Contemporary Authors

• Transnational Public Goods, Hierarchy Theory, and Supranational Design Social Science Faculty, University of Hawaii, Hilo College (Hilo, HI), 1976
• The Political Economy of Public Goods and International Cooperation University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies (Denver, CO), 1978
• Public Goods and Public Policy Sage (Beverly Hills, CA), 1978
• Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of NATO University of Aberdeen, Department of Political Economy (Aberdeen, Scotland), 1979
• The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 1986
• International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events Iowa State University Press (Ames, IA), 1989
• The Economics of Defence Spending: An International Survey Routledge (New York, NY), 1990
• Collective Action: Theory and Applications University of Michigan Press (Ann Arbor, MI), 1992
• Handbook of Defense Economics Elsevier (New York, NY), 1995
• The Economics of Defense Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 1995
• Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political, and Economic Problems Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 1997
• The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present, and into the 21st Century Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 1999
• The Future of Development Assistance: Common Pools and International Public Goods Overseas Development Council (Washington, DC), 1999
• Economic Concepts for the Social Sciences Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 2001
• On Financing Global and International Public Goods World Bank, Economic Policy and Prospects Group (Washington, DC), 2001
• The Economics of Defence Edward Elgar (Northampton, MA), 2001
• Regional Public Goods Typologies, Provision, Financing, and Development Assistance Expert Group on Development Issues (Stockholm, Sweden), 2002
• The Economics of Conflict Edward Elgar (Northampton, MA), 2003
• Global Collective Action Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 2004
• The Political Economy of Terrorism Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 2006
• Transnational Cooperation: An Issue-based Approach Oxford University Press (New York, NY), 2015

1. Transnational cooperation : an issue-based approach LCCN 2015014989 Type of material Book Personal name Peinhardt, Clint, author. Main title Transnational cooperation : an issue-based approach / Clint Peinhardt and Todd Sandler. Published/Produced New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2015] Description xiv, 336 pages ; 24 cm ISBN 9780199398607 (alk. paper) 9780199398614 (alk. paper) Shelf Location FLM2016 005321 CALL NUMBER JZ1308 .P45 2015 OVERFLOWJ34 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms (FLM2) 2. The political economy of terrorism LCCN 2011015035 Type of material Book Personal name Enders, Walter, 1948- Main title The political economy of terrorism / Walter Enders, Todd Sandler. Edition 2nd ed. Published/Created Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, c2012. Description xvi, 390 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ISBN 9781107004566 (hardback) 9780521181006 (paperback) CALL NUMBER HV6431 .E54 2012 LANDOVR Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 3. The political economy of terrorism LCCN 2005016251 Type of material Book Personal name Enders, Walter, 1948- Main title The political economy of terrorism / Walter Enders, Todd Sandler. Published/Created Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006. Description xiii, 278 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ISBN 0521851009 (hbk.) 0521616506 (pbk.) 9780521851008 (hbk.) 9780521616508 (pbk.) Links Table of contents only http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0514/2005016251.html Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0633/2005016251-d.html Contributor biographical information http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0733/2005016251-b.html CALL NUMBER HV6431 .E54 2006 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER HV6431 .E54 2006 Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms 4. Global collective action LCCN 2004040672 Type of material Book Personal name Sandler, Todd. Main title Global collective action / Todd Sandler. Published/Created Cambridge, England ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2004. Description xiii, 299 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ISBN 0521834775 (cloth) 0521542545 (pbk.) Links Sample text http://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam041/2004040672.html Table of contents http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam041/2004040672.html Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam041/2004040672.html Contributor biographical information http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0733/2004040672-b.html CALL NUMBER JZ1308 .S26 2004 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER JZ1308 .S26 2004 FT MEADE Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 5. The economics of conflict LCCN 2003049437 Type of material Book Main title The economics of conflict / edited by Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley. Published/Created Cheltenham, UK ; Northhampton, MA : Edward Elgar, c2003. Description 3 v. : ill., maps ; 26 cm. ISBN 1840647825 (3 vols.) 9781840647822 (3 vols.) CALL NUMBER HB195 .E347 2003 Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER HB195 .E347 2003 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms 6. The economics of defence LCCN 2001023887 Type of material Book Main title The economics of defence / edited by Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler. Published/Created Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : E. Elgar Pub., c2001. Description 3 v. : ill. ; 26 cm. ISBN 185278945X CALL NUMBER HC79.D4 E266 2001 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER HC79.D4 E266 2001 Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms 7. On financing global and international public goods LCCN 2002615983 Type of material Book Personal name Sandler, Todd. Main title On financing global and international public goods [electronic resource] / by Todd Sandler. Published/Created Washington, D.C. : World Bank, Economic Policy and Prospects Group, 2001. Links http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=2317 CALL NUMBER Electronic resource Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms 8. Economic concepts for the social sciences LCCN 2001025637 Type of material Book Personal name Sandler, Todd. Main title Economic concepts for the social sciences / Todd Sandler. Published/Created Cambridge [U. K.] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2001. Description xiii, 285 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ISBN 0521792622 0521796776 (pbk.) Links Sample text http://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam031/2001025637.html Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam021/2001025637.html Table of contents http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam025/2001025637.html CALL NUMBER HB87 .S234 2001 LANDOVR Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE CALL NUMBER HB87 .S234 2001 LANDOVR Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 9. The future of development assistance : common pools and international public goods LCCN 99037117 Type of material Book Personal name Kanbur, S. M. Ravi Main title The future of development assistance : common pools and international public goods / by Ravi Kanbur and Todd Sandler with Kevin M. Morrison. Published/Created Washington, DC : Overseas Development Council, 1999. Description p. cm. ISBN 1565170261 Links Contributor biographical information http://www.loc.gov/catdir/bios/jhu052/99037117.html Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/jhu052/99037117.html CALL NUMBER HC60 .K273 1999 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER HC60 .K273 1999 Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms 10. The political economy of NATO : past, present, and into the 21st century LCCN 98039564 Type of material Book Personal name Sandler, Todd. Main title The political economy of NATO : past, present, and into the 21st century / Todd Sandler, Keith Hartley. Published/Created Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999. Description xiv, 292 p. ; 24 cm. ISBN 0521630932 (hardback) 0521638801 (pbk.) Links Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam029/98039564.html Table of contents http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam025/98039564.html CALL NUMBER JZ5930 .S26 1999 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER JZ5930 .S26 1999 FT MEADE Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 11. Global challenges : an approach to environmental, political, and economic problems LCCN 96048226 Type of material Book Personal name Sandler, Todd. Main title Global challenges : an approach to environmental, political, and economic problems / Todd Sandler. Published/Created Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press, 1997. Description xvii, 234 p. : ill., maps ; 24 cm. ISBN 0521583071 (hc) 0521587492 (pbk.) Links Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam028/96048226.html Table of contents http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam025/96048226.html CALL NUMBER HD87 .S364 1997 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER HD87 .S364 1997 FT MEADE Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 12. The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods LCCN 95040500 Type of material Book Personal name Cornes, Richard, 1946- Main title The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods / Richard Cornes, Todd Sandler. Edition 2nd ed. Published/Created Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996. Description xix, 590 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ISBN 0521471486 (hc) 0521477182 (pb) Links Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam027/95040500.html Table of contents http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam025/95040500.html CALL NUMBER HB846.3 .C67 1996 LANDOVR Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE CALL NUMBER HB846.3 .C67 1996 LANDOVR Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 13. Handbook of defense economics LCCN 95040584 Type of material Book Main title Handbook of defense economics / edited by Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler. Published/Created Amsterdam ; New York : Elsevier, 1995- Description v. <1 > : ill. ; 25 cm. ISBN 0444818871 (v. 1 : alk. paper) Links Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0601/95040584-d.html Table of contents only http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0601/95040584-t.html CALL NUMBER HB195 .H26 1995 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms 14. The economics of defense LCCN 94026588 Type of material Book Personal name Sandler, Todd. Main title The economics of defense / Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley. Published/Created Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1995. Description xiii, 387 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ISBN 0521442044 0521447283 (pbk.) Links Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam026/94026588.html Table of contents http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam022/94026588.html CALL NUMBER HC110.D4 S26 1995 LANDOVR Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE CALL NUMBER HC110.D4 S26 1995 LANDOVR Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 15. Collective action : theory and applications LCCN 92018908 Type of material Book Personal name Sandler, Todd. Main title Collective action : theory and applications / Todd Sandler. Published/Created Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, c1992. Description xix, 237 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ISBN 0472095013 (alk. paper) 0472065017 (pbk. : alk. paper) CALL NUMBER HB846.5 .S24 1992 Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER HB846.5 .S24 1992 LANDOVR Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 16. The Economics of defence spending : an international survey LCCN 89049513 Type of material Book Main title The Economics of defence spending : an international survey / edited by Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler. Published/Created London ; New York : Routledge, 1990. Description xvi, 285 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ISBN 0415001617 CALL NUMBER UA17 .E26 1990 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms 17. International terrorism in the 1980s : a chronology of events LCCN 88019891 Type of material Book Personal name Mickolus, Edward F. Main title International terrorism in the 1980s : a chronology of events / Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean M. Murdock. Edition 1st ed. Published/Created Ames : Iowa State University Press, 1989. Description 2 v. ; 24 cm. ISBN 0813800242 (v. 1) 0813801729 (v. 2) CALL NUMBER HV6431 .M494 1989 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER HV6431 .M494 1989 Copy 3 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER HV6431 .M494 1989 Alc Copy 2 Request in Reference - Main Reading Room (Jefferson, LJ100) 18. The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods LCCN 85019014 Type of material Book Personal name Cornes, Richard, 1946- Main title The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods / Richard Cornes, Todd Sandler. Published/Created Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1986. Description xii, 303 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ISBN 052130184X 0521317746 (pbk.) Links Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam031/85019014.html CALL NUMBER HB846.3 .C67 1986 Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms Shelf Location FLM2016 067608 CALL NUMBER HB846.3 .C67 1986 OVERFLOWJ34 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms (FLM2) 19. Burden sharing, strategy, and the design of NATO LCCN 80486112 Type of material Book Personal name Sandler, Todd. Main title Burden sharing, strategy, and the design of NATO / [by] Todd Sandler and John F. Forbes. Published/Created [Aberdeen] : University of Aberdeen, Department of Political Economy, [1979] Description [2], 34 leaves ; 30 cm. CALL NUMBER UA646.3 .S33 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms 20. Public goods and public policy LCCN 77017865 Type of material Book Main title Public goods and public policy / edited by William Loehr, Todd Sandler. Published/Created Beverly Hills : Sage Publications, c1978. Description 240 p. : ill. ; 22 cm. ISBN 0803909659 080390939X CALL NUMBER HJ192 .P8 Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER HJ192 .P8 CABIN BRANCH Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 21. The political economy of public goods and international cooperation LCCN 78055185 Type of material Book Personal name Sandler, Todd. Main title The political economy of public goods and international cooperation / by Todd M. Sandler, William Loehr, Jon T. Cauley. Published/Created [Denver] : University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies, c1978. Description xi, 98 p. : graphs ; 24 cm. CALL NUMBER HB99.3 .S26 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER HB99.3 .S26 FT MEADE Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 22. Transnational public goods, hierarchy theory, and supranational design LCCN 77624254 Type of material Book Personal name Sandler, Todd. Main title Transnational public goods, hierarchy theory, and supranational design / by Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley. Published/Created Hilo : Social Science Faculty, University of Hawaii, Hilo College, 1976. Description 51 leaves : ill. ; 26 cm. CALL NUMBER HJ192 .S25 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms

• LOC Authorities -

  LC control no.: n 77012834

  Personal name heading:
  Sandler, Todd

  Found in: Public goods and public policy, 1978 (a.e.) t.p. (Todd
  Sandler) in galley (assoc. prof. of economics, Univ. of
  Wyo., Laramie)
  Cornes, R. The theory of externalities, public ... 1986:
  CIP t.p. (Todd Sandler) data sheet (Sandler, Todd
  Michael; b. 12/16/46)

  ================================================================================

  LIBRARY OF CONGRESS AUTHORITIES
  Library of Congress
  101 Independence Ave., SE
  Washington, DC 20540

  Questions? Contact: ils@loc.gov

• - http://www.utdallas.edu/~tms063000/

  about me

  Todd Sandler researches international political economy, defense, environmental issues, international health concerns, terrorism, and public economics.

