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WORK TITLE: The Secret State
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PSEUDONYM(S):
BIRTHDATE:
WEBSITE:
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COUNTRY: Cyprus
NATIONALITY: British
https://theamericanscholar.org/spies-like-us/# * http://www.sheilland.com/john-hughes-wilson * http://www.coasttocoastam.com/guest/hughes-wilson-john/84329 * http://www.telegraph.co.uk/authors/john-hughes-wilson/ * https://www.amazon.com/John-Hughes-Wilson/e/B001HCZNJI
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LC control no.: n 95096354
LCCN Permalink: https://lccn.loc.gov/n95096354
HEADING: Hughes-Wilson, John
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PERSONAL
Male.
ADDRESS
CAREER
Military historian, broadcaster, and writer. Served in the Intelligence Corps and as a Special Forces Operations officer for 25 years, retired as colonel on NATO’s International Political Staff, 1994. Frequent broadcaster for BBC television and radio. Counterterrorism trainer; associate fellow of the RUSI; specialist consultant to United Nations and the European Union. Archives Bi-Fellow of Churchill College Cambridge.
MIILITARY:Served as an infantry officer with the Sherwood Foresters.
MEMBER:International Guild of Battlefield Guides (past president).
WRITINGS
SIDELIGHTS
British author John Hughes-Wilson is also a broadcaster who focuses on military and intelligence matters, a reflection of the several decades he spent in the British military and as a senior British intelligence officer. Among his numerous titles are Blindfold and Alone: British Executions in the Great War; The Puppet Masters: Spies, Traitors and the Real Forces behind World Events; and The Secret State: A History of Intelligence and Espionage (published in England as On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret World).
Blindfold and Alone
Hughes-Wilson’s 2001 work, Blindfold and Alone, written with Cathryn Corns, is a history of British soldiers who were executed during World War I by their own army. As Hughes-Wilson demonstrates, 351 British soldiers were executed between 1914 and 1920; of these, 266 were the result of desertion in the face of the enemy. These executions continue to resound a hundred years after the end of the war, as questions have arisen about shell shock and the role it played in desertions. There have also been calls for posthumous pardons, with the British government’s decision in 1998 to see these executed soldiers as victims, but stopping short of pardoning them. Hughes-Wilson and Corns attempt to put these executions in the context of the times regarding social, medical, and military customs. The authors divide the book into three parts and thirty-eight chapters. Part one looks at the history of the military law calling for such executions, as well as the history and evaluation of shell shock. Part two takes on individual cases and looks at the problem of desertion, and part three investigates the aftermath, including postwar commissions on the executions and the impact of shell shock on those convicted of desertion. The authors employed recently released court-martial records for this work, with Corns, a clinial scientist, adding her knowledge to that of the military experience of Hughes-Wilson.
Reviewing Blindfold and Alone in Library Journal, Michael F. Russo felt that “this is a unique, important work and a valuable resource.” London Guardian Online contributor Malcolm Brown also had praise, noting, “This is a powerful, forcefully argued and necessary book.” Brown added: “Overall I welcome and applaud this excellently researched and compulsively readable book. I entirely endorse its argument that we should be wary of applying modern civilian peacetime values to a time when the death penalty was almost universal, psychiatry scarcely existed and the resilience and reliability of her forces in the field was seen as crucial to Britain’s national survival. … I sense this subject will remain on the agenda for some time yet.”
The Puppet Masters
In The Puppet Masters, Hughes-Wilson takes readers behind the scenes to provide a secret history of intelligence operations. The author looks at intelligence gathering from the time of the Old Testament to that of Elizabeth I, the Cambridge spies, Cold War spies, and Middle Eastern terrorism. Hughes-Wilson contends that spying and not prostitution is the world’s oldest profession, and he provides numerous examples, from the prostitute in Jericho who hid Joshua’s spies to CIA gambits, and from intelligence networks of Caesar and Genghis Khan to those of George Washington and Napoleon Bonaparte. Hughes-Wilson examines great intelligence failures such as the World War I battle at Gallipoli and the World War II Dieppe Raid; he also looks at good intelligence that was overlooked or ignored, as in the World War II Battle of Arnhem, and additionally looks at instances of famed successes of intelligence, as in the defeat of the IRA bombing campaigns and the capture of the war criminal Slobodan Milosevic.
Writing in the Spectator, M.R.D. Foot had a positive assessment of the The Puppet Masters, noting: “As a good historian should, Hughes-Wilson moves effortlessly forwards from the past into the present, and shows how the current campaign the Western world is
fighting against various kinds of terror has developed. He takes an admirably practical, round-head, down-to-earth approach; unhappily, he is cavalier with dates. If he would set right such familiar facts as when the Duke of Wellington was prime minster, or in what month the Battle of Mons was fought, there should be a well-thumbed copy of this book on every general’s and every intelligence officer’s bedside table.” Similarly, a California Bookwatch reviewer termed the book a “lively read for both serious military history buffs and general-interest readers alike.” London Telegraph Online writer Noel Malcolm felt that “Hughes-Wilson’s most compelling examples belong to the field of military intelligence: again and again, he demonstrates that success on the battlefield has depended on it.” Malcolm added: “[Hughes-Wilson] is rightly critical of the sort of peace-time intelligence systems that turned various European countries, from the mid-19th century onwards, into police states.” Likewise, a contributor in the online World Intelligence Review concluded: “Many of Hughes-Wilson’s balder statements are calculated to stimulate debate and get the heart racing, and in this objective he undoubtedly succeeds.”
The Secret State
Hughes-Wilson provides another overview of intelligence and espionage operations in The Secret State, a “nuts-and-bolts look at the history and uses of intelligence,” according to a Kirkus Reviews critic. The author offers a brief snapshot of the history of espionage, then goes on to look at how intelligence operations actually work, and thereafter proceeds to the meat of the book. He examines numerous case histories from Pearl Harbor to the failure of Stalin to heed intelligence warnings of Hitler’s intention to invade the Societ Union and of the successful deception involved in D-Day; of the gradual transformation of intelligence from the human level (HUMINT) to the technoligical (SIGINT and ELINT); and of Cold War espionage from traitors to successes. Hughes-Wilson additionally looks at specific issues of security breaches such as WikiLeaks and Julian Assange, and the NSA breach by Edward Snowden.
