiro has taken up this challenge. He has provided empirical evidencethat suggests there are reasons for thinking MRT to be false with regard to at least some humanmental capacities. As a result philosophers of mind in general and functionalists in particular wouldbe well advised to pay close attention to the physical constraints that determine evolutionary braindevelopment. More specifically, Shapiro seems to be suggesting what is sometimes called afunctional specification version of physicalism in regard to mind. But what kind of evidence has heoffered? In particular, is it the kind of evidence that should persuade someone attracted to afunctional approach to psychological explanation? It seems to me that he has not.The question of whether the direction of argument is from functionalism to MRT or from MRT tofunctionalism is significant. Putting it the way Shapiro does (from functionalism to MRT)mischaracterizes some of the most attractive aspects of functionalism. For example, functionalismallows us to abstract from or de-emphasize the importance of realization and focus on analyzinggeneral, teleological capacities into conceptually simpler non-teleological capacities. Consider thecommonly used example of digestion. It’s not as though people take the fact that digestion can becharacterized functionally that makes people think it’s multiply realizable. Rather it is the obviousmultiple realizability of this capacity that motivates people to discuss it as a teleological system
  Essays in Philosophyfile:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/gilsonrev.html[9/18/2009 5:08:02 PM]abstracted from any particular physical realization.Shapiro tells us that by the “mind” he means something like the collection of mental capacities thatconstitute the distinctively human psychological profile (Lawrence Shapiro; The Mind Incarnate,70-1). He specifically cites memory, attention, language use and perception. In his argument forMCT, however, Shapiro focuses exclusively on the more peripheral aspects of the mind such asperception and the types of brain states that are required to realize the specific perceptual capacitiesthat we have as human beings. He does this because they are the only aspects of the mind aboutwhose realization we have even the most basic understanding. Shapiro is quite explicit about this:“I have said nothing so far about the states of the mind that have perhaps received most noticein contemporary philosophy of mind. These are the so called folk psychological states, that is,beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes. ... If the current state of knowledge about agiven mental capacity contains little or no information about how it might be realized, then itseems hardly worth discussing the possibility of its multiple realizability. To date there issimply not enough known about how propositional attitudes might be realized. Indeed, anumber of prominent philosophers believe that folk psychological states attributed to a subjectdo not correspond in any interesting way to structures in the subject’s brain.” (Shapiro; TheMind Incarnate, 70)It’s interesting to note that the prominent philosophers he cites here are Churchland, Dennett andStitch—all eliminativists about propositional attitudes.What Shapiro says about the realization of propositional attitudes is obviously true—no one has anyidea how these might be realized. In fact it seems likely that they will never be realized in the sensethat the physicalist has in mind. Consider the fact that a functional specification version ofphysicalism will never be able to deal with Putnam’s famous twin earth examples involving narrowbelief states. Another example of the implausibility of higher level mental states having straight-forward realizations conditions in the brain is expressed by Arthur Collins’ master argument(Collins, The Nature of Mental Things). This argument appears to establish that attributed beliefscannot be identified with any physical state of an organism. Jonathon Dancy uses Collins’ result toargue that motivating reasons cannot be states of the agent. (Dancy, Practical Reality, 108-12). Butsurely eliminating the ‘folk psychological’ concepts of belief and motivating reasons from thephilosophy of mind isn’t the only available response. Further, its not just propositional attitudes,but much simpler cognitive states, that have realization troubles. Consider singular thought. It seemsclear that we will never be able to explain the difference between general and singular thought byappeal to brain states alone. At the very least we haven’t a clue how to go about it, but we do havesome good ideas once we abandon the mind-brain identity thesis. An even more obvious problemfor the mind-brain identity thesis is the realization of colors and qualia.The general point that I am trying to make is that our very limited knowledge of how mental statesand capacities are physically realized in the brain makes the question of multiple realizabilitylargely irrelevant to the vast majority of issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. Until we havesome idea of how these mental capacities are realized by the brain (or even whether speaking aboutrealization in the brain makes sense in reference to these capacities) we should not, to echo Blockand Fodor, adopt only theories of the mind that speak in terms of properties of the brain. I need tobe perfectly clear here. Shapiro never makes bold statements or predictions about the realization of
  Essays in Philosophyfile:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/gilsonrev.html[9/18/2009 5:08:02 PM]these sophisticated mental capacities. He never overstates his conclusion. Nevertheless, it does seemclear that that Shapiro seems ghosts in any attempt to investigate properties of the mindindependently of those of the body and brain. According to these criteria, most of the workcurrently being done in the philosophy of mind is a paranormal adventure.Gregory D. GilsonUniversity of Texas-Pan American