  He received his PhD from the State University of New York at Binghamton in 1971. He teaches Honors: Introduction to Game Theory, The Political Economy of Terrorism, Graduate Public Economics, and Intermediate Microeconomics.

  Sandler's research has appeared in leading journals in economics and political science, including the American Political Science Review, the American Economic Review, American Journal of Political Science, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Political Analysis and the Journal of Law and Economics. He has also authored or co-authored twenty-two books.

  He serves on numerous editorial boards, including Global Policy, American Political Science Review, Review of International Organizations, Defence and Peace Economics, and Journal of Conflict Resolution.

  Sandler has served as consultant for the United Nations Development Program, the Overseas Development Council, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Inter-American Development Bank, International Task Force for Global Public Goods, the World Bank, and UNIDO.
  Past Work Experience

  Dockson Professor of International Relations and Economics, University of Southern California (2000-2007)
  Distinguished Professor of Economics, Iowa State University (1986-2000)
  Professor of Economics, University of South Carolina (1985-1986)
  Professor of Economics, University of Wyoming (1976-1985)
  Appointments at Arizona State University, SUNY Binghamton and elsewhere

  Awards & honors

  Duncan Black Award for best article in Public Choice, 2005.
  Co-recipient National Academy of Sciences Award for Behavioral Research Relevant to the Prevention of Nuclear War, 2003
  Dockson Professor at the University of Southern California
  Honorary Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of York, October 1999-September 2002, October 2003 to September 2006, October 2006 to September 2009.
  Annual Award for Excellence in Honors Teaching for 1998.
  NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship, 1998-2000.

  Professional Organizations

  American Economic Association
  American Political Science Association
  Royal Economic Society
  Public Choice Society
  Southern Economic Association
  Western Economic Association International

  Media Expertise

  Terrorism
  Publications & Research
  Selected Books

  The Political Economy of Terrorism (with Walter Enders) (Cambridge University Press, 2012)
  Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 1 and 2 (North-Holland, 1995, 2007)
  Global Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, 2004)
  Economic Concepts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 2002)
  The Political Economy of NATO (with Keith Hartley) (Cambridge University Press, 1999)

  Selected Articles

  “Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence,” (with Daniel G. Arce) British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 4, October 2007, pp. 573-586.

  “Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial Dispersion,” (with James C. Murdoch), American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No.1, January 2004, pp. 138-151.

  “The Participation Decision Versus the Level of Participation in an Environmental Treaty: A Spatial Probit Analysis,” (with James C. Murdoch and Wim Vijverberg), Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, No. 2, February 2003, pp. 337-362

  “Economics of Alliances: The Lessons of Collective Action,” (with Keith Hartley), Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39, No. 3, September 2001, pp. 869-896.

  “Immigration Policy and Counterterrorism,” (with Subhayu Bandyopadhyay), Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 110, February 2014, pp. 112-123.

  “An Evaluation of INTERPOL's Cooperative-Based Counterterrorism Linkages,” (with Daniel Arce and Walter Enders), Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 54, No. 1, February 2011, pp. 319-337.

  CV: http://www.utdallas.edu/~tms063000/vita.pdf

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  Todd Sandler

  Vibhooti Shukla Professor of Economics and Political Economy

  Current Teaching and Research: Professor Sandler applies theoretical and empirical models of economics to the study of international political economy, defense, environmental issues, and public finance. He is particularly interested in the application of game theory (noncooperative and cooperative) and microeconomics to issues in international relations. Since 9/11, he focused on empirical and theoretical analyses of terrorism. He continues to work on public goods, environmental economics, and defense economics.
  His monographs on Regional Public Goods (2002, co-authored with Daniel Arce) and The Future of Foreign Assistance (1999, co-authored with Ravi Kanbur) put forward new strategies for giving foreign aid. In Global Collective Action (2004) and Global Challenges (1997), he presents novel uses of game theory to distinguish exigencies that are self-correcting from those that are not. In a series of innovative papers since 1983, he applied theoretic and empirical methods to the study of international terrorism. Some of this work is summarized in The Political Economy of Terrorism (2006, co-authored with Walter Enders), whose second edition was published in 2012.
  His current work focuses on the formation of international environmental agreements and regimes. Another facet of his work analyzes alliances, intergovernmental agreements, and the design of supranational structures. His recent research interests also address intergenerational choices and the ability of generations to bargain in a forward and backward fashion. In 2001, he published a major work (intended for a wide audience) on evaluating economic concepts and methods used over the last century in order to predict where economics must go in the future. In addition, he is expanding the theoretical foundations of the study of public goods. He is also working on new papers on transnational terrorism, global public goods, peacekeeping, foreign aid, collective action, and the commons.
  Professor Sandler teaches Microeconomic Principles, Game Theory, Intermediate Microeconomics, Graduate Public Economics, and The Political Economy of Terrorism. At UTD, he is active in the CV Honors Program.
  Major Publications: Transnational Cooperation: An Issue-Based Approach (Oxford University Press 2015 with Clint Peinhardt), The Political Economy of Terrorism, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge, 2012), Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 2 (Elsevier, 2007), Global Collective Action (Cambridge, 2004), Regional Public Goods: Typologies, Provision, Financing, and Development Assistance (Almqvist & Wicksell International, 2002), Economic Concepts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 2001, translated into Chinese and Russian), The Political Economy of NATO (Cambridge 1999 with Keith Hartley); The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Clubs Goods, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge 1996 with Richard Cornes); The Economics of Defense (Cambridge 1995 with Keith Hartley, translated into Japanese); Handbook of Defense Economics (North-Holland 1995 co-edited with Keith Hartley, translated into Chinese); and Collective Action: Theory and Applications (University of Michigan 1992).
  He has published article in journals such as: American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Economic Journal, Journal of Conflict Resolution, European Economic Review, Journal of Economic Literature, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Journal of Public Economic Theory, International Studies Quarterly, British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Public Economics, Economica, Oxford Economic Papers, and elsewhere.
  Forthcoming and Current Work: He has forthcoming papers on terrorism, global and regional public goods, and the commons. His work in progress deals with various aspects of terrorism including: evaluating the counterterrorism net gains offered by INTERPOL, analyzing the impact of giving into hostage-taking terrorists, and studying the influence of regime types on terrorism.
  Consultancies: UN Development Program, Overseas Development Council, World Bank, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Inter-American Development Bank, International Task Force for Global Public Goods
  PhD.: S.U.N.Y. Binghamton
  Fields: International Political Economy, International Politics and Security, Public Economics, Environmental Economics, Applied Microeconomic Theory.

• Global Policy - http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/editorial-board/todd-sandler

  Todd Sandler
  Vibhooti Shukla Chair in Economics and Political Economy
  University of Texas at Dallas

  Todd Sandler holds the Vibhooti Shukla Chair in Economics and Political Economy at the University of Texas at Dallas. His research interests include transnational terrorism, global collective action, and treaty formation. His work on global public goods dates back to the 1970s. In 2003, he was the co-recipient of the National Academy of Sciences Award for Behavioral Research Relevant to the Prevention of Nuclear War for his theoretical and statistical analysis of terrorism. He is author of Global Challenges; Global Collective Action; and The Political Economy of Terrorism.

Peinhardt, Clint. Transnational cooperation: an issue-based approach
M. Amstutz
53.8 (Apr. 2016): p1237.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2016 American Library Association CHOICE
http://www.ala.org/acrl/choice/about

Peinhardt, Clint. Transnational cooperation: an issue-based approach, by Clint Peinhardt and Todd Sandler. Oxford, 2015. 336p bibl indexes afp ISBN 9780199398607 cloth, $99.00; ISBN 9780199398614 pbk, $34.95

53-3718

JZ1308

2015-14989 MARC

Peinhardt (Univ. of Texas, Dallas), a political scientist, and Sandler (Univ. of Texas, Dallas), an economist, examine factors that contribute to or impede interstate cooperation at the global, regional, and transnational levels. This study uses game theory to illuminate the limits and possibilities of transnational collective action. In the first part of the book the authors present theoretical and conceptual elements relevant to the logic of collective action, while chapters 5-12 examine transnational cooperation in specific issue-areas. Some of the neutral or beneficial issues examined include sovereignty, foreign aid, global health, sovereignty, international trade, and global finance; some of the harmful issues discussed include civil wars, terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, rogue states, air pollution, and nuclear proliferation. This sophisticated, well-written book provides an excellent introduction to transnational cooperation. The case studies not only illuminate how game theory and the logic of collective action help explain the limits and possibilities of cooperation in specific issue-areas but provide a clear and succinct overview of each of the global issues being addressed. This book is strongly recommended for all academic libraries and for college courses on global collective action. Summing Up: *** Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduate, graduate, and research collections.--M. Amstutz, Wheaton College
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Amstutz, M. "Peinhardt, Clint. Transnational cooperation: an issue-based approach." CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, Apr. 2016, p. 1237. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA449661849&it=r&asid=c1397d2eed9b27bb0e1ea8eaf2e5a491. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A449661849
The Future of Development Assistance
Arvind Sivaramakrishnan
37.4 (Winter 2000): p23.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2000 United Nations Publications
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/online.html

That the approach is original is certain; in face of current economic and political orthodoxy, it is not easy to show the rich, let alone the very rich, that they too will suffer if the poor, let alone the very poor, continue to suffer. Yet, this is precisely what the authors have done, and a further merit of their argument is that they have put it tersely and directly, in terms drawn from technical but non-mathematical economics. "The Future of Development Assistance: Common Pools and International Public Goods," by Ravi Kanbur and Todd Sandler with Kevin M. Morrison, (Overseas Development Council, Policy Essay No. 25, 1999), makes a bold, direct and original attempt to address some of the most striking problems of our age, namely, those arising from the frequent failure of international aid programmes to achieve their apparently unimpeachable aims.

The problems are familiar enough. According to the authors, they include the direction of aid towards political rather than development objectives, most notably during the cold war, as well as a lack of coordination among donors and a lack of participation or "ownership" by recipient States. One result has been that recipients have focused, at great cost in resources and staff time, on meeting donors' requirements or conditionalities, even if this has meant failing to convince their own populations that such requirements are sound. It is worth noting here that neither the authors nor respected aid agencies such as Oxfam reject conditionality per se; but Kanbur and his colleagues point out that, in practice, aid flows have little connection with whether or not donor conditions are met. They also note that the imposition of conditions can actually make it harder for donors to know precisely what recipients are thinking. Excessively close monitoring too, means that only what is monitored will actually be seen.

Significantly, the authors go on to reject several current dogmas of aid. The first is economic liberalism, which favours aid for those States that follow "sound" fiscal policies and, in some cases, has shown results in the form of improved aggregate growth, but has signally failed to solve the problems of coordination and ownership. The proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), all of whom seem to have their own particular policies and priorities, has made coordination, monitoring and evaluation virtually impossible, and has created an interest group in the form of NGO staff and beneficiaries.

As to private-sector bodies in donor countries, these often benefit directly (sic) via procurement contracts with donor Governments and have a vested interest in the maintenance of aid programmes. This interest presumably obtains irrespective of the effectiveness or quality of a programme. The upshot is that, driven by their different political and institutional environments, recipients and donors have become entwined in a system of development assistance, despite a lack of consensus on how to pursue that development.

The second dogma the authors reject is the currently fashionable--but hardly new--idea of partnership, according to which donors design programmes in the light of recipients' national development strategies. This method has its adherents in the World Bank and has succeeded where recipient States have provided domestic political space for wide debate over their own development strategies. In general, though, partnership approaches have failed to create institutions and mechanisms for the realization of coordination and ownership.

A third approach which, according to the authors, has failed is that of country-focused but sector-wide strategies, in which all donors working in a particular area of aid such as health or education coordinate their work. This has the advantage of giving donors and recipients the capacity to evaluate sector-wide progress and thereby develop policy environments; it has succeeded where recipient States and their populations have had a high level of ownership. Kanbur and his colleagues, however, remind us that the approach depends heavily on transparency and accountability in recipient States, and that it inevitably creates a gap between recipients' national strategies and donors' priorities and concerns. It also requires a high level of coordination between donor agencies, and the authors conclude that in general it has been a failure.