The Kirkus Reviews critic called The Secret State a “vigorous survey with specific case studies and a useful bibliography for further study.” William Grabowski, writing in Library Journal, also had a high assessment, noting: “The balance of history, critical analyses, and insider’s perspective on often chilling realities will appeal to any reader interested in learning how global intelligence agencies function.” A Bookwatch contributor similarly commented: “The Secret State is a powerful history that asks many hard questions in a wide-ranging survey packed with political, historical, and social analysis.” Reviewing the British edition of the book in Global Security and Intelligence Studies, Adeyinka Makinde observed: “As a work which covers a great deal of ground and one that attempts to synthesize a narrative and analysis of the broad aspects of process and organizational efficacy within the political contexts of the day, [The Secret State] is likely to be of interest not only to the connoisseurs of popular history, but also to scholars and practitioners in the field of intelligence.”
BIOCRIT
PERIODICALS
Bookwatch, February, 2017, review of The Secret State: A History of Intelligence and Espionage.
California Bookwatch, August, 2006, review of The Puppet Masters: Spies, Traitors and the Real Forces behind World Events.
Global Security and Intelligence Studies, fall, 2016, Adeyinka Makinde, review of On Intelligence: The History of Espionare and the Secret World, p. 103.
Kirkus Reviews, December 1, 2016, review of The Secret State.
Library Journal, January, 2002, Michael F. Russo, review of Blindfold and Alone: British Military Executions in the Great War, p. 122; May 15, 2015, Henrietta Verma, “The Things They Carried: History 100(ish) Objects at a Time,” p. 94; January 1, 2017, William Grabowski, review of The Secret State, p. 115.
Publishers Weekly, December 19, 2016, review of The Secret State, p. 117.
Spectator, July 24, 2004, M.R.D. Foot, review of The Puppet Masters, p. 33.
ONLINE
American Scholar Online, https://theamericanscholar.org/ (September 11, 2017), “John Hughes-Wilson.”
Guardian Online, https://www.theguardian.com/ (August 24, 2001), Malcolm Brown, review of Blindfold and Alone.
Sheil Land Associates, http://www.sheilland.com/ (September 11, 2017), “John Hughes-Wilson.”
Telegraph Online, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ (July 4, 2004), Noel Malcolm, review of The Puppet Masters.
World Intelligence Review, http://www.worldintelligencereview.com/ (June 25, 2010), review of The Puppet Masters.*
John Hughes-Wilson
Person.png John Hughes-Wilson Amazon
(author)
Interests • military history
• intelligence agencies
John Hughes-Wilson is a full time author and broadcaster specialising in military-historical and intelligence matters. He has commentated widely on military and intelligence subjects.
In addition to being an Associate Fellow of RUSI and member of the RUSI Journal's Advisory Board, John is also an Archives Bi-Fellow of Churchill College Cambridge. In addition, he is a specialist consultant to the UN, EU, MoD, universities, and businesses. His works include: Puppet Masters: The Secret History of Intelligence (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2004), Military Intelligence Blunders, 1999 [new edition, 2004], Blindfold and Alone (with Cathryn Corns), 2001 and Editor, with international experts, of Nuclear Strategy for the 21st Century 1996 [1]
John Hughes-Wilson retired in 1994 as a Colonel on NATO's International Political Staff [Brussels]. His military career also included posts: Head of Policy Section and Senior British Intelligence Officer, SHAPE. [Mons] and Intelligence, Counter Terrorism, Special Forces. UK/ NATO appointments, Command and Staff.
A Document by John Hughes-Wilson
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Title Document type Publication date Subject(s) Description
Maggie's Guilty Secret article December 2013 Arms-to-Iraq
October surprise
Margaret Thatcher
Allivane International
Scott Report
William J. Casey
Jimmy Carter
Ronald Reagan A brief resume of the "Arms to Iraq affair" by a former colonel on NATO's international political staff in Brussels. It revisits the abortive rescue of US diplomatic staff held hostage by Iran under President Carter, paving the way for the UK to supply arms to both sides in the soon-to-follow Iran-Iraq war in covert defiance of UN sanctions. The affair remains one of ultra-sensitivity to the UK Establishment which has been engaged in a monumental cover-up ever since.
References
Jump up ↑ John Hughes-Wilson CV - RUSI web site January 2014
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John Hughes-Wilson is a full time author and broadcaster, specialising in military-historical intelligence matters. He has commentated widely on military and intelligence subjects. John is an Archives Bi-Fello of Churchill College, Cambridge, and an Associate Fellow of the RUSI. In addition, he is a specialist consultant to the UN, EU, MoD, universities and businesses. In 1994 he retired as Colonel on NATO's International Political Staff.
Some of John Hughes-Wilson's books:
John Hughes-Wilson
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WORKS IN PROGRESS - WINTER 2017
Spies Like Us
Print
iStock
By John Hughes-Wilson
DECEMBER 5, 2016
jhw
Colonel John Hughes-Wilson served in the British army’s intelligence corps for 30 years. His most recent book is The Secret State: A History of Intelligence and Espionage. We asked him to consider the future of spying.
1. When the Cold War fizzled in the early 1990s, American officials began asking what to do with the U.S. intelligence agencies. Politicians were keen to save money; the “securocrats” were focused on saving their jobs. It soon became clear, however, that the new political landscape had actually increased the need for intelligence. Today, fresh targets, national economic rivalries, new threats (such as weapons proliferation, terrorism, rogue states, arms trafficking, and drug dealing), and emerging threats like cyber war and Islamic jihad all demand new answers and intelligence structures. Is the present organization of agencies suitable for future challenges or does it need restructuring?
2. The biggest problem intelligence agencies face is the accelerating pace of change in the digital age, which has opened up mass surveillance beyond the comprehension of existing laws. New laws will be needed. How do we frame new legislation to give intelligence and security agencies the flexibility they need to compete without handing them carte blanche?
3. As South Africa’s Shadow Defence Minister David Maynier put it last year, “The state security agency has now become a state within a state beyond effective scrutiny and oversight of parliament.” Maynier highlighted a quandary of all democratic governments. National intelligence agencies too often take on an unregulated institutional life of their own, immune to taxpayers and lawmakers alike, without authority and without oversight. But because intelligence is the servant of government and not the other way around, this tendency only makes the need for ever-tighter oversight and control of intelligence and security agencies more imperative. But who will watch the watchmen? What agency will enforce the limits to government invasion of citizens’ privacy?