• Notes from Two Scientific Psychologists
  http://psychsciencenotes.blogspot.com/2012/07/embodied-cognition-by-lawrence-shapiro.html
  Word count: 1123

  FRIDAY, 27 JULY 2012
  'Embodied Cognition', by Lawrence Shapiro

  'Embodied Cognition', by philosopher Lawrence Shapiro, is not a book advocating for any particular brand of embodiment. Instead, Shapiro has performed an invaluable service and written an overview of the current state-of-the-art in embodied cognition. The book is thorough, even-handed, and not afraid to highlight key successes and failures of embodied cognition's attempts to take over the world of cognitive science.

  Shapiro was recently featured on a Brain Science Podcast which is well worth a listen. He can be found online at his website.

  Shapiro starts out with a description of what standard cognitive science is, so that we can evaluate theories that claim to compete with it. He identifies that the standard approach is computational, and that mental processes do their work by manipulating symbols with algorithms that take perception as input and output behaviour. He then briefly summarises the two main challengers to this account of cognition, Gibson's ecological psychology and connectionism. Gibson worked hard (and successfully) to demonstrate that much of the work of visual perception is not done 'in the head', while connectionism showed how to solve cognitive problems with non-symbolic, distributed systems. Shapiro treats these as the first real attempts to answer the question, 'if not symbolic representation, then what else could it be?', and the basic insights from these programmes are spread throughout embodied cognition

  Shapiro then splits current approaches to embodiment into three streams: the Conceptualisation hypothesis, the Replacement hypothesis, and the Constitution hypothesis. He reviews work in each stream and evaluates each as a challenger to the standard approach separately.

  Conceptualisation
  This is broadly the hypothesis that the way we conceive of the world depends on the form of our bodies. Examples include
  the way we experience colour comes from how our colour detection systems interact with light (Varela, Thomson & Rosch, 1991)
  the way we form and understand the metaphors that ground our conceptualisations is shaped by our bodies (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999)
  the way we understand abstract concepts such as time are grounded in embodied experiences of things such as space (the past is behind, or up; Boroditsky, 2001)
  the meaning of amodal symbols is grounded in model symbols from our perceptual systems (Barselou, 1999; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002).
  In general, Shapiro says, this stream of work does a poor job of competing with the standard approach; many of the empirical results can be readily explained computationally and a lot of the theory hangs on untestable thought experiments about the kinds of concepts spherical beings who live in zero gravity can have.

  Replacement
  Work in this stream claims that computational approaches to cognition are inherently flawed, and should be replaced with dynamical, ecological descriptions. After reviewing the classic example of the Watts steam governor (van Gelder, 1995) Shapiro talks about some of the exemplar research in this area, including
  categorical perception using embodied neural networks (Beer, 2003)
  robotics work (especially the pioneering work from Rodney Brooks (e.g. Brooks 1991)
  He also reviews some common objections, such as the idea that all these systems still include representations. The Replacement hypothesis comes out as a stronger competitor to the standard approach, but only in a limited set of cases so far (the 'dynamics works for perception action but not language' objection). Shapiro is happy to admit that the 'so far' is an important caveat, but is correct that this is the state of the art today.

  Constitution
  This stream is mostly organised around Clark & Chalmers (1998) hypothesis of the extended mind. Work in this area is mostly theoretical and philosophical, and consists of heated arguments about whether things outside the brain are genuinely parts of cognitive processes, or whether they simply cause a cognitive process to happen. The key work reviewed here, besides Andy Clark's book Supersizing the Mind (2008) is
  sensorimotor theories of perceptual experience (O'Regan & Noë, 2001) that claim we experience the world the way we do because we learn the various contingencies between how we move and how perceptual information changes as a result - a ball looks like a ball because it looks a certain way as we move our eyes)
  the role that gesture seems to play in language - not merely augmenting the core meanings of speech, but a key player in communication (e.g. Ehrlich et al, 2006)
  He then also reviews the challenge from Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, that this hypothesis routinely confounds constitution with cause and is thus not the challenger to standard cognitive science Clark claims it is. He concludes that the Constitution hypothesis has a lot going for it, is doing quite well in the face of the onslaught from Adams & Aizawa,but isn't necessarily a challenger to supplant standard cognitive science. There is plenty of room here, he notes, for these approaches to work together.