A further set of problems is identified by the authors in the sheer unreliability of economic dogma and aggregated economic information as a guide to the effectiveness of aid. The development strategies in the 1970s of certain Latin American States increased internal inequalities, in apparent contrast to the results obtained in East Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, but the aggregate information has to be handled with great care.

Arvind Sivaramakrishnan is a lecturer in politics and law at Taunton's College, Southampton, United Kingdom. Specific references have not been listed, but several texts have served as background. He is also indebted to Dr. Atul Khare, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, for discussions on the monitoring of programmes.

To start with, inequalities in East Asia showed signs of increasing even before the financial crisis of the late 1990s; secondly, in Africa, economic liberalization may have increased aggregate growth and provided some reduction in poverty, but it has increased inequalities; thirdly, in Russia, the devastation caused by liberalization, combined with the abolition of public provision, has shown that governance and regulation cannot be safely abdicated; and finally, more careful analytical work has revealed significant distributional differences across gender and ethnic lines.

If the authors leave little to be commended in the current field of development aid, they do not hesitate to throw down the gauntlet: what is needed is a more radical approach in which donors really do cede control to the recipient-country Government, advancing their own perspective on development strategy through general dialogue with the country and with each other, rather than through specific programmes and projects. The radicalism of this proposal goes further, with the requirement that donors would neither be permitted to earmark funds for particular projects nor allowed to monitor specific attempts at implementation; rather would recipient States devise plans and programmes in consultation with their own populations and then in discussion with donors who would contribute funds according to their own assessment of strategies, specific projects and recipients' ability to implement and monitor programmes.

Although the authors do not make it very clear how their proposal would in practice be made convincing enough for apparently self-interested donor-States--and domestic constituencies and interest-groups-to support it, they start with the strong example of international public goods, which although not intended to replace the better forms of current aid will, Kanbur argues, strengthen the case for aid by showing how donors and recipients are mutually involved. According to Kanbur, the key points about international pure public goods are that they are non-marketable in that there is no affordable way to extract payment from the beneficiaries and, secondly, that consumption of these goods by one does not affect others' access to them. That public goods are not necessarily universally available--for example, particular goods may he confined to particular geographic regions--does not affect the argument; neither does Kanbur consider it a problem that public goods do not necessarily have to be provided by the publ ic sector. He and his colleagues go on to develop a taxonomy of international public goods, according to which some goods are exclusive or partially exclusive, and therefore impurely public. They also suggest, if schematically, possible institutional arrangements for the maintenance of international public goods. The precise taxonomic and institutional details are not germane here; what does matter about Kanbur's argument is that he and his colleagues have, in and through apparently conventional economic language and terminology, opened up issues that are both highly significant and inherently political.

Indeed, the authors themselves all but underplay the political issues which their case necessarily involves. For example, when criticizing the linking of aid to political objectives, they seem to take "political" as equivalent to "ideological," in the everyday sense of the latter term. Secondly, they recognize that aid programmes cannot succeed unless recipient States have systems which provide high standards of public debate on priorities and needs, as well as high levels of transparency and political accountability in their public processes, and that the so-called miracle economies of East Asia provide substantial and highly directive State funding for both infrastructure and education. The latter is often considered decisive for national economic advancement, for the reduction of infant mortality and population expansion, and for the improvement in the condition of women's lives; South Korea spends $130 of public funds per head per year on education, while the current figure for India, where many of the re levant indicators are worse than they were 30 years ago, is $9.

Thirdly, the authors are well aware that in both donor and recipient States there are substantial interest-groups who stand to benefit from the existence of certain types of aid programmes and even to benefit from the non-delivery of funding to intended recipients. In response, they call for the greater involvement of electorates in debate on the nature and direction of aid, and recognize that in some programmes this is already happening. It is here, perhaps, that the genuinely innovative nature of the argument emerges. What Kanbur and his colleagues have demonstrated is both the politicality of the questions and, by implication, the way in which the issues involved reach for and appeal to a common humanity in all of us. It can be no accident that ordinary people around the world are starting, as a matter of routine, to buy what are sometimes called fair-trade goods; neither can it be an accident that ordinary people in both the developed and developing world have expressed themselves very forcefully on the existing schemes of international trade, even to the point where the head of a transnational food giant has stated publicly that what the big corporations fear above all else is consumer backlash.

At this point too, the arguments around aid may have to take leave of the customary categories of economics, the language of preferences and of costs, benefits, utilities and disutilities. The language of preferences seems unable to address the question of the justification of preferences and, at worst, has to rule the matter of justification out of court. This is not just a theoretical matter. Kanbur cites the improvement of labour standards in the developing world as a possible international public good, because it could well relieve downward pressure (sic) on workers in the developed world. Yet, that point is itself iconoclastic and original in a world in which controllers of production in the developed world have substantial disincentives to improving conditions for workers in the poorer countries.

Not to mention still further disincentives to admitting any commonalities between the respective groups of workers. As to market access, despite all its talk of opening up markets, the World Bank, in a recent evaluation of India's economic reforms of the last decade, never once mentioned the matter of how Indian producers of industrial goods might gain access to markets in the developed world. All it says is that the prospects are good for expanded Indian exports of traditional products like leather and textiles. Neither of those can earn the volume of hard currency that, say, engineering goods could earn. An extended idea of international public goods, is the key issue here.

This would include knowledge, information and debate. No culture has a monopoly of these, and the further possibility obtains that if they are treated as commodities, then they will be subject to the pathologies of aid that are already all too common.

Reasoning and argument towards the establishment of the best course of action were for Aristotle the defining features of humanity; their importance today could not be greater. Perhaps, what the transnational giants and those in political office should fear most is not consumer backlash, but the responses of informed and thinking citizens anywhere in the world.
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Sivaramakrishnan, Arvind. "The Future of Development Assistance." UN Chronicle, Winter 2000, p. 23. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA74583363&it=r&asid=19704a6e8e4b61f8a5631fcc6f77d4d0. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A74583363
The Political Economy of Terrorism
Vikas Kumar
47.4 (Dec. 2013): p1054.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/JEI0021-3624470413
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2013 Taylor & Francis Group LLC
http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?acr=jei

The Political Economy of Terrorism, by Walter Enders and Todd Sandler. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Paperback: 978-0-521-18100-6, $32.99, 406 pages.

Terrorism has attracted unprecedented academic interest in the West after September 11, 2001. The authors of the book under review are among the best known contributors to the economic analysis of terrorism. In this book, they explore terrorism--a political phenomenon--using economic models and statistical analyses. Rational-actor models help understand strategic interdependencies in counterterrorism, while statistical analyses presumably yield robust inferences. The book is divided into twelve chapters that broadly deal with the direct (human casualties) and indirect (economic) impacts of terrorism and counter-terrorism.

The first two chapters introduce the problem of terrorism which involves circumventing the politics that the liberal West faces from the perspectives of victims, perpetrators, and audience. Terrorism is delimited by distinguishing between terrorism, warfare, insurgencies, and crime and between terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, and state terror. The authors argue that political repression, rather than poverty, is the prime motivator of terrorism and that the incidence of terrorism shares a non-linear relationship with political freedoms. Recruits belong to countries with fewer freedoms, while targets belong to liberal democracies.

The third chapter introduces statistical analyses of terrorism. Counterterrorism, its externalities, public-good character, and policy-induced substitution between terrorist activities and targets, occupy the next two chapters. The following chapter presents a lucid game-theoretic discussion of barriers to international cooperation. The discussion, however, does not account for the bureaucratic continuity and electoral myopia of liberal democracies. It overlooks the fact that each country's counterterrorism machinery is intertwined with its larger security apparatus, so that international cooperation is mostly possible between close allies and between asymmetric powers. It also overlooks bureaucratic and sub-national barriers to counter-terror operations within countries, but there is some related discussion on rent-seeking and terrorism alert systems in the chapter on homeland security. The discussion on the inefficiency of UN treaties and Interpol's cost-effectiveness is very interesting.

The seventh chapter uses game models and statistical analyses to examine the incidence of hostage-taking. The eighth chapter, which presents an engaging discussion of the organization of terrorist groups, should have been placed immediately after the second or third chapter. The ninth chapter discusses 9/11 as a turning point and conjectures whether the attack could have been predicted. The latter discussion is methodologically weak.

The discussion drags towards the end when the book engages with the economic impact of terrorism, U.S. homeland security, and the future of terrorism. The chapter on homeland security, for instance, reads like a government handout, and seems to have been inserted only to cater to the U.S. textbook market. This chapter could have been merged with the chapter on economic impact, which discusses how the cost of terrorism to an economy depends on its size and structure.

A few critical observations are also in order. First, there is no coherent discussion on appropriate measures of terrorism that, in turn, renders the elaborate statistical analysis moot. For instance, international terrorism cannot be measured without accounting for the fact that many insurgent groups are not averse to terrorism and operate across what they view as artificial colonial borders.

Two other points regarding data need to be noted. One, some tables and figures are incomplete. In Table 8.1, for example, an additional column indicating the country of origin of terrorist organizations would have helped. Furthermore, this table omits very important organizations. For instance, while the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)--a small group based in northeast India--is mentioned, the region's most important terrorist group, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), is not included. Two, the analysis is mostly restricted to the period before 2006, which excludes the bulk of the attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. If more recent data were included, then, among other things, the book's conclusions regarding the link between liberal democracies and suicide terrorism would have been affected. Incidentally, there is no chapter dedicated to suicide terrorism.

Second, the authors justify their use of rational-actor models by arguing that terrorists are rational because they respond to changing risks in a sensible and predictable fashion" (p. 14). Why should predictability be the defining feature of rationality?

Third, the analysis of trade-off between civil liberties and security examines relatively small changes in the West through a magnifying glass. In any case, the levels of civil liberties do not change continuously with terrorist threat as they are determined by a larger set of historical factors, not all of which are affected by terrorist attacks. This renders ineffective the usual notion of choice discussed in the book.

Fourth, while the review of literature on economic analyses of terrorism is exhaustive and well-integrated into the discussion, it overlooks other sub-disciplines of economics, let alone other disciplines. The economics of religion could have helped understand suicide terrorism and the organization of religious terrorist groups. Similarly, public choice and discussions within economics regarding how people process expert opinions could have helped to better understand the problem of choice on the level of civil liberties in the face of terrorist threats. The authors are perhaps able to ignore other streams of social science literature because terrorism is reduced to stylized facts that can be statistically analyzed.

Fifth, the authors do not engage certain key questions: Why there are so few non-Muslim religious terrorist groups at present? What governs the choice between politics and terrorism and between state terror and state-sponsored terrorism?

Finally, the most contentious aspect of this book, which offers "an up-to-date survey of the study of terrorism" (p. 25) for use in college-level courses, is that it presents a Western perspective on terrorism, using economic tools, instead of economic analysis of terrorism. The authors begin by saying that "the events of 11 September 2001 served as a wakeup call to the world" (p. 1) and the "society lost innocence" (p. 2). But it is well known that, until "that fateful day," the West used political Islam in the so-called "third world" without fearing any serious domestic consequences. 9/11 merely shattered the fallacious presumption that geographical separation and conventional military superiority implied invulnerability. The Cold War origins of terrorism are overlooked and the West is cast as an unfortunate victim of cross-firing between illiberal regimes elsewhere and their terrorist opponents. This narrowly defined Western perspective affects the discussion of terrorism. For want of space just one example is cited here. Terrorist "grievances" are perfunctorily referred to in the book, and counterterrorism is reduced to the right mix of technology and international cooperation, even though our current state of understanding of counterterrorism is far more nuanced.

Poor organization and some conceptual problems notwithstanding, this book presents a very good introduction to using economic tools to study terrorism. Moreover, unlike a number of other books written by economists on non-market phenomena, this book does not claim to be simple; yet, its simplicity is refreshing.

DOI 10.2753/JEI0021-3624470413

Vikas Kumar

Azim Premji University

Vikas Kumar is an assistant professor of economics at Azim Premji University, Bangalore (India).