4. Intelligence blunders in the 21st century are potentially very dangerous. The greatest threat has always been the armed fanatic, whether that’s a lone killer with a grievance, a terrorist, or a rogue nation’s mad leader bent on war. But now we have nuclear arsenals. If the definition of responsible intelligence is “to speak truth to power,” then tomorrow’s spies will face today’s challenges: how to collect, collate, interpret, and disseminate timely, accurate intelligence to help policymakers and decision makers do their jobs. However, in the digital world, we are inundated by information. How can we use new technology—the very same technology that is making intelligence’s task so difficult now—to find peaceful solutions?
John Hughes-Wilson served in the British army’s intelligence corps for 30 years.
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Copyright © 2017 The American Scholar
QUOTE:
The Secret State is a powerful history that asks many
hard questions in a wide-ranging survey packed with political, historical, and social analysis.
10/2/2017 General OneFile - Saved Articles
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Print Marked Items
The Secret State
The Bookwatch.
(Feb. 2017):
COPYRIGHT 2017 Midwest Book Review
http://www.midwestbookreview.com/bw/index.htm
Full Text:
The Secret State
Colonel John Hughes-Wilson
Pegasus Books
80 Broad Street, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10004
9781681773025, $29.95, www.pegasusbooks.com
The Secret State: A History of Intelligence and Espionage is a study of espionage that comes from a colonel who
provides a sweeping history from the classical origins of intelligence work to modern times in the digital age, providing
an in-depth survey of traditional intelligence, the evolution of information-gathering processes from the Cold War to the
cyber environment, and how political forces around the world fostered new forms of reconnaissance photography,
intelligence gathering, interpretation, and information processing. The Secret State is a powerful history that asks many
hard questions in a wide-ranging survey packed with political, historical, and social analysis. It's a recommended pick
not just for political studies readers; but for any interested in the intelligence community and its background.
Source Citation (MLA 8th
Edition)
"The Secret State." The Bookwatch, Feb. 2017. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA485971417&it=r&asid=97f58b1c49d880913977578ab6ebab9c.
Accessed 2 Oct. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A485971417
---
QUOTE:
The balance of history, critical analyses, and insider's perspective on
often chilling realities will appeal to any reader interested in learning how global intelligence agencies function.
10/2/2017 General OneFile - Saved Articles
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/marklist.do?actionCmd=GET_MARK_LIST&userGroupName=schlager&inPS=true&prodId=ITOF&ts=1506967585231 2/11
Hughes-Wilson, John. The Secret State: A
History of Intelligence and Espionage
William Grabowski
Library Journal.
142.1 (Jan. 1, 2017): p115.
COPYRIGHT 2017 Library Journals, LLC. A wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution
permitted.
http://www.libraryjournal.com/
Full Text:
* Hughes-Wilson, John. The Secret State: A History of Intelligence and Espionage. Pegasus. Jan. 2017.528p. illus.
maps, bibliog. index. ISBN 9781681773025. $29.95; ebk. ISBN 9781681773698. POL SCI
The fusion of Internet, mass-media distortion, and profit-driven news reportage has created an environment light on--if
not tacitly hostile toward--facts. Hughes-Wilson's (.A Brief History of the Cold War) history of intelligence and
espionage is weighty in two regards: detail and daring. One of Britain's top military historians, he chronicles and
analyzes the traditional intelligence cycle of Direction, Collection, Collation, Interpretation, and Dissemination,
revealing its failings and triumphs, and warning against bureaucratic bloat. The uncluttered text is augmented by maps
and charts, appearing precisely where needed, showing patterns and illustrating protocols. The assessment of global
intelligence ranges from ancient Egypt and Rome through early photographic technology in World War I, the Cold War
electronic revolution (with Joseph Stalin among the first to ignore crucial intelligence), the catastrophic horrors--and
U.S. intelligence failures--of 9/11, into today's cyberwar batde space. Noteworthy is the absence of celebratory hype
that sometimes colors this field, but the author gives credit where due and frankly describes the spy's life as a jarring
mix of boredom and extreme danger. VERDICT The balance of history, critical analyses, and insider's perspective on
often chilling realities will appeal to any reader interested in learning how global intelligence agencies function.--
William Grabowski, McMechen, WV
Source Citation (MLA 8th
Edition)
Grabowski, William. "Hughes-Wilson, John. The Secret State: A History of Intelligence and Espionage." Library
Journal, 1 Jan. 2017, p. 115+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA476562418&it=r&asid=36a192f01409bf2083b895d9e41866c6.
Accessed 2 Oct. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A476562418
---
QUOTE:
nuts-and-bolts look at the history and uses of intelligence.
vigorous survey with specific case studies and a useful bibliography for further study.
10/2/2017 General OneFile - Saved Articles
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Hughes-Wilson, John: THE SECRET STATE
Kirkus Reviews.
(Dec. 1, 2016):
COPYRIGHT 2016 Kirkus Media LLC
http://www.kirkusreviews.com/
Full Text:
Hughes-Wilson, John THE SECRET STATE Pegasus (Adult Nonfiction) $29.95 1, 24 ISBN: 978-1-68177-302-5
A nuts-and-bolts look at the history and uses of intelligence.Veering off from his earlier Military Intelligence Blunders
(1999), this more technical manual by British military historian Hughes-Wilson gives a solid overview of the
importance of secret intelligence and case studies of successful and failed spying, from the earliest times to leaks by
Edward Snowden and Al Jazeera. First, the author gives a quick survey of the history of intelligence, specifically in
war, with an eye toward Machiavelli's canny statement: "Never attempt to win by force what can be won by deception."
Secrecy and surprise are tantamount to making good decisions, and Hughes-Wilson asserts, "military defeats are almost
invariably associated with intelligence defeats." He cites Hitler's foolhardy attack of the Soviet Union without grasping
Stalin's ability to muster nearly 600 divisions against the Nazi onslaught. The author delineates the process of
intelligence gathering (the "intelligence cycle") and the difference between HUMINT (human intelligence) and SIGINT
(signals intelligence). The former entails the motivations of the spy himself: money, ideology, coercion, ego, or
grievance. Hughes-Wilson offers famous examples of each, such as the stunning identity of a Soviet spy "at the very
top of the Nazi war machine," code-named "Werther," whose intelligence was crucial in defeating the Nazis on the
eastern front: the personal secretary to Hitler, Martin Bormann. SIGINT includes code-breaking, such as the work of
the fabled Room 40 in the Old Admiralty Building in London during World War II and the U.S. Navy's cryptological
breakthroughs in the summer of 1942, which allowed it to trap the Japanese fleet off of Midway Island. Surveillance
(e.g., the Cuban missile crisis) and deception (D-Day) garner their own chapters, followed by the famous cases in
which interpretation and dissemination of vital intelligence was ignored--most famously in the attack on Pearl Harbor.