  Summary
  Overall, this is an excellent resource and a handy reference for a debate that is happening across multiple literatures (in psychology, robotics, philosophy and more). Shapiro provides a clear overview of the state of the art, and is basically correct in his various evaluations of where things stand. This will stand for some time as a key resource, and I would use the hell out of it as a core text for a course on embodied cognition.

  I was also interested to note that the research I typically point to as not-really-embodied-cognition does not feature in this book. At best, this work might fit under the banner of the Conceptualisation hypothesis, which does not come out well as a competitor to the standard approach or even as a workable scientific approach. I'm treating this as another nail in the coffin I'm building for this research.

  A take home note
  I was depressed by one thing in this book: the degree to which vast amounts of embodied cognition work consists of arguing about thought experiments. Does Otto really remember things using his notebook the way Inga does with her brain? Just what would those floating spheres know about 'forwards' or 'up'? What about all those brains in vats and the incredible things scientists can apparently do to them? For the love of science, people, give it up. You end up arguing about the details of things that do not (and possibly can not) exist, rather than the thing we're actually interested in - how cognition is actually implemented in us. Embodied cognition will never get anywhere without working with real systems and figuring out whether they are embodied or extended.

  References
  Shapiro, L. (2011) Embodied Cognition. NY: Routledge Press Amazon.co.uk

• EdTechDev
  https://edtechdev.wordpress.com/2010/10/14/review-of-shapiros-embodied-cognition/
  Word count: 464

  Review of Shapiro’s Embodied Cognition
  Posted on October 14, 2010 by Doug Holton
  I’m giving a talk at AECT in a couple of weeks on embodied cognition and education, as well as working on some related writings (and here are slides from my previous AERA talk on the subject). One related book I recently picked up is Embodied Cognition by Lawrence Shapiro. It’s a brand new book, and I’ve seen some positive reviews of it. It’s supposed to be a balanced perspective on embodied cognition research and theory.

  But I flipped to the few pages on sensorimotor contingency theory (Noe, O’Regan), and Shapiro repeatedly says that a problem for the theory is that it can’t show that a brain in a vat doesn’t have sensory experiences (the “Argument from Envatment”).
  I think even a 3 year old can tell you that a brain in a vat doesn’t have sensory experiences, no more than a head of lettuce.

  This is a clear case of paradigm shifts. Shapiro is trying to talk about one paradigm from the perspective of another, older one (what he asserts is “standard cognitive science”). And according to Shapiro, it is the burden of the new paradigm to “distinguish itself” from the old one and “prove” itself. Take for example his assertion that “the burden that the sensorimotor theory of perception carries is to show that the brain alone is not constitutive of perceptual experience.” He most frequently cites work by Adams and Aizawa, who wrote a book critical of embodied cognition.
  That’s not how paradigm shifts work (see Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions from 1962). We shift to a new paradigm when the old one starts sounding ridiculous (brains in vats), or when the new paradigm is more useful or more parsimonious, or more consistent in its framework and so forth.
  Shapiro’s book takes the traditional point of view on cognition, and of a computer-like, disembodied brain (he himself calls this “standard cognitive science”), and analyzes embodied cognition theories from that viewpoint.
  He keeps using the term “knowledge”, for example, as something in the head that has nothing to do with action or physical experience or the environment. For example a fully paralyzed person is only capable of having “knowledge”, not actually “doing” anything embodied. I think paralyzed people can still try to do things (phantom limb, etc.), and they know how to do things (not to mention they can actually still do many things such as move their eyes and so forth). You can call their attempted actions a mental simulation if you like, but FMR studies show that mental simulation activates the same brain regions as the real actions.