Kumar, Vikas
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Kumar, Vikas. "The Political Economy of Terrorism." Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 47, no. 4, 2013, p. 1054+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA353439075&it=r&asid=49efef74528c87e46ab39855f6e09913. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A353439075
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TERRORISM
Kemal Argon
27.4 (Dec. 2010): p90.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2010 Professors World Peace Academy
http://www.pwpa.org/main/?page_id=19

Walter Enders and Todd Sandler Cambridge University Press, 2006 Paper, 278 pages, Cambridge University Press, $23.99

This work by Enders and Sandler is an important text in the field of terrorism studies that has mushroomed since September 11, 2001. This book describes the phenomenon and certain scientific approaches to understanding and forming strategies for dealing with it. Terrorism is defined by Enders and Sandler as the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims. This entails two essential ingredients characterizing any modern definition of terrorism: the presence or threat of violence and a political/social motive. Enders and Sandler have created a work that uses a political economy approach, relying on economic methods and political analysis to describe the phenomenon of terrorism, not conventional wisdom.

The book is written from a perspective of residents in a liberal democracy, the U.K. Liberal democracies face a dilemma, in that many of the protections guaranteed to citizens of liberal democracies are exploited by terrorists. Freedom of association allows terrorists to form groups and networks. Freedom of speech allows terrorists to disseminate propaganda and freedom of movement allows terrorists to cross international borders. Liberal democracies are therefore rich targets for terrorists. Enders and Sandler identify a civil liberties versus protection trade-off. Terrorism presents a dilemma for liberal democracies as remaining an open society allows terrorists to work while too harsh a response can curb popular support and create support for the terrorists. Liberal democracies are especially vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

The media have a role to play as terrorists need the media to spread their message of tear as well as propaganda. The media can serve a beneficial role in leading to the capture of terrorists and disseminating terror warnings.

Importantly, the authors advocate statistical analysis to either substantiate or refute "observed" patterns in a time series plot or patterns suggested by a particular political or economic model. Unlike the perception given by the media, there is no decided upward trend in any of the series. The authors advocate use of spectral analysis to analyze cyclical phenomena. Amongst other observations, it may be seen that the severity of attacks has increased with the demise of the Soviet Union and the increase in religious "fundamentalism." This statistical analysis is a major tool for understanding more of the reality of the phenomenon at any one point in time.

In addressing counterterrorism, the authors describe government actions to inhibit terrorist attacks or curtail their consequences. They describe defensive and proactive measures, relying on game theory analysis. They also address the possibility of getting at the roots of terrorism, one option being addressing the grievances of the terrorists and eliminating the rationale for violence. However, problems can arise when such accommodations can give rise to countergrievances from those harmed by government concessions. Granting concessions can give the perception that terrorism is successful. Terrorist grievances are not always well formulated. Countries' responses to terrorists' demands can also work at cross purposes. A more fruitful approach might be to make non-terrorist activities less expensive and therefore more attractive, rather than to reward terrorist campaigns through concessions. Actions to bolster legitimate means can curb terrorism without compromising the ideals of liberal democracy by rewarding terrorism.

Many social scientists view terrorists as rational actors who use their scarce resources to maximize their expected utility. There can be unintended consequences of government policies designed to thwart one type of terrorist behavior that can induce increases in other types of terrorism. Empirical literature supports the importance of the substitution effect in transnational terrorism and policies which do not constrain terrorists' behavior have no effect on the level of terrorism. Piecemeal policies that only thwart one attack mode induce substitution.

The authors argue for increased international cooperation to deal with terrorism. However, cooperation will continue to be partial and of limited effectiveness vis a vis networked global terrorists. Nations will continue to preserve their autonomy over security.

Hostage taking receives its own chapter. These have a disproportionate influence. The authors describe areas for further research on negotiation and bargaining models and variables. More empirical research is needed.

A number of trends are happening after 9/11. Fundamentalist terrorism is shifting to the Middle East and Asia. Overall there appears to be a shift away from liberal democracies. Augmented homeland security measures seem to have made Americans safer domestically but placed them at greater risk while abroad.

The authors devote a chapter to the economic effects of terrorism. While estimates by the International Monetary Fund paint a picture of the economic impact of terrorism being low, the various and indirect costs of terrorism are difficult to measure.

In addition to the tools of game theory and statistical analysis, a strategy for homeland securityis seen by Enders and Sandler as crucial. The proper mix of defensive and proactive measures must be addressed by government. The proper mix requires a careful analysis as trade-offs occur. For example, more proactive measures might decrease the need and cost for domestic measures but create more terrorists in the long run. The authors talk about expected outcomes and comparative payoffs of choices of proactive policies. There are also choices to be made between official and private security forces and there are insurance matters. Enders and Sandler call for optimal integration with other forces of the intelligence community as well as foreign counterparts charged with homeland security.

Enders and Sandler reach the frightening but important conclusion that terrorism is here to stay. As long as there are grievances there will be conflict and terrorism will be a tactic associated with conflicts. Terrorist attacks are cost effective and suicide attacks may be expected to come to Europe, although there may be other mass-casualty attacks. Terrorism levels the playing field between the weak and the strong and provides the weak with a cost-effective means to engage in conflict. While the bomb will remain the preferred method of attack for terrorists, methods will proliferate as will costs of counterterrorism.

This book is a valuable contribution to the field of terrorism study for a number of reasons. One is that is describes a systematic approach to understanding the phenomenon and formulating policy solutions. Enders and Sandler use a game-theory approach to policy making as well as for calling for statistical analysis, this fitting in well with strategies for homeland security. This is a better approach to merely following conventional wisdom and developing piecemeal strategies.

Thinking about terrorism has often been associated with "radicalization." As Githens-Mazer and Lambert note, radicalization is a research topic plagued by assumption and intuition, unhappily dominated by "conventional wisdom" rather than systematic scientific and empirically based research. (1) Enders and Sandler point to these more scientific approaches to dealing with the whole problem of terrorism and this makes their approach of interest to societies with Muslim minorities.

Githens-Mazer and Lambert further opine that, "Conventional wisdom on radicalization has sapped this term of scientific value, so that the label of 'radicalization' has become instead a tool of power exercised by the state and non-Muslim communities against, and to control, Muslim communities." (2) If this is true, the approach by Enders and Sandler is a much better alternative to the amateurishness of accepting unsupported assumptions and partisan prescriptions which can end up oppressing people in one or more communities. The Political Economy of Terrorism by Enders and Sandler is an important addition to the field of terrorism study and a resource for policy makers. Its proposals of more scientific approaches to dealing with the phenomenon of terrorism may facilitate professionalism in the field that will be of benefit to all those concerned with peace and security of their own communities.

(1.) Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, "Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails: the persistence of a failed discourse," International Affairs 86: 4 (2010) 889-890; 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

(2.) Ibid, 901.

Kemal Argon

Visiting Assistant Professor of World Religions

University of Bridgeport

Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604

USA

Argon, Kemal
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Argon, Kemal. "THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TERRORISM." International Journal on World Peace, vol. 27, no. 4, 2010, p. 90+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA244650340&it=r&asid=6cb7ad3e3fb5e275f3d527f11c1888e8. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A244650340
The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present, and into the 21st Century
IVAN ELAND
5.2 (Fall 2000): p303.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2000 Independent Institute

The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present, and into the 21th Century By Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xiv, 292. $59.95 cloth, $22.95 paper.

Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley claim that The Political Economy of NATO "presents conclusions based on rigorous analysis rather than ideology" (p. xii), but the book clearly exhibits a bias toward retaining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and expanding its missions. The authors acknowledge that "perhaps the greatest challenge facing NATO is to convince its members and critics ... that the alliance still has a role to play in the post-Cold War period" (p. 7). Sandler and Hartley admit that key questions include whether NATO should be abolished and whether other organizations could confront military threats more successfully than NATO. The book not only avoids discussion of those important issues but never even lays out the arguments expressed by the critics of the alliance.

The authors' pro-NATO bias is demonstrated by two conclusions: first, "That NATO must redefine itself and demonstrate that it still has a strategic role to perform if it is to survive during the post-Cold War era"; second, "NATO security must take on a broader definition in the post-Cold War period to include the protection of the environment, resource supply lines, and informational assets" (p. 251). The first conclusion implicitly assumes that retaining NATO should be a goal. During the Cold War, however, NATO was formed as a means to an end, deterring or defending against a massive Soviet attack on western Europe. Public-choice economists might accuse the authors--academics who study NATO--of benefiting from the alliance's post-Cold War attempt to avoid extinction by combating new threats and adding new missions.

In addition to the threats implied above, Sandler and Hartley identify the following as potential threats to NATO nations: transnational terrorism, increasing inequality in the world distribution of income, and rogue-state aggression and attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction. All such threats may affect nations within NATO, but the authors never make convincing arguments that such threats can be dealt with by an alliance designed for collective defense.

In fact, Sandler and Hartley use game theory to show that nations have incentives to ignore and in some cases to undermine agreements to fight terrorism. Yet the authors still seem to be reluctant to give up on a role for NATO in combating terrorists. Similarly, although they astutely note that recent U.S. administrations have exaggerated the threat from rogue states as a justification for retaining a large military and admit that cheating will undermine any attempt to create an international cartel to stop the rogues from buying arms and technologies for weapons of mass destruction, they cannot seem to pinpoint an institutional role for NATO in battling rogue states. Their suggestions that NATO could act as a multinational strike force for the United Nations to enforce international environmental treaties or to stamp out revolutions caused by increasing inequalities of income seem far-fetched and ill-advised. Sandler and Hartley even argue that alliance nations have increasing interests in Asia and that the NATO force might participate in any future Korean conflict! Such statements indicate their bias toward an activist NATO that is involved worldwide.

Despite Sandler and Hartley's less than convincing analysis of how NATO will help combat the "new" post-Cold War threats, including terrorism, the section on the economics of terrorism is excellent. Sandler and Hartley note that terrorism is difficult to stop because terrorists incur less cost than the targeted country. The government of the targeted country must defend against all types of attack at multiple venues, but terrorists can strike the location that will minimize their cost, where government defenses are weakest. If the government improves the defenses against one type of threat, then terrorism, like water, will flow down the path of least resistance. As an example, the authors note that the fortification of embassies reduced strikes on the buildings but increased more lethal attacks--assassinations of diplomats outside the fortified areas.

Sandler and Hartley also correctly conclude that the law-enforcement model (sharing intelligence and apprehending terrorists) is preferable to the military model (retaliatory strikes) when fighting terrorism. The authors note that President Reagan's military strike against Libya in retaliation for a terrorist attack merely generated more terrorism in response, but they fail to extrapolate that effect to U.S. military action in general. My own research has documented retaliatory terrorist attacks in response to U.S. and NATO military actions--for example, the war in Kosovo. A more restrained U.S. foreign policy would reduce terrorism against American targets far more than relying on a military alliance to carry on the fight.

The informational content of the chapter on NATO's defense industrial base is good, but the chapters on NATO expansion and alliance burden sharing leave much to be desired. In the chapter on NATO expansion, Sandler and Hartley make logical errors, mischaracterize research, and fail to include important published data. They criticize Department of Defense (DOD), RAND, and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) studies of the costs of expansion for including costs that would have been incurred in the absence of expansion for improvements to the forces of new members and enhancements to the power-projection capabilities of existing non-U.S. NATO allies.

But all three studies included such expenses for a reason. Defense spending decreased significantly in new member nations during the post-Cold War period until they sought NATO membership at the very end of the 1990s. In the early to mid-1990s, with no imminent threat on the horizon, they were in no hurry to use the scarce resources needed to reform their economies for defense spending. To be accepted into NATO and obtain a long-term security guarantee against a potentially resurgent Russia, those nations pledged to increase defense spending. In short, joining NATO led them to spend more on defense than they would have spent without alliance membership. Since 1991, existing non-NATO allies have been pledging to increase power-projection capabilities; they have done very little to fulfill that pledge. If the new members are really to be defended, non-U.S. NATO allies will have to increase such capabilities. Thus, all three studies properly included the two categories of expenses in the cost of expanding the alliance.

Sandler and Hartley also criticize the three studies for not including a net present value of the costs of expansion or a quantification of its benefits. This criticism is Monday morning quarterbacking at its finest. First, it was impossible to predict when the expenses would be incurred; therefore, a net present value estimate could not be made without piling assumption on assumption. Second, benefits of expansion are controversial, and benefits in general are notoriously difficult to quantify. If the benefits were so easy to quantify, Sandler and Hartley should have done so themselves. Unfortunately, all they do is criticize the other studies.