As the author rightly notes, technological leaks (e.g., Wikileaks), terror, and cyberwar present new intelligence
challenges. A vigorous survey with specific case studies and a useful bibliography for further study.
Source Citation (MLA 8th
Edition)
"Hughes-Wilson, John: THE SECRET STATE." Kirkus Reviews, 1 Dec. 2016. General OneFile,
go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA471901838&it=r&asid=3702b0843568f983b3e929686e26a353.
Accessed 2 Oct. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A471901838
---
QUOTE:
As a good historian should, Hughes-Wilson
moves effortlessly forwards from the past into the present, and shows how the current campaign the Western world is
fighting against various kinds of terror has developed.
He takes an admirably practical, round-head, down-to-earth approach; unhappily, he is cavalier with dates. If he would
set right such familiar facts as when the Duke of Wellington was prime minster, or in what month the Battle of Mons
was fought, there should be a well-thumbed copy of this book on every general's and every intelligence officer's bedside
table.
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Eyes, ears and other means
M.R.D. Foot
Spectator.
295.9181 (July 24, 2004): p33.
COPYRIGHT 2004 The Spectator Ltd. (UK)
http://www.spectator.co.uk
Full Text:
THE PUPPET MASTERS: SPIES, TRAITORS AND THE REAL FORCES BEHIND WORLD EVENTS by John
Hughes-Wilson Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 20 [pounds sterling], pp. 478, ISBN 0297846159
Colonel Hughes-Wilson has written a powerful book about what, even within living memory, used to be a taboo
subject: the role of intelligence in warfare. In the reviewer's childhood, it was taken for granted in the British officer
corps that one never talked about intelligence; it was known to be indispensable but must remain under a veil of
secrecy, for talking about it would only draw attention to how it was secured, and thus endanger the supply of it. The
growth of mass media and public interest in it, and misunderstanding of it, has changed all that, but there has been, till
now, no comprehensive history of it.
When, to his own surprise, Hughes-Wilson was cross-posted as a captain from an infantry regiment into the Intelligence
Corps, he looked for a general history of the subject, and could not find one; so, early in his retirement from the army,
he has written one. He goes back to Herodotus for his opening: the story of Histiaeus, the Ionian prince, in house arrest
at Darius' capital of Susa, who tattooed a message on a slave's scalp, let the slave's hair grow again, and then sent him
off to Ionia with a verbal message--that his head was to be shaved once more. A major war resulted. He shows, too, that
the Roman emperors were well served with information from all over their empire, collected under the cover of
prospecting for food and forage for their armies.
Over and over again, he shows that recent and contemporary events have historical roots. There is nothing new about
terror: think of the Mongols' piles of skulls. There is nothing new about decipher: how did Mary, Queen of Scots come
to grief? Walsingham's agents intercepted her messages, deciphered them, and entrapped her. There is nothing new
about deception either: Sun Tzu was recommending it long before Christ was born. Hughes-Wilson expounds how
George Washington wielded deception against the British in the American War of Independence as deftly as Churchill's
deception staff wielded it a century and half later against the Germans in the war against Hitler.
Napoleon, like Montgomery, used to claim that his own strategic insight provided him with the victories that in fact
were secured for him by his intelligence staff. Once, Napoleon's intelligence failed, before Marengo, and he was lucky
to escape with his reputation intact. Once, Wellington's excellent intelligence system failed him, when a dunderhead
delayed a vital report just before Waterloo, and Napoleon almost surprised him. In the Peninsular War, Wellington had
had so far-ranging and so efficient a scouting system that Hughes-Wilson even compares it to the service Churchill's
commanders got from Enigma decrypts.
Among several good anecdotes about successful spies, the case of Julius Silber deserves note. Bilingual in English and
German, he served at the postal censorship in London for most of the 1914-18 war, and passed data steadily to
Germany, under cover of his own 'Passed by Censor' stamps, without ever being detected. Even the Bettany case had a
precedent: in Queen Anne's reign Harley had a confidential clerk called Gregg, who tried to change sides and was
unmasked by a security check inserted by the cautious Dutch in the route between Harley and a double-agent in France.
Gregg, like Queen Mary, went to the scaffold; Bettany only went to jail.
The principles remain the same; techniques continue to vary. This book has several useful summaries of the Cold War's
hot spots, such as the U-2 crisis and the unremitting submarine struggle. As a good historian should, Hughes-Wilson
moves effortlessly forwards from the past into the present, and shows how the current campaign the Western world is
fighting against various kinds of terror has developed.
He takes an admirably practical, round-head, down-to-earth approach; unhappily, he is cavalier with dates. If he would
set right such familiar facts as when the Duke of Wellington was prime minster, or in what month the Battle of Mons
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was fought, there should be a well-thumbed copy of this book on every general's and every intelligence officer's bedside
table.
Foot, M.R.D.
Source Citation (MLA 8th
Edition)
Foot, M.R.D. "Eyes, ears and other means." Spectator, 24 July 2004, p. 33. General OneFile,
go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA120191304&it=r&asid=090be583dd1d07a051ca8f64210fe459.
Accessed 2 Oct. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A120191304
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The Secret State: A History of Intelligence and
Espionage
Publishers Weekly.
263.52 (Dec. 19, 2016): p117.
COPYRIGHT 2016 PWxyz, LLC
http://www.publishersweekly.com/
Full Text:
The Secret State: A History of Intelligence and Espionage
John Hughes-Wilson. Pegasus, $29.95 (528p)
ISBN 978-1-68177-302-5
Hughes-Wilson (A Brief History of the Cold War), a leading British authority on intelligence matters, defines-and
describes the "intelligence cycle"--direction, collection, collation, interpretation, and dissemination--while delivering a
thematically organized account of intelligence in contemporary contexts. He begins with human intelligence
(HUMINT). Spies, Hughes-Wilson argues, are produced by money, ideology, coercion, ego, and grievance. Their
effectiveness is correspondingly random. Signal intelligence (SIGINT), which includes electronic and photographic
means, is specific. "Nothing is secret from the eye in the sky"--which enhances the difficulties of collation,
interpretation, and dissemination, as illustrated by the Tet Offensive, the Yom Kippur War, Operation Barbarossa, and
the attack on Pearl Harbor. Providing timely, accurate information to those who need to know involves security, "the
handmaiden of intelligence." When personnel security is lax or breached, "espionage, sabotage, and subversion" are
predictable consequences. In the electronic dimension, WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden exemplify the "fine line
between the crime of spying" and the public service of monitoring the modern surveillance state, which largely arose as
a response to terrorism. To underscore his points, he includes examples of intelligence fiascos. In an emerging era of
cyberwar, Hughes-Wilson concludes that "for good or ill, intelligence will remain at the heart of the world's affairs."