As the author of the CBO study on the costs of expansion, I was disappointed by Sandler and Hartley's mischaracterization of it, and I wonder if they properly characterized other research that they mention in their book. The CBO study did not uniformly assume a resurgent Russia as the threat, as Sandler and Hartley imply. In its most modest option, CBO assumed an attack by a medium-size regional power--for example, Belarus attacking Poland or Serbia attacking Hungary. Sandler and Hartley assert that the appropriate strategic environment for calculating costs must emphasize peacekeeping and crisis management; yet military planners must plan in the worst case for an Article V defense against a regional power. Furthermore, the authors attempt to compare studies that had different assumptions, when such comparison is unnecessary. A study that I completed after moving to the Cato Institute normalized the assumptions of the DOD and CBO studies for direct comparison and provided a detailed critique of DOD's methodology (the authors relied on a general rendition of DOD's assumptions in a General Accounting Office report).

Because Sandler and Hartley did not read the Cato Institute report, they lumped the RAND and CBO studies with the much less-rigorous DOD report and criticized them all. The RAND and CBO studies, however, identified the military requirements to combat a range of threats and provided a detailed cost accounting of those requirements. DOD used questionable, politically convenient assumptions and estimated the costs for many categories of military improvements by arbitrarily deciding how much was affordable (those numbers were kept low so that Congress would not get "sticker shock" and reject expansion). In short, the authors blurred the debate on the costs of expansion rather than providing illumination.

Similarly, in the chapter on burden sharing, the authors distort the issue. Although they make the keen observation that the alliance defense burden will be increasingly skewed toward the larger nations as NATO's primary mission becomes peacekeeping and out-of-area operations, their quantification of U.S. benefits from the alliance are grossly overstated. Based on population, gross domestic product (GDP), and exposed borders, the authors assert that the United States and Canada would derive, by far, more benefits than any other nations in the alliance. Yet the Europeans live near any potential threats, and the North Americans do not. North America will help defend Europe, not vice versa. In a post-Cold War era, when the threats are low and the allies are rich, Sandler and Hartley should have devoted more attention to the important question that they avoid: For the United States, do the net benefits of staying in NATO exceed those of its withdrawal?

IVAN ELAND Cato Institute
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
ELAND, IVAN. "The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present, and into the 21st Century." Independent Review, vol. 5, no. 2, 2000, p. 303. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA67262728&it=r&asid=388238cf2d0c23f3b435865b21f45396. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A67262728
The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present, and into the 21st Century
Gerard Corkeron
26 (Annual 1999): p156.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 1999 Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne
http://www.ssps.unimelb.edu.au/research/current/mjp

Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley. 1999. The Political Economy of NA TO: Past, Present, and into the 21st Century. Cambridge University Press

For most Australian readers, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is of peripheral interest at best. Our main military alliance is with the US, and the focus of that relationship is the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, Australian trade with the European Union is significant, and many Australians have relatives still living in parts of Europe that are prone to instability. Australia therefore has an interest in peace and stability in Europe, and that interest is primarily based on economic considerations and pressures from domestic constituencies. While instability in Europe might not threaten Australia's physical security, it would affect its economic security. The security that NATO affords Europe therefore provides significant benefits to Australia at no cost.

NATO also serves as a model of a durable and effective multilateral military alliance. The same cannot be said of many of the multilateral alliances that Australia has been a member of in the Asia-Pacific region. They have lacked durability, as examples such as ANZUS and SEATO illustrate. The decline of these alliances are due to political differences, but it is interesting to note that they have lacked, as have most other military alliances throughout the world, an institutional infrastructure like that possessed by NATO. Australia now has numerous bilateral defence agreements, and while this may be beneficial in terms of treating each relationship as a separate issue, it may be more costly in terms of the duplication of diplomatic efforts. There is a growing debate in Australia as to whether we should continue with these bilateral relationships, or work towards developing a multilateral defence relationship with countries such as the US, Japan and South Korea. While NATO may not be the perfect model, it is certainly one that Australian policy makers should study closely if this debate ever develops into a serious policy consideration. Todd Sandier and Keith Hartley have both been NATO research fellows, and their book on NATO's political economy is a worthwhile read for those with an interest in NATO, defence economics, or the political economy of multinational institutions.

The North Atlantic Treaty came into effect in 1949. Two of its main goals were to deter aggression from the Soviet Union and its satellites, and to bind the US to an alliance with Western Europe. Interestingly, one of the driving forces behind NATO was Canada. Having fought two wars on European soil, Canada believed that peace and security in Europe were essential for Canadian security and prosperity. The US was initially reluctant to commit itself to Europe in such a way, while Canada and some European states felt that US participation was essential. This contrasts with the current situation, where NATO is often accused of being dominated by American interests. For a little over 40 years NATO identified its main threat as coming from its eastern borders. It prepared itself to repel, or at least delay, a massive Soviet ground assault from East Germany. Since the end of the Cold War, it has had to redefine itself against new and emerging threats. The various conflicts in the Balkans have provided NATO with a new mission in the post-Cold War. Instead of deterring aggression against its own borders, NATO has recently been called upon to end, or at best contain, aggression within the borders of neighbouring states. This new mission has provided for NATO a tangible role with which it is able to justify its existence.

Sandler and Hartley discuss some of the big issues that have confronted NATO in recent years. In 1999, at a date after the publication of this book, NATO admitted three new members that had formerly been members of the Warsaw Pact: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Before this occurred, various studies were undertaken to assess the expected economic costs and benefits of expansion, while on the international relations front, relations with Russia were the main concern. The authors provide a good analysis of the economic aspects of this debate, and they also offer sound opinions on the political and military costs and benefits. They explore NATO's growing role as a regional peacekeeper, and suggest that while NATO can do a better job than the UN in this area, it is likely to result in an increased burden for its larger members. As for the development of a separate European defence identity through such bodies as the European Union or the Western European Union, they suggest that any future defence organisations should only exist if they can offer something new; they should specialize in areas where they have a comparative advantage, rather than attempting to duplicate NATO but without the US.

What is missing from this book is an in-depth discussion at a level below that of the institutional. Certainly the larger members are referred to, but smaller members such as, Iceland and Luxembourg, do not rate a mention apart from their inclusion in various tables, while Canada only receives a brief mention. As most of NATO's decisions are reached through consensus, analysis of what NATO offers each individual member from a political economy perspective would be interesting to read about. While the smaller members may contribute little to NATO, it is possible that the benefits they receive from participation in NATO might be just as easily enjoyed if they did not participate.

In their opening chapter, Sandler and Hartley claim that "this book is intended for talented undergraduates and graduate students in economics, political science (especially international relations), and public policy. Since the technical rigor of the book is greatly limited, it should also appeal to an audience outside of academia...." While some of the economic models and concepts discussed in this book might not be technically rigorous for these esteemed writers, for those unfamiliar with them the book can be challenging to read. Having said that, this book has much to offer as an analysis of NATO from a particular analytical perspective.

Gerard Corkeron,
University of Melbourne

Corkeron, Gerard
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Corkeron, Gerard. "The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present, and into the 21st Century." Melbourne Journal of Politics, vol. 26, 1999, p. 156+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA80056880&it=r&asid=01260a9971d1a45bd00f32275c3c6922. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A80056880
Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political, and Economic Problems
Richard L. Stroup
3.1 (Summer 1998): p125.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 1998 Independent Institute

* Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political, and Economic Problems

By Todd Sandler

Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. 234. $54.95 cloth (ISBN 0521583071), $16.95 paper (ISBN 0521587492).

On the first page of his new book, Global Challenges, Todd Sandler declares that it is "market failures that are behind many of the crises confronting the world today." He lays out the standard failures: externalities, public goods and free riders, and open access arising from property-rights failures. The crises are also familiar: the buildup of greenhouse gases, acid rain, tropical deforestation, loss of biodiversity, depletion of the stratospheric ozone shield, population growth, and soil loss. Besides environmental crises, Sandler lists nuclear proliferation, transnational terrorism, and income inequality among nations. Will technology save us? Technology is a "two-edged sword" (p. 7), bringing new problems even as we try to use it to improve our lives.

Sandler, an economist at Iowa State University, is not entirely pessimistic. "The purpose of this book is to use modern tools and concepts of economics to put global and regional challenges into perspective" (p. 21). Nations, he indicates, could potentially solve these problems by cooperation; for example, by forming governmental entities at the supranational level or by entering into global and regional treaties. He notes that "effective action can be fostered if the participants' incentives are kept in mind." Incentives for whom? "Nations are assumed to behave to further their own interests, not the good of the world. If world welfare is to be furthered by a collective response, then there must be sufficient gains in such actions to motivate the participants" (p. 22). Sandler does not explain what the goals of a nation are or how national leaders weight the differing goals of the citizens. In most of the rest of the book, the nation--not the individuals or firms that cause the market failures--is the unit of analysis. Sandler is "concerned with how nations are likely to confront the challenges on the horizon and whether institutions could be tailored to their selfish behavior to avert disaster" (p. 22).

In chapter 2 Sandler introduces strategic action, the prisoners' dilemma, and other elements of game theory in the context of environmental and other crises. Market failure is further explained, and international spillover effects are shown to be possible results. The author's self-described "pragmatic approach" is to ask how nations can collectively resolve those dilemmas. "By identifying what promotes and inhibits collective actions among these calculating nations," he shows "which global issues pose the greatest challenge" (p. 51).

In chapter 3, "For Our Children's Children," Sandler explains that benefits and costs to future generations are underrepresented by the use of discounting procedures, in the sense that a dollar's worth of benefits today is counted more heavily than the same benefit accruing to a later generation. Various possible ways in which the present generation might have a reason to promote "farsighted collective action" are discussed.

In chapter 4, "Global House," Sandler discusses how national governments are sometimes stirred to collective action, either regionally or more broadly, as in the case of banning chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The failure (as Sandler was writing) of nations to agree to reduce greenhouse gases, and thus to reduce the risk of future global warming, he explains by reference to factors such as the differences of scientific opinion and the complexity of monitoring and controlling emissions. Acid rain and transnational terrorism are also discussed in the context of the prisoners' dilemma and other game-theory constructs. Sandler stresses the need for each cooperating nation to perceive net gains to itself from any activities in which it participates.

Will repeated interactions among nation-states lead to cooperation? Chapter 6, "Change We Must: Evolutionary Concerns," pertains to cooperation and noncooperative strategic behavior in the context of repeated games and evolutionary games. In the latter, as a result of past patterns of wins and losses, "strategic choices are programmed by the player's genetic code and are not a conscious choice" (p. 173).

The causes and consequences of the growing income inequality among nations receive attention in chapter 7, "Equity among Nations?" ("Equity" and "income equality" seem to be interchangeable terms for Sandler,)Inequality may complicate cooperation, but there are certain benefits: "Best shot" technologies, such as finding a cure for a plague or recovering a sunken nuclear submarine, are likely to be undertaken by the richest nations to the benefit of all. Then, too, "there is a strategic benefit to being poor, because poverty facilitates free riding" (p. 194). But when the weakest link among cooperators is critical, as in controlling terrorist groups, inequality reduces the chance of successful cooperation. A single cheater, paid or otherwise, might defeat eradication efforts. Another problem, says the author, is that poorer nations might utilize weak environmental laws to attract industry.

The eighth and final chapter of the book provides summary comments and draws together the author's key conclusions. The last paragraph begins, "The world is, indeed, besieged by global challenges requiring collective action" (p. 214). But Sandler is optimistic that, if leaders pay attention to the game-theory conclusions he puts forth, they can solve or at least reduce the effects of these crises.

Global Challenges should be interesting to anyone eager to spend time thinking about strategic factors in a search for cooperation among nations when a serious cross-border externality exists. It offers some interesting insights about how to anticipate some of the serious difficulties faced by anyone who seeks solutions to perceived global challenges, although many of those insights are unsurprising. The book is clearly written, in the main, seldom lapsing into game-theory jargon without sufficient explanation of terms. There is virtually no mathematics to trip up the nonmathematical reader.

The book cannot be recommended as a reasonable overview or description of the international "crises" described in it, at least where the environmental problems are concerned. It is essentially a brief for more and stronger collective action, with discussion of the hindrances to be expected along the way. To Sandler, scientific uncertainty is confined to questions about the precise size and placement of the various types of horrible destruction that we face if calls for collective action are not heeded or if collective action proves unsuccessful. For example, the idea that the buildup of certain greenhouse gases, which clearly is happening, might not be driving the little bit of global warming we have seen in the past century, or might not lead to catastrophe if unabated, is not considered in the book, even though the pages of Science and Nature are filled with debates among scientists on these issues.