(Feb.)
Source Citation (MLA 8th
Edition)
"The Secret State: A History of Intelligence and Espionage." Publishers Weekly, 19 Dec. 2016, p. 117. General
OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA475324339&it=r&asid=4c17816fbb6e78ad0672bf617598e081.
Accessed 2 Oct. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A475324339
---
QUOTE:
this is a unique, important work and a valuable resource
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Blindfold and Alone: British Military Executions
in the Great War. (History)
Michael F. Russo
Library Journal.
127.1 (Jan. 2002): p122.
COPYRIGHT 2002 Library Journals, LLC. A wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution
permitted.
http://www.libraryjournal.com/
Full Text:
Corns, Cathryn & John Hughes-Wilson. Blindfold and Alone: British Military Executions in the Great War. Cassell,
dist. by Sterling. 2001. 543p. photogs. index. ISBN 0-304-35397-3. $34.95. HIST
It hardly seems fair to place a man in hell and then to punish him when he shows fear. Yet this was standard procedure
in the British army in World War I, when execution by firing squad was punishment for desertion in the face of the
enemy and other crimes. Using recently released courts-martial records, clinical scientist Corns and retired British army
intelligence Colonel Hughes-Wilson attempt to explain Britain's use of the ultimate punishment in terms of the military,
medical, and social mind-sets of the time. The book begins and ends well, with essential background at the front and
ruminative discussion at the back. In between, however, is a tedious bog. Here, the authors summarize case after
miserable case, each reported in exactly the same numbing, repetitive fashion. The authors do not chronicle all 346
British military executions that took place at that time; it just feels as if they do. Words like heart-rending and poignant
are sometimes used, but such emotions rarely emerge from the page. There's no flesh on these old bones, and, though it
is clear that the authors themselves see the men who were shot as individuals, for us they remain only names.
Nevertheless, this is a unique, important work and a valuable resource; recommended for both larger public and
academic libraries.--Michael F. Russo, Louisiana State Univ. Libs., Baton Rouge
Russo, Michael F.
Source Citation (MLA 8th
Edition)
Russo, Michael F. "Blindfold and Alone: British Military Executions in the Great War. (History)." Library Journal, Jan.
2002, p. 122. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA82479757&it=r&asid=390421c306f324a63b46deb92804cb21.
Accessed 2 Oct. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A82479757
---
QUOTE:
A lively read for both serious military
history buffs and general-interest readers alike.
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The Puppet Masters
California Bookwatch.
(Aug. 2006):
COPYRIGHT 2006 Midwest Book Review
http://www.midwestbookreview.com
Full Text:
The Puppet Masters
John Hughes-Wilson
Cassell
Wellington House, 125 Strand, London WC2R OBB
0304367109 $12.95 www.orionbooks.co.uk
THE PUPPET MASTERS: SPIES, TRAITORS AND THE REAL FORCES BEHIND WORLD EVENTS covers
intelligence around the world and its effect on major events in world history, from Cold War spying operations to the
effects of intelligence on statesmen, politicians, and agencies of military and government alike. It draws strong
connections between world history and legacies left by intelligence operations during war and peacetime alike,
providing a fine survey of underlying rationale, historical events, and more. A lively read for both serious military
history buffs and general-interest readers alike.
Source Citation (MLA 8th
Edition)
"The Puppet Masters." California Bookwatch, Aug. 2006. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA149662283&it=r&asid=68a0e14585fe5dfb919c42911866d118.
Accessed 2 Oct. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A149662283
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The things they carried: history 100(ish) objects
at a time
Henrietta Verma
Library Journal.
140.9 (May 15, 2015): p94.
COPYRIGHT 2015 Library Journals, LLC. A wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution
permitted.
http://www.libraryjournal.com/
Full Text:
The idea of presenting popular history through objects got a boost from Tom Standage's popular A History of the World
In Six Glasses (Walker. 2005), which discusses human development from the Fertile Crescent, where they drank beer,
to today's Coca Cola-fueled society. The trend has really taken off lately, though, with readers who like a reference
browse delighting in books that explore various aspects of our world and its history through ... stuff.
Collections of 100 Items are particularly the rage, and are also fascinating. More than, say, six drinks, a compilation of
100 objects gives the author space to get a little whimsical or unexpected. Like any list that claims to be definitive, the
chosen artifacts can spark some knotty discussions. Which items were chosen, and why? What's missing? Which
choices are odd, or expand the definition of the title?
World Tours
A recent standout is Neil MacGregor's A History of the World in 100 Objects (Viking. 2009. ISBN 9780670022700.
$45), a book that makes 100 seem a tiny number. All that history in so few things? As director of the British Museum,
however, MacGregor had the knowledge and the offerings--all the items are from the British Museum--to condense
history into an examination of a few items and to make it captivating. The book's cover claims that the material looks at
the world "From the Handaxe to the Credit Card," but inside is information on everything from known items such as the
Rosetta Stone to "Maya Relief of Royal Blood-Letting" and "Australian Bark Shield." The related BBC series is
available for download at bbc.co.uk/ahistoryoftheworld.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
DK and the Smithsonian's History of the World in 1,000 Objects (2014. ISBN 9781465422897. $50) luxuriates in its
expansiveness, offering DK's familiar layout of color photo-filled spreads, with images complemented by the
publisher's usual mix of generous narratives and pithy captions. Some of the photos are very large, covering most of the
oversize book's width, while others focus on tiny details or offer smaller images of artifacts. Chronological chapters
range from "Early Societies: 20,000-700 BCE" to "A Shrinking World: 1900 to Present" and a final chapter provides
illustrated "Timelines of World History."
A look at the locals
Other titles cover less of the world but also delve into 100 (ish) objects. The Smithsonian's History of America in 101
Objects (Penguin. 2013. ISBN 9781594205293. $50; LJ 10/1/13), by anthropologist and cultural historian Richard
Kurin, the Smithsonian Institution's under secretary for history, art, and culture, was inspired by MacGregor's book and
takes a similar approach. The objects, grouped by era in the volume, are from the museum's collection (though several
supporting images feature items from other institutions). The assemblage is an often heartbreaking look at the history of
America. Featured, for example, are slave shackles, Sitting Bull's drawing book, Dorothy's ruby slippers, Cesar
Chavez's union jacket, and a New York Fire Department engine door from September 11.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
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In the introduction to Sam Roberts's A History of New York in 101 Objects (S. & S. 2014. ISBN 9781476728773 $30),
the New York Times urban affairs correspondent mulls the difficulty of choosing so few items to represent the city, and
explains his criteria--the objects included are durable and "have played some transformative role in New York City's
history or [are] emblematic of some historic transformation." The book is not all neck-craning, big city-wowza--in fact,
it's mostly not that. While the Chrysler Building's spire is listed, for example, so are bagels and subway tokens (the
latter have gone the way of the Mastodon, whose tusk also makes the cut).
For patrons who are more digitally inclined, Adam Matthew's History of America in 50 Documents, part of its
American History, 1493-1859 database, offers primary source material from New York's Gilder Lehrman Institute of
American History. The holdings are weighted toward documents from the Revolutionary and Civil War periods and
include such items as an annotated copy of the first draft of the U.S. Constitution, correspondence from George
Washington, and a letter from Harriet Beecher Stowe to Queen Victoria and Prince Albert.
Also focusing on one country, but a much smaller one, is Fintan O'Toole's A History of Ireland in 100 Objects (Royal
Irish Academy. 2013. ISBN 9781908996152. $50; LJ 5/1/13). O'Toole, the literary editor of the Irish Times, describes
how people have inhabited Ireland for a relatively short period of time, and much of that history is unrecorded. His
introduction explains the waves of change that buffeted the island over the centuries and that resulted in the items on
display in the book, most of which come from the country's National Museum. They range from a Mesolithic fish trap
to a decommissioned AK47 and include magnificent relics such as the Cross of Cong but also everyday symbols of a
tough history, such as an emigrant's suitcase.
Events in detail
MacGregor (A History of the World in 100 Objects) has also turned his attention to a much more microhistory; his
Shakespeare's Restless World: A Portrait of an Era in Twenty Objects (Penguin. 2013. ISBN 9780670026340. $36; LJ
1/14) examines Jacobean (1603-25) society in detail, again using objects from the British Museum. This time the author
worked with the Royal Shakespeare Company and the BBC and chose objects that offer "twenty ... journeys, through
the charisma of things, to a past world." Sir Francis Drake's circumnavigation medal opens the work, for instance, and a
description of his accomplishment is complemented by navigation-related quotes from the Bard's works.
Antiquarian map and book dealer Tim Bryars and the British Library's curator of antiquarian mapping Tom Harper's A
History of the Twentieth Century in 100 Maps (Univ. of Chicago. 2014. ISBN 9780226202471. $45) chronicles "the
first period of near-universal map literacy." Its beautiful entries are not only traditional maps; the authors' careful
language shows that some of the items that were "printed, drawn or otherwise constructed" last century were
technically diagrams. Others showed imaginary places or were rendered as, for example, postcards. The images are
accompanied by lengthy histories of the items and the circumstances under which they were created, making the work
ideal for readers of cultural and cartographic history.
The Civil War is a perennially popular topic for books, but 2013 saw an especially large crop as it was the
sesquicentennial of the Battle of Gettysburg, which took place in July 1863. Among the offerings Lincoln scholar
Harold Holzer's The Civil War in 50 Objects (Viking. ISBN 9780670014637. $36; LJ 1/13). Holzer used the New-York
Historical Society's Gilder Lehrman Collection as a source and describes the society's preservation of war-related
artifacts and documents, and Civil War-era New York. In the book's introduction, Holzer lays out his focus: "the arc of
black freedom," he says, "consitututes the most important thread running through this book." That freedom must have
seemed very distant at the start of the war is evidenced in the first artifact: shackles for a child slave.
Last year saw the centennial of the beginning of World War I and released to coincide with the anniversary were three
books titled The First World War in 100 Objects: one by Peter Doyle and Hew Strachan (History Pr. ISBN
9780142181591. $30); another by John Hughes-Wilson and Nigel Steel (Firefly. ISBN 9781770854130. $39.95); and
the third by Gary Sheffield (Carlton Bks. ISBN 9781780973968. $39.95). Coverage in the books overlaps, with Doyle
and Strachan's and Sheffield's titles both featuring Archduke Franz Ferdinand's car as the first entry, for example.
Overall, each title presents a mix of personal, military, and political items, but the Firefly publication stands out for the
quality of its images and the depth of knowledge brought to the project by its creators; Colonel Hughes-Wilson is
president of the International Guild of Battlefield Guides, and Steel is the Imperial War Museum's principal historian.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
Food and more What we ate over the centuries says a lot about us, of course, making William Sitwell's A History of
Food in 100 Recipes (Little, Brown. 2013. ISBN 9780316229975. $35; LJ 4/15/13) a rewarding and unusual read. The
entries cover from 1958 BCE to 2011, and some are as scarily authentic as you might fear ("bring to a boil while
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removing the fetid scum," reads a 1250 Egyptian cookbook entry on making meatballs in pomegranate sauce). Versions
of many of even the older foodstuffs described, however--honeyed cheesecake from 200 BCE and hot chocolate from
1568 CE--can be found in homes today, though perhaps not under the same names. Adventurous cooks as well as those
who enjoy alternative histories will enjoy this behind-the-scenes look at the past.
Each of the 100 symbols in astrologer Sarah Bartlett's beautifully illustrated Secrets of the Universe in 100 Symbols
(Fair Winds. 2015. ISBN 9781592336760. $30; LJ 4/1/15) represents a culture's way of making or finding meaning in
the world; the book goes into considerable detail on the history behind the symbols and often describes materials and
creation. For example, the entry on Jewish tefillin describes how the boxes, which contain scrolls, are used during
prayer in accordance with Talmudic instructions. The text explicates the rules governing the sacred objects' creation and
use, information that is accompanied by close-up photographs of tefillin and another photo of them being worn. As well
as types of objects, particular artifacts or phenomena are often described, such as Halley's Comet, an ancient symbol of
both good and evil. Deities and other personages get their due, too.