In his final paragraph Sandler writes, "Although the news media have characterized the world as facing imminent disaster from insidious pollutants, ghastly viruses... and bloodthirsty terrorists, I have taken a more-reasoned approach." But his reasoning is harnessed to the task of finding ways to impose collective solutions on these problems. Like the news media he mentions, his reporting of the facts on the global crises, or at least the environmental crises, is one-sided. As an example, he speaks of "good ozone" (in the stratosphere) and "bad ozone" (at the earth's surface) without mentioning that surface ozone, though indeed troublesome in the ways he indicates, also shields us from ultraviolet rays just as stratospheric ozone does. Similarly, although the expected warming effects of carbon dioxide emissions are described and decried, the direct benefits to plants (and the animals they feed) of added carbon dioxide in the air are not mentioned. Yet in fact, this "greenhouse gas" is purchased by the owners of greenhouses, because carbon dioxide is plant food. Nor does Sandler mention, as an economist seeking to maximize net benefits should, that more carbon dioxide reduces the requirement of most plants for water and enhances their resistance to drought. In fairness, I note that he does once mention the sometimes beneficial impact of warming on agriculture.

The environmental news is good and bad. Sandler reports the bad at length but says next to nothing about the good. Nor does he deal with the serious scientific doubts about the bad. If the temperature of the earth rises by, say, three degrees Celsius over the next century, will sea levels rise or fall? Scientific journals carry debates on the topic, which is key to global warming fears, but Sandler simply assumes the worst.

The economic thinking in this book also seems rather one-sided. Pointing out the potential problem of irreversibility if the climate warms due to human activity, Sandler overlooks that large sacrifices now, taken to counter a problem we later find to be nonexistent or unresponsive to our sacrifices, impose a large, known, irreversible penalty on our heirs. Passing up a $1,000 investment now, to purchase $1,000 worth of reduced carbon dioxide emissions, means passing up a $117,000 benefit that could be received after fifty years (at a 10 percent rate of return, which is low for the stock market over a fifty-year period); or a loss of the $13,689,000 that could be had after one hundred years. Which choice on our part would our heirs in a hundred years prefer? The "irreversible" label can be applied to aspects of almost any policy, not just to changes in nature.

Sandler has some interesting things to say, derived from game theory, about how and where collective action might be imposed on the citizens of the world in response to a perceived crisis involving cross-border externalities. But he works hard, in a one-sided fashion, to stoke the perception that certain "crises" are real and will have terrible consequences unless the strategies he suggests are used to help craft collective controls on citizens of the world. Adopting that strategy will clearly impose costs on us now; it may help or harm future generations. At present, with regard to the environmental "crises" Sandler discusses, we simply do not know.
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Stroup, Richard L. "Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political, and Economic Problems." Independent Review, vol. 3, no. 1, 1998, p. 125+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA20942736&it=r&asid=704fd740bc0476d377eb78cf2699a0db. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A20942736
Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political, and Economic Problems
Michael McGinis
92.2 (June 1998): p508.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 1998 Cambridge University Press
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PSR

By Todd Sandler. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 234p. $54.95 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Michael McGinnis, Indiana University

Todd Sandler uses a common set of analytical tools to analyze an unusually wide range of substantive concerns. He presents the necessary tools of game theory and public policy in a very accessible form. Throughout the book the focus remains on transnational dilemmas involving the environment (acid rain, ozone depletion, global warming, deforestation, loss of biodiversity) as well as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the transmission of disease. All are treated as instances of collective action in response to different forms of market failure.

The argument builds on basic justifications for government intervention in the presence of externalities, public goods, or poorly defined property rights. Since national governments jealously protect their sovereignty, some practices are not easily applicable to transnational problems. But Sandler argues that many options short of global governance are still available. His overriding theme is that many regional and global environmental problems can be solved without signing international treaties or establishing global organizations, provided the incentives are right. Once sufficiently credible information is available, he argues, most transnational problems can be resolved in one way or another.

This notion that different collective action problems call for different responses is hardly novel, so the contribution of this book must lie in the ways the author distinguishes among types of problems. Sandler provides a series of useful distinctions, each clearly illustrated with succinct descriptions of appropriate examples. Analysis quickly moves beyond such standard distinctions as the contrast between local environmental problems with immediate and easily observable consequences (such as acid rain) and problems of global scope involving longer term and uncertain consequences (such as global warming). Of particular interest is his use of maps to illustrate why European nations found it easier to cooperate on reducing sulfur emissions than nitrogen oxide, even though both are components of acid rain.

Less well-known distinctions are put to innovative uses. Sandler argues that unequal distributions of effort may facilitate production of public goods characterized by a "best-shot" production technology (such as discovering a cure for a new disease) while at the same time making it difficult to produce public goods with a "weakest link" technology (such as prophylactic measures taken to limit the spread of that disease). In the former case, levels of effort are related to the private advantages large contributors gain from development of a novel solution. In such circumstances, Sandler argues that the international community should act to reinforce or encourage unequal allocations of benefits. This (limited) celebration of inequity as a solution to some public goods provision problems is perhaps the clearest instance of his avowed intention that this book be seen as "provocative."

What I found most intriguing was Sandler's analysis of intergenerational justice. Sandler argues that the current population of the world is, in effect, engaged in a strategic interaction with subsequent generations. The current generation has a "first-mover advantage," since it can structure the range of choices available to later generations. This second mover has less effect on the outcome than in models of contract disputes or election campaigns, but emotional ties between generations may make the first player less likely to exploit this strategic advantage (under some conditions). This example nicely illustrates the benefits of forcing theory and substance to interact on a sustained basis; after reading this book, one's vision of both theory and substance may be changed. In particular, distinctions between national and international politics break down as the reader comes to realize that the same collective action problems and a similar (but not identical) range of solutions occur in both arenas.

Overall, the diverse components of this analysis are tightly integrated into a logically coherent whole. Yet, portions of the argument could have been more fully justified, and possible extensions or elaborations are left undeveloped. For example, controversies concerning income redistribution as a justification for governmental intervention are not discussed. Also, contrasts between democratic and autocratic regimes are not presented systematically. In different chapters democratic regimes are reputed to be both less concerned with maintaining a long-term reputation for toughness (by negotiating with terrorists) and more concerned with the longer term welfare of future generations (by protecting the environment). There may not be a direct contradiction here, since different actors (officials seeking reelection versus public preferences) were used in these examples, but the overall implications of democratization remain unclear.

The chapter on the "architecture of institutions" posits a developmental sequence in which a small group of like-minded states cooperate on an ad hoc basis and generate reliable information about the magnitude of the problem, thus providing the basis for negotiation of generally applicable treaty restrictions. The author admits this process may need to be supplemented with a minimal global infrastructure that can define property rights and sanction treaty violators. One important question was left unexamined, however. Since, as the author demonstrates, separate environmental problems are interrelated in the physical world, is it not possible that the international community needs to respond in a more comprehensive fashion? I share the author's skepticism regarding calls for comprehensive schemes of global governance, but I would like to have seen a stronger analytical basis for his dismissal of this alternative.

One unfortunate omission is application of the theoretical argument to multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations. Sandler focuses almost exclusively on the incentives facing national governments, which remain the single most important type of actor in transnational dilemmas. He does discuss INTELSAT as an example of nongovernmental provision of a club good, but this possibility could easily have been included in the initial presentation of the theoretical framework. (Some public policy analysts see nonprofits as filling gaps left open by market and government failures.)

This book develops a series of important connections between theory and substance in an eminently clear fashion. Basic background data are provided for major environmental concerns (plus transnational terrorism), but an expert in any one substantive area is likely to feel slighted by the frequent changes in topic. A reader seeking technical details will be disappointed by Sandler's informal style. Such readers can turn to other sources, including books by this same author.

But when it comes to demonstrating the benefits of comparison across different substantive issues, the importance of cross-issue linkages, or the value of communication between policy analysts and game theorists, this book would be hard to beat.
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
McGinis, Michael. "Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political, and Economic Problems." American Political Science Review, vol. 92, no. 2, 1998, p. 508+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA20851396&it=r&asid=55e346f76951619f58ea65a2889e73d3. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A20851396
Global Challenges
Nir Becker
64.4 (Apr. 1998): p1016.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 1998 Southern Economic Association
http://www.utc.edu/Outreach/SouthernEconomicAssociation/southern-economic-journal.html

By Todd Sandler.

New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xvii, 234. $54.95.

The impression that one gets after reading Global Challenges by Todd Sandler is that we are all going to die, either from nuclear bombs or simply from pollution. This inevitable, quite pessimistic conclusion keeps popping up in this book even though Sandler himself argues that one does not necessarily have to be so pessimistic. The book is about an interesting idea that occupies a lot of research energy in the environmental economics profession. With technological innovation, production externalities that do not respect national borders become more and more important and paint a gloomy future for our planet. Environmental problems have always concerned societies. What makes the problem that Sandler analyzes interesting is that, while in the past, some problems could be solved at the regional or national level, today, international effort is needed to solve such problems as global warming, tropical deforestation, and others discussed extensively in the book. While nations can internalize the externalities by mechanisms such as taxes, tradable permits, or direct control, these methods cannot work in the international arena without the countries agreeing first on the rules of the game. This is only one of the major difficulties facing the world today, and Sandler tries to explain them with some policy conclusions.

The book is not hard to read. It is interesting and stimulating. It is suited not only for economists but also (and maybe especially) for public policy students and for political scientists as well as policy makers not necessarily involved in academic work. This is both an advantage and disadvantage to be discussed later. The book contains eight chapters, which will be briefly discussed, but I will concentrate more on the overall direction taken by the book's contents.

In Chapter 1, the problem is defined and some examples are provided to show that we are living now in a problematic world. In Chapter 2, Sandler uses game theory in which the outcome to one player (in this case a country) depends not only on his or her actions but on the actions of the other players as well. This is especially suited to cases in which property rights are not well defined, such as with environmental resources. Sandler argues that there will be people that question his decision to use game theory, and he proposes combining results from other methods with this method. However, he stops short of suggesting what kind of alternatives one may consider and how one should go about combining them. Game theory is like a crystal ball. It shows us what might happen, but arriving at solutions (or equilibrium in game theory jargon) involves making assumptions that are sometimes reasonable but sometimes too hard to swallow.

These introductory chapters lead Sandler to Chapters 3 and 4, in which he describes different global problems. Starting with Chapter 3, a conflict between different generations is analyzed and, moving to Chapter 4, an array of environmental and political problems are discussed. These are indeed two major types of problems facing the planet: conflict among generations (most of them not yet born) and a conflict among nations at one point in time with regard to the problems of population, tropical deforestation, global warming, ozone shield depletion, acid rain, terrorism, and peacemaking! In addition, the interested reader could add Chapter 7 to these two chapters. There, Sandler analyzes in an interesting way the implications of (in)equality among different nations. Surprisingly, he finds that sometimes it is good to increase this inequality.

Chapter 5 deals with the institutional design to confront these problems. Sandler correctly suggests that, while there is no one solution for all problems, there are directions in which one might think about solutions to the problems raised earlier. I would recommend this chapter as the most important for decision makers and public policy students.

Chapter 6 tries to deal with the problem in an alternative way. Here, Sandler tries to combine the theories of evolutionary games to see if they can he considered as possible tools for analyses of such problems. He finds some arguments for major nations to join forces and convince others to follow. It is difficult, however, to buy the evolutionary game for the case of a conflict among different nations. I think evolution has more to do with individuals and trying to expand from that to nations would be stretching too far.

The book concludes with Chapter 8, in which Sandler summarizes his ideas and gives some reflections on future directions, as well as conclusions, about the most promising areas for policy as opposed to problems for which solutions are hard to find.

My concerns with the book are divided between a marketing aspect and a more substantial aspect. I will start with the latter. My major concern here is that Sandler spends more time (and space) on describing the problems and too little time on solving them. Indeed, a nongame theorist can be fascinated by describing what seems to be an unreasonable solution (continuation of environmental degradation) in neat terms of game theory. However, if one wants to go a step further, he or she would have a hard time finding solutions in the book. On the back cover, Russel Hardin is quoted, saying ". . . a remarkable array of problems . . . a superb starting point . . ."; one can also add that the array is too great to be useful and that, unfortunately, the start does not lead very far to any definite direction.

One point that Sandler makes is that benefits should be localized in order to sustain an agreement. How one should implement this remains a mystery to me. The major problem facing our planet is global warming. This problem has abatement benefits that spread all around the world. This is the nature of the problem and nothing much can be done about it. Actually, there is one thing that can be done about it and this is to create one global government for the entire world (or fewer governments). However, Sandler opposes this idea in several places in the book. The alternative of agreements would be very hard to implement, and while arguing in the first chapter that he intends to be provocative, Sandler would still advocate sovereign nations and ad hoc agreements. The next environmental summit is to be held in Kyoto, Japan, in December. After reading Sandler's book, I am not going to hold my breath for the results. One can feel which way the wind blows just by reading the newspapers in the U.S.

On the other hand, Sandler mentions the successful chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) agreements and sulfur dioxide. But this is exactly the problem. Reaching an agreement on these issues was easy because the benefits were greater than the costs, even if other countries would not cooperate. An agreement is easy to achieve when cooperation does not matter much but very hard to get when the benefits of cooperation are large but not locally concentrated, and there are many nations that will lose. This is exactly the case of global warming: We can use the old-fashioned way of ignoring the problem, but one day it will get us, all of us, including those who contributed to the emissions and those who did not.

Sandler has an interesting but dangerous argument about inequality. He claims that there are conditions under which increasing inequality would be a blessing. This would work in cases in which the richer countries with higher incomes would have a larger incentive to solve the problem. It might be so, but I would not conclude that one should set up a policy program to do that. Increasing inequality is by no means a Pareto improvement (although it could be in some exceptions). Even if environmental conditions could be improved, this gives little comfort to the developing nations. I certainly would not want to be the one presenting that idea in a developing country.

My other major concern is with the marketing of the book. I refer to the inclusion of terrorism as another example of a global challenge. I think that the book would have benefitted from deleting this topic and including some other topics related to environmental challenges. The linkage that Sandler tries to draw between the environment and terrorism is strained and hard to sell. On the other hand, topics such as water, which acts like air in the sense that it does not respect international borders, and food, which is very much related to the inequality problem, are totally ignored in the book. We were lately informed that Ted Turner has agreed to contribute $1 billion to the United Nations, given in 10 annual payments of $100 million. In his statement, Mr. Turner said that he would like to help the poorest people on earth. Rough estimates and back-of-the-envelope calculations point out that the poorest 10% of people (about half a billion) live on a daily income of $1. Suppose that the $100 million would be given to these people and suppose transaction costs are negligible. Each person would receive 20 cents. In order to solve the world hunger problem, the developed nations cannot count on individual contributions but will have to tax their citizens by hundreds of billions of dollars. Is this possible today? I don't think so. The same applies for water issues that offer a potential for cooperation but are also a potential direct cause for war between different nations. True, this is only a regional challenge, but so are acid rain and some other problems that were extensively analyzed by Sandler.

Terrorism should be treated in a different way. First, it is not only terrorism that can be analyzed in a game-theory framework but also the arms race, trade wars, etc. It is hard to understand why one specific problem should be explained and analyzed while others are not even mentioned. But terrorism has another feature that is distinct from environmental problems. In dealing with terrorists, we are dealing with people, while in dealing with the environment, we are dealing with nature. There is a huge difference between the two. Terrorists, as ugly as their actions might be, cannot be considered as a natural phenomenon. Rather, these are people that, as Sandler argues, have political causes. They only use terrible means to achieve them. I would add that terrorism is the power of the weak. In other words, today's terrorist is tomorrow's diplomat, and there are plenty of examples. I also cannot entirely agree with Sandler's definition of terrorism only as a group of people who are using means of fear and excessive power to influence the entire population. Would that make President Clinton a terrorist because he would not sign the treaty banning land-mine use? I doubt it.

All in all, I think Sandler's book is a serious and fascinating attempt to touch an important and interesting problem. I would certainly use it as a supplementary book in my class to further emphasize how life on earth is primarily a question of interdependence. The solutions to these problems, both institutionally and technologically, are very far away.

Nir Becker University of Haifa
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Becker, Nir. "Global Challenges." Southern Economic Journal, vol. 64, no. 4, 1998, p. 1016+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA20916046&it=r&asid=b753bf042002a9f93544b58779ae73dc. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A20916046
The Economics of Defense
Charles H. Anderton
63.3 (Jan. 1997): p812.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 1997 Southern Economic Association
http://www.utc.edu/Outreach/SouthernEconomicAssociation/southern-economic-journal.html

This book surveys many of the major contributions, methods and ideas of the defense and peace economics literature. The book draws upon Sandler and Hartley's comparative research strengths in the field. An excellent balance is struck between data, mathematical models, and discussion. Topics include alliances, arms races, arms control, weapons trade, procurement, defense industry, economic impacts of defense spending, terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The book could be used in graduate or upper-level undergraduate courses on the economics of peace and war. Economists entering the field will find the book to be an excellent source for what has been accomplished and for research areas that need the most attention. For specialists already in the field, the book serves as an up-to-date unified source of the academic literature on defense and peace economics.

After an opening chapter that defines the scope of the field, an excellent review of the economic theory of alliances is presented. The literature was motivated by Olson and Zeckhauser's [3] pure public good model of alliance burden-sharing. The model generates a number of testable predictions including the classic burden-sharing hypothesis: large, wealthy allies shoulder the burden for small, poorer allies. The prediction was borne out using 1964 data on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By the 1970s, the burden-sharing hypothesis no longer seemed to apply to NATO. To explain the empirical shortcoming, researchers developed more general alliance models that allowed military expenditures to provide multiple benefits that vary in their degree of publicness among allies. The new models provided fresh hypotheses about alliance behavior. The authors present the theoretical and empirical development of the economics of alliances in a rigorous, accessible, and thorough manner. Their summary table of twenty-three empirical studies on alliances is notable for its clarity and usefulness.

A chapter on arms races covers all of the core models: Prisoner's Dilemma, Richardson's equations, McGuire's static optimization model, the Intriligator-Brito model, Wolfson's economic warfare, Brito's dynamic optimization model, and Simaan and Cruz's differential game approach. Major extensions to the core models are presented as well as selected empirical studies of arms rivalries.

The procurement chapter highlights the principal-agent problem and builds upon Scherer's [4] classic text. Approaches to defense contracting and procurement cost estimation procedures are reviewed. Empirical studies of costs, learning curves, regulation, and competition draw upon U.S. and U.K. data.

The chapter on the economics of the defense industrial base (DIB) focuses on the supply side of the market for military equipment. Theoretically and empirically, this is one of the least developed fields in defense and peace economics. The authors reveal the deficiencies in the literature. The field is ripe for serious attention by specialists in industrial organization.

Some government specialists in procurement, military manpower, and defense industry may wish for more than the book offers in these areas. The authors emphasize and specialize in the academic literature, though they include some government sources. An insurmountable hurdle for many academics is that some important information on defense industry, military manpower, procurement, and the arms trade is classified.

A chapter on the relationship between defense spending and economic growth in less-developed countries begins with Emile Benoit's [1; 2] provocative contributions. Benoit's empirical results suggested a net positive association between defense spending and economic growth for forty-four LDC's. The findings generated a flood of research that Sandler and Hartley place into two broad categories: studies that found fault with Benoit's methodology, and studies that investigate the relationship between economic growth and defense spending using an alternative methodology. The authors discover the following pattern: (1) models that include demand side effects, where defense can crowd out investment, found that defense spending had a negative impact on growth; (2) most supply-side models found a small positive defense impact or none at all. The chapter concludes with an outstanding summary table of empirical studies.

The arms control and disarmament chapter is based on the paradigm that disarmament is an investment process involving short-run costs in return for long-run benefits. The short-run costs include unemployment and other resource dislocations. Long-run benefits involve the reallocation of resources to civilian goods. The authors survey the literature related to disarmament investment scenarios and other issues related to arms control (e.g., substitution effects, stability, verification, uncertainty, and lobbying pressures). One idea that the book could have addressed more fully is the assumption of cost-less arms reduction that permeates theoretical models of arms races and arms control. Cost-less arms reduction, of course, flies in the face of reality as Sandler and Hartley show. The destruction of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons and the storage of toxic weapons materials is very costly. Theoretical models of arms control need to explicitly incorporate resource constraints on arms reduction.

A chapter on non-conventional conflict surveys rational-actor models and empirical studies of revolutions, insurrections, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. These topics are rife with strategic interactions, free riding, preference manipulation, preference suppression, and bandwagon effects. Economists still have much to contribute to this literature.

The book contains useful chapters on the demand for military goods, military manpower, industrial and alliance policies, the arms trade, and defense conversion. A concluding chapter summarizes major findings and offers a rich menu of research agendas.

Defense and peace economics is relatively unknown in the economics profession. Very few graduate or undergraduate programs offer courses in the field. It is likely that many economists do not consider conflict to be a subject matter of economics. Sandler and Hartley's book demolishes that view. The book's thorough and natural application of economics to peace and war, and its accessibility, suggest a unique potential: non-specialists could use the book to develop a graduate or undergraduate course in the economics of peace, conflict, and defense. If you are looking for a new field with teaching and research challenges, give the book a try. For the few economists who have staked their careers in defense and peace economics, the book is an excellent summary and an encouragement to continue working in the field.

Charles H. Anderton College of the Holy Cross

References

1. Benoit, E., Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Boston: D.C. Heath, 1973.

2. -----, "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries." Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1973 26(2), 271-87.

3. Olson, M. and Zeckhauser, R., "An Economic Theory of Alliances." Review of Economics and Statistics, 1966 48(3), 266-79.

4. Scherer, F. The Weapons Acquisition Process: The Economic Incentives. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1964.
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Anderton, Charles H. "The Economics of Defense." Southern Economic Journal, vol. 63, no. 3, 1997, p. 812+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA19273197&it=r&asid=5e899b993583c5a5e6d5b7fa5a04665a. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A19273197
International Cooperation and Public Goods: Opportunities for the Western Alliance
Glenn Palmer
87.4 (Dec. 1993): p1052.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 1993 Cambridge University Press
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PSR

The application of public goods models to alliances represents more than a quarter-century's work. Starting from the original formulation by Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, a variety of tests, critiques, modifications, and extensions have been offered. At its best, the body of work provides an example of the scientific endeavor--cumulative research done on the basis of some generally agreed-upon agenda and issues. Boyer's book continues in this excellent tradition by broadening the scope of the discussion to include public goods beyond those directly relating to the security of NATO.

Boyer contends, correctly, that research on public goods and alliances has centered far too much on security matters. Certainly, the provision of security is the primary function of NATO; but the network among the member states that the alliance has fostered allows us both to see how other public goods are provided and to determine whether free-riding characterizes as much of international relations as the original Olson-Zeckhauser model implies. This is an important issue that goes to the heart of much of our understanding of how cooperation among states occurs. Thus, Boyer's work is significant for what it tells us about the less obvious forms of cooperation that may permeate international relations.

The heart of Boyer's argument is that many public goods, not just security, are provided by the Western alliance. Much of the research on the subject assumes that security is the only public good that matters; that since the United States provides a disproportionate share of that security, the other members of the alliance are free-riding; and that the provision of the public good is thus suboptimal. Boyer challenges these assumptions by using free-trade theory's concept of comparative advantage to develop his notion of political comparative advantage, which concludes that "policy constraints produce conditions that can facilitate a division of labor among the allies regarding alliance security". Essentially, these constraints mean that some states will find it relatively more costly to produce some goods than others. Boyer demonstrates the existence of these policy constraints through analyses of public opinion data within alliance members--analyses that conclude that there are a "diversity of security preferences among nations and . . . specialization tendencies within the alliance". For instance, Dutch public opinion approves of foreign aid to a much greater extent than do Americans; and in accordance with Boyer's argument, in 1987, the Netherlands spent almost 1% of its gross domestic product on Official Development Assistance, compared to .2% for the United States. Similarly, relative spending on research and development demonstrates some patterns that can be explained by Boyer's political comparative advantage. Boyer also includes an enlightening chapter on international monetary cooperation to demonstrate the multidimensional character of burden sharing.