In The History of the Book in 100 Books (Firefly. 2014. ISBN 9781770854062. $35; LJ 11/1/14), print historian,
librarian, and consultant (UNESCO; the British Library) Roderick Cave and picture researcher Sara Ayad discuss and
portray 100 "books" on a spread each, arranged in chapters on eras. They begin with ancient cave paintings and tally
sticks and continue through 12th-century Indian palm-leaf manuscripts, the Archimedes Palimpsest (1229), and
Ptolemy's 1482 Cosmographia to items that resemble what we read today. The books and accompanying crisp color
photos are absorbing enough by themselves, but the information on each item and the world it came from make this
exciting browse an interdisciplinary treasure as well.
Finally, for a more lighthearted look at history, try Josh Leventhal's A History of Baseball in 100 Objects (Black Dog &
Leventhal. May 2015. ISBN 9781579129910. $29.95). On its "tour through the bats, balls, uniforms, awards,
documents, and other artifacts that tell the story of the national pastime," the title also investigates American and world
history. Readers will learn, for example, that President William H. Taft was not available to throw out the first pitch in
the opening game of the 1912 season because of the sinking of the Titanic earlier in the week, and that Boston's
Wrigley Field was scheduled to get its first electric lights in December 1941, but then Pearl Harbor was attacked and
the construction materials were diverted to the war effort. The photographs are telling as well; the six men in the
portrait of the Knickerbocker Base Ball Club, c. 1847 are all white Americans, whereas the book's last photo captures
teams from the Dominican Republic and Venezuela lining up for the 2013 World Baseball Classic.
Henrietta Verma is Editor, LJ Reviews
Verma, Henrietta
Source Citation (MLA 8th
Edition)
Verma, Henrietta. "The things they carried: history 100(ish) objects at a time." Library Journal, 15 May 2015, p. 94+.
General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA413785711&it=r&asid=7bef8ed8d57e234466a70805925749d7.
Accessed 2 Oct. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A413785711
QUOTE:
as a work which covers a great deal of ground and one
that attempts to synthesize a narrative and analysis of the broad aspects of process
and organizational efficacy within the political contexts of the day, it is likely to be
of interest not only to the connoisseurs of popular history, but also to scholars and
practitioners in the field of intelligence.
Global Security and Intelligence Studies - Volume 2, Number 1 - Fall 2016
pp. 103-105
Adeyinka Makinde
John Hughes-Wilson (2016). On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret
World, First Edition. London: Constable. ISBN: 978-1-472-11353-5. 528 pages. £25.00
The field of intelligence studies is a relatively new academic discipline that has
developed an identifiable intellectual community. It has served as a conduit through
which the history of war, the development and decline of empire as well as the calibration
of foreign policy have been subjected to fresh formats of inquiry and analysis. The study
of the relationship between the practice of intelligence and its impact on state policy
in so far as military action is concerned is one, given the repercussions, respectively, of
the attack on 9/11 and the decision to go to war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, that is
of particular interest to scholars, policymakers and practitioners of the craft. It is also a
subject area of inestimable fascination to a general reading public with a ready appetite
for stories on espionage and accustomed to a market in which there has been a surge
in the popular history genre. This has meant that studies on the history of military
intelligence, as is the case with other genres of history, have been divided into those
that fit alternately into the academic and popular writing categories.
John Hughes-Wilson, a retired British Army Intelligence Corps colonel whose
career spanned active service in the Falkland Islands and Northern Ireland as well
as administrative postings in Whitehall and NATO, is an author whose offerings on
military intelligence history fit into the popular writing category. His brief but robust
introduction offers no apologies for avoiding “getting completely lost in the thickets
of philosophy and Hegelian dialectic” as an academic text might tend to do. Instead,
his work adopts a case study approach to explain and analyze the operation of the
intelligence apparatus within the context of espionage and the conduct of war.
Before this, he takes the reader through preliminaries: a chapter on a condensed
history of the development of what he refers to as the “Second Oldest Profession” from
biblical times to the modern era, followed by a brief consolidating chapter stressing
the importance of intelligence in national self-defense by references to statements
written by Machiavelli and Sun Tzu while at the same time offering words of rebuke
for the shortcomings of Clausewitz’s 1832 masterwork, On War. He provides a lucid
overview of the fundamentals of the intelligence cycle, providing admittedly simplified
diagrammatic representations of the process, a collection plan as well as an indicator
and warning display. These are tools he deploys to function as key reference points
for analysis when he explores the different themes which he proceeds to set out. His
consideration of HUMINT and the factors typically enabling intelligence agencies to
penetrate their competitors is predicated on the traditional MICE acronym: Money,
Ideology, Compromise/Coercion and Ego. These factors provide the backdrop to his
retellings of major espionage failings and successes of American and British intelligence
agencies including that of the Walker family’s betrayal of U.S. Navy secrets and Oleg
Penkovsky’s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Review of On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and
the Secret World
doi: 10.18278/gsis.2.1.7
Global Security and Intelligence Studies - Volume 2, Number 1 - Fall 2016
104
Hughes-Wilson is particularly adept at fleshing out the historical development
of SIGNIT and IMINT from the most rudimentary technology to the highly advanced
equipment of today. His case study on how signals intelligence was crucial in ensuring
the victory of the U.S. Navy over the Imperial Japanese Navy at Midway is particularly
gripping. It is also enlightening about the organizational pathologies perpetually at
play in contemporary intelligence structures, one aspect of which relates to the vexed
question of the ownership of SIGNET: does it reside with the communicators and
signalers on the one hand or with the intelligence people?
Hughes-Wilson is an engaging writer who brings the reader inside the mind
of the prudent intelligence operative: consistently asking questions and performing
an officious bystander test as he sifts through large amounts of information. He is
very good at guiding the reader through the practical application of the theories
undergirding the intelligence process. This is particularly illuminating in regard to
his summation of the severe deficiencies in the American intelligence apparatus in
1941 on the eve of a war that all knew was coming. For it is the case that the problems
leading up to Pearl Harbor, including those of over compartmentalization and interorganizational
rivalries, are ones of enduring relevance and bring into focus the need
for all-source integration and assessment; an ideal which is difficult to achieve within
any national security establishment.