Boyer's book has three flaws, two of them relatively minor. In his literature review section, Boyer relies too uncritically upon the work of others. For instance, Boyer's model maintains that security is provided through a variety of policies and that the analyst must put these policies together to achieve a full understanding of the public goods mechanisms underlying the alliance. To do this, Boyer unnecessarily and unfortunately ties his model to past efforts (particularly the joint-product model of Todd Sandler and his colleagues) to disentangle "security" into its components. It is unnecessary because Boyer's model has a definition of security that includes far more than its military component, while Sandler and associates are solely interested in the distinction between deterrent and defensive weaponry. It is unfortunate because Boyer paints a picture of cooperating states doing what they do best, while the joint-product model assumes the more traditional anarchic world of international relations. By tying his work so closely to this school, Boyer's contribution may be missed. The second minor flaw is the placement of his formal models in the appendices. These, to me, were the most interesting parts of the book; and readers would do well to consult them when reading the relevant chapters, rather than turn to them as an afterthought.

The more fundamental problem regards the characteristics of the goods being produced by the alliance. While Boyer admits that foreign aid and research and development are not pure public goods, they produce positive externalities in much the same way security does. But while security is provided knowingly and explicitly in order to be consumed by allies, foreign aid and research and development are much more private in nature; and their effects on allies is, at best, only a subsidiary consideration. An implicit and discernable division of labor on security matters is implied by its nature as a public good. But analyses of foreign aid and research and development are not based upon the clear testable propositions derived from the public goods paradigm. The conclusions of these analyses are, necessarily, more ad hoc and less than convincing. It is difficult to understand, for instance, why the Netherlands spends a relatively large proportion of its gross domestic product on foreign aid and research and development, while Belgium is only in the middle range. Boyer argues that preferences determine political comparative advantage, which, in turn, determines these relative expenditures. But this is the same as saying that they spend what they spend because they want to. Many of us base our expectations on assumptions regarding the preferences of the actors, but the tests of hypotheses derived from models built from those assumptions need to be rigorous and differentiating.

Nonetheless, Boyer's book is a fascinating and valuable contribution to the on-going work on alliances. The book should be carefully read by anyone interested in alliances, public goods, or formal models of international relations. His models provide what will become fruitful grounds for research and exploration; and for that, his contribution to the work in the field will be long-lasting and significant.

GLENN PALMER State University of New York, Binghamton
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Palmer, Glenn. "International Cooperation and Public Goods: Opportunities for the Western Alliance." American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 4, 1993, p. 1052+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA14903621&it=r&asid=255ed9d09864883eb151991ab1619203. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A14903621
Collective Action: Theory and Applications
Jack Knight
87.3 (Sept. 1993): p776.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 1993 Cambridge University Press
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PSR

Todd Sandler has written a systematic review and critical analysis of the vast literature on the collective action problem produced since the publication of Mancur Olson's classic, The Logic of Collective Action (1965). The book is an accomplished blend of theory, analytical applications, and empirical evidence. For newcomers to this literature, it will serve as an admirably thorough and accessible introduction to a surprisingly complex field. For scholars who have substantial knowledge of the literature, it might not provide many new theoretical insights; but it will offer an interesting and comprehensive source for the growing work, both theoretical and empirical, on these questions.

Sandler presents the main theoretical analysis in the first three chapters. The main thrust of this analysis proceeds as follows. He highlights three fundamental features of Olson's original discussion, which Olson offered as explanations of why collective action efforts might fail: (1) the size of the group (the larger the group, the greater the possibility of failure in the optimal provision of the collective good); (2) the composition of the group (the existence of asymmetries among group members in levels of demand or available productive resources can influence the likelihood of collective success); and (3) the institutional framework in which the collective effort is attempted (the existence of selective incentives or informal sanctions can enhance the prospects for collective success). He then assesses the continuing validity of these three features in light of 25 years of additional research on these questions.

This assessment constitutes one of the major contributions of the work. Through the use of recent advances in game theory, Sandler investigates the nature and structure of the strategic interactions involved in collective action efforts. The underlying idea is that the structure of such interactions is much richer and more complex than is presumed by the Olson analysis. By focusing on four central features of the nature of these interactions, Sandler is able to distinguish the types of collective action that are consistent with Olson's original explanation from those which are not. These central features are (1) the nature of the demand for the collective good, (2) the technology of production of the good, (3) any additional constraints on the production or distribution of the good, and (4) the nature of the expectations of the actors (i.e., what one actor believes the other actors plan to do in the interaction). Sandler concludes from this analysis that although Olson's original explanation does not generalize across all of the cases, it remains valid for a wide range of collective action problems.

Readers familiar with the literature on collective action will see that this is not, in and of itself, an original criticism of Olson. Noteworthy about Sandler's effort, however, is the precise and cogent manner in which he presents the many layers of his critique. This analysis is further augmented by his extensive discussion, in chapter 3, of recent theoretical developments related to collective-action questions. The subject areas of this discussion include the theory of clubs, variations on the assumption of strategic rationality, the neutrality theorem for pure public goods, the dynamic aspects of collective action, and the implications of uncertainty. Given Sandler's long interest in questions concerning the theory of clubs, it is understandable that he would devote a considerable amount of the discussion to this issue. But except for an extended discussion of the dynamic questions, the other issues receive merely cursory analysis. More attention to the strategic rationally and uncertainty issues would have been useful, especially to political scientists and other readers of this journal.

The chapters that focus on applications and empirical evidence testify to the power of the rational choice analysis of collective action. In these discussions, Sandler presents an impressive array of substantive examples drawn from economics, international relations, political science, labor relations, trade policy, and classical political theory. In addition to offering a persuasive case for the substantive relevance of the analytical framework that he assesses in the earlier chapters, he investigates the available empirical evidence as to the validity of the basic collective action model. This last discussion should be of special interest to readers seeking empirical tests of rational choice models.

In this book, Sandler has provided an important service to scholars interested in the general problem of collective action among rational, self-interested actors. He has synthesized a large body of theoretical and empirical work in a thoughtful and, for the most part, nontechnical manner. It can serve as a sophisticated guide through a complex and growing literature.
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Knight, Jack. "Collective Action: Theory and Applications." American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 3, 1993, p. 776+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA14541349&it=r&asid=2ec976a10672ee41dca8bd85946afd07. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A14541349
The Economics of Defence Spending: An International Survey
Charles H. Anderton
59.1 (July 1992): p113.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 1992 Southern Economic Association
http://www.utc.edu/Outreach/SouthernEconomicAssociation/southern-economic-journal.html

In this book Professors Hartley and Sandler present case studies of the economic, political and social causes and consequences of defense spending for nineteen nations.(1) The central theme of the book is the diversity of international experience in national attitudes and policies toward defense: some nations join military alliances (e.g., former Warsaw Treaty countries); others pursue independence (e.g., France) or neutrality (e.g., Sweden); some acquire large stockpiles of nuclear weapons (e.g., U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., France); others have nuclear weapons potential but have not acquired large stockpiles (e.g., India, Pakistan); some defense policies are driven primarily by external threat (e.g., Israel) while others seem partially designed to protect the regimes in power from their own citizens (e.g., Argentina, some former Warsaw Pact countries). Hartley and Sandler's book successfully displays the special characteristics and motivations that drive defense resource allocation within nations.

Each case study begins with descriptive statistics of economic and military indicators (e.g., GDP, growth, inflation, unemployment, government budget, military spending, defense burden). The foreign policies and military backgrounds of the nations between 1960 and 1987 are discussed with special attention paid to external or internal threats, arms rivalry, foreign commitments, alliance membership and the arms trade. The role of the military-industrial-complex within the nations is also considered. Most of the chapters present an empirical estimation of the country's demand for military expenditures. Throughout the chapters, distinctive features and problems for each nation are highlighted.

One of the most interesting chapters is Daniel N. Nelson's on the political economy of military effort in the former Warsaw Pact nations. Instead of focussing on the usual theme of the negative economic impacts of defense spending, Nelson explores the interplay between a failed economic and political system and higher military effort. Nelson's thesis is that the fundamental political and economic failure of socialism leads to higher military spending by insecure political elites. The higher military spending, however, further erodes the political and economic legitimacy of the system. The reduced capacity of the political elites to ensure their leading role leads to further extraction of resources for military protection or coercion. This negative dynamic must give way somewhere - in a Tiananmen-type crackdown or overthrow of the old order (or both). Consider the case of Poland:

Because of the political insecurity of the communist regime in Poland, military effort increased when socioeconomic crises surfaced. Yet such added commitments of resources when coupled with heightened activity by military and security forces, had debilitating effects: they cost billions of zloty, disrupted domestic transport and communications, lowered the availability of foreign high-technology imports, and exacerbated already bad relations between the regime and workers, intellectuals and students.

Martial law in Poland followed by the replacement of the communist party seems consistent with the negative dynamic hypothesized by Nelson. The model also seems relevant for the East European, Soviet and Chinese experiences.

Another interesting chapter is James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler's study of Sweden. In spite of its neutrality, Sweden maintains a significant commitment of resources to defense. At the time of the study (mid-1980s) Sweden had seven-and-a-half months conscription, active forces just under twice those of Norway, and when reserves were counted Sweden could mobilize 9.3 percent of its population within 72 hours.

Murdoch and Sandler use a joint model to test whether Sweden implicitly relied on NATO for part of its defense. In the joint product model, a nation's military spending yields a private defense good (e. g., protection of coastal water resources, control of social unrest) and an international public defense good (i.e., deterrence). Murdoch and Sandier maintain that NATO's adoption of the flexible response doctrine in the early 1970s led to conventional force build-ups by the smaller NATO allies, offering greater freeriding possibilities for Sweden. Murdoch and Sandier conclude from their empirical tests that prior to the flexible response doctrine, Sweden was self-reliant for its defense. During the flexible response era, however, Sweden began to rely, to some extent, on its NATO neighbor Norway.

Thomas Sheetz studies military resource allocation decisions in Argentina, Chile and Peru. While "border disputes have historically provided the principal pretext for arms procurement in the region," Sheetz believes that the attainment of internal security by the military governments and the special interests of the military branches have also been important motivators for military spending. Sheetz work implicitly raises the question, what is "national defense"? Is it protection of a nation's citizens from external threat or protection of the rulers of the nation from any conquest, external or internal? The latter definition of "national defense" seems appropriate for Argentina, Chile and Peru for at least some of their histories. (It also seems appropriate for some of the former Warsaw Pact nations and China).

Other case studies not mentioned here generally provide useful statistics, descriptions and analyses.

There are a few problems with the book. Some of the empirical specifications of the demand for military spending are ad hoc (as Hartley and Sandier recognize in their introduction). A few authors put too much faith in the reliability of their empirical measures and draw fairly strong conclusions from them. These are typical problems in the military spending literature.

The book would have benefitted from a case study of China. Hartley and Sandler were not able to come up with an expert to do the Chinese study. The Chinese case is important because the Chinese political elites have been able to use their military power to maintain control, in spite of their illegitimacy among much of the Chinese urban population. What distinctive political, economic, military, geographical, and cultural forces prevented the negative dynamic described by Nelson from overcoming the Chinese political elites while the East European leaders fell? A Chinese case study would help answer this question.

Another weakness of the book is that much of the material is outdated. The data run up through 1986 or 1987 in most cases. Some of the nations in the study no longer exist (e.g., E. Germany, Soviet Union). The world stage radically changed, altering the military underpinnings of most of the nations in the study. I don't consider this a major drawback. Almost every book written in defense economics between 1989 and 1991 became at least partially outdated within a few months. Our world maps had lifespans measured in weeks. The Hartley and Sandler book provides a diverse picture of the political economy of military spending just prior to and, in some cases, during the cataclysmic international events of the past few years. It is important analytical history. Defense economists, international relations specialists and anyone interested in trying to unravel and understand the economics and politics of defense issues that confronted many nations of the world in the mid-to-late 1980s will want to read this book.

(1.) The nations in the sample are the United States, the former Warsaw Pact countries (Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania), United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Sweden, Israel, India, Pakistan, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Japan.
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Anderton, Charles H. "The Economics of Defence Spending: An International Survey." Southern Economic Journal, vol. 59, no. 1, 1992, p. 113+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA12880481&it=r&asid=91ebd7e78da602cf7d314ab9e134398b. Accessed 27 Feb. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A12880481

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