The choice of case studies tailored to fit a particular theme of the intelligence
process, whether related to failures or successes, provides the basis for a series of
illuminating deconstructions. For instance, the failure of the political leaders of the
Soviet Union and Israel to predict the oncoming onslaughts, respectively, of Operation
Barbarossa in 1941 and Operation Badr in 1973 was due, Hughes-Wilson argues,
not with nonpossession of the correct information predicting enemy intentions but
instead centered on the translation of information into intelligence. In the former
case, it hinged on a developed organizational culture of only reporting information
which the dictator found palatable while the latter was caused by the monopolization
of all-source intelligence by Israeli Military Intelligence. On the issue of protecting
state secrets, he uses the recent high-profile cases of Bradley Manning, Julian Assange,
and Edward Snowden as exemplars explaining the impact of an inadequate security
checking mechanism, the increasing difficulty of securing masses of electronically
collected data in the high-technology age and the eternal dilemma of balancing
national security concerns with that of protecting whistleblowers acting in the public
interest. For deception, the Allied planning of the highly risky, but ultimately successful,
D-Day landings is used while the area dealing with intelligence fiascos considers the
U.S. Special Forces operations in Son Tay, Vietnam and Iran at the time of the hostage
crisis. The author also provides an excoriating analysis of the role played by the leaders
of the British intelligence community in enabling the administration of Tony Blair to
produce a “dodgy dossier” which led the country into a war of dubious legality against
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003.
The issue of intelligence and the challenges posed to national security by
terrorism and by cyber warfare are also given consideration by the author. He provides
a thoughtful summary on the grievances and “catalysts for conflict” that often form the
Global Security and Intelligence Studies
105
backdrop to terror campaigns before focusing on the contemporary security concerns
associated with the “War on Terror”. He is adept at summarizing the interrelatedness
of cyber war, cyber terrorism, and cybercrime. Here, the threats posed by China, the
Russian Federation, and North Korea are pointedly noted as he stresses the complexities
associated with tracing the source of attacks and the severe consequences that could
impinge on civil and military capacities in the event of an all-out war.
Hughes-Wilson provides a lengthy but highly readable consideration of
military intelligence that succeeds in giving the reader a fairly comprehensive overview
of the practice of intelligence and security. While it falls short of the rigor expected of
an academic text in terms of theoretical detail and the provision of a comprehensive
bibliography and citations, it cannot be faulted for being unchallenging or lacking in
analytical content. The revolutionizing effect of technological advancement on the
gathering, dissemination, and evaluation of intelligence is cogently explained as indeed
is the underpinning rationale of his assessment that Julian Assange’s “Wikileaks”
project has succeeded in redefining security.
But it does have its shortcomings. For instance, there is no discernible standard
regarding the selection or non-inclusion of case studies. Also, given the contemporary
prevalence of asymmetric warfare, an examination of the role of intelligence in
conflicts between state and nonstate militaries would have been apt. The conflict in
2006 between Israel and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah would have presented an ideal
case study. It is clear to military analysts that a series of skillfully planned deceptions
and security strategies on the part of Hezbollah provided the means for the militia
to withstand the might of the Israeli Defence Force. A thorough consideration of
intelligence ought arguably to have included an appraisal of the darker aspects of the
use of intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency strategies. U.S. military intelligence
covertly orchestrated death squads using a recurring modus operandi to tackle
insurgencies in Vietnam, Central America, and Iraq while British army officer Frank
Kitson’s concept of “gangs and counter-gangs” was ruthlessly employed in Kenya and
Northern Ireland. In a similar vein, the use of anti-Warsaw Pact “stay behind” cells
under the command of NATO during the Cold War-era communist containment
strategy is not mentioned. Still, as a work which covers a great deal of ground and one
that attempts to synthesize a narrative and analysis of the broad aspects of process
and organizational efficacy within the political contexts of the day, it is likely to be
of interest not only to the connoisseurs of popular history, but also to scholars and
practitioners in the field of intelligence.
Adeyinka Makinde
QUOTE:
Hughes-Wilson's most compelling examples belong to the field of military intelligence: again and again, he demonstrates that success on the battlefield has depended on it. He is rightly critical of the sort of peace-time intelligence systems that turned various European countries, from the mid-19th century onwards, into police states.
Intelligence services are forever
Noel Malcolm reviews The Puppet-Masters by John Hughes-Wilson
12:01AM BST 04 Jul 2004
James Bond films are not what they used to be. In many ways, they are better, with much more spectacular action sequences and special effects. But the one defect that has been painfully obvious, since the end of the Cold War, is the lack of a credible enemy.
True, the old films had more than their fair share of crazed megalomaniacs and absurdly improbable world-wide federations of evil. Yet those fantasy villains were somehow acceptable at the time, because we knew that behind and beyond them all there loomed a real enemy: Moscow Centre. The script-writers 'most recent attempts at topical realism - a psychopathic version of Rupert Murdoch fomenting war in the China Seas; a high-tech North Korean getting hold of the latest satellite weaponry - do not and cannot fill that gap.
Of course, since September 11, 2001, we have all known what the most vital task of the intelligence services must be: protecting our citizens from mass murder by terrorists. During the previous decade, however, there was much less certainty about what those services should be doing. One popular idea was that they should concentrate on tackling the drugs trade and international crime popular, that is, with the politicians, but not with the intelligence professionals themselves, who did not want to be turned into glorified policemen.
John Hughes-Wilson is a former officer in the Intelligence Corps; and he seems to have got the idea of writing this book some time in the 1990s, when the ''swords into ploughshares'' argument was still going strong. Here is someone determined to call a sword a sword - and to keep it that way. For the overall argument of the book is that the need for high-quality intelligence is not a product of temporary circumstances, but a permanent feature of human life.
Accordingly, Hughes-Wilson starts with an ancient Egyptian intelligence report of circa 3000BC: ''We have found the track of 32 men and three donkeys''. Next we have the spies sent by Joshua into the city of Jericho, in c1200BC ; then examples of intelligence-gathering among ancient Greeks and Romans; stories of medieval Assassins, Mongols, Venetians and others; chapters on Elizabeth I 's spymaster, Walsingham, on Richelieu and his ''Eminence Grise '', and so on.
By the 19th century the documentation is more plentiful, and the stories become more detailed: Wellington's codebreaker, the espionage chiefs who served Napoleon and Bismarck, the spies on both sides in the American Civil War. And finally we have the embarras de richesses of the 20th century, with its institutionalised intelligence services in two global hot wars and a cold one. Hughes-Wilson has a lively pen and an eye for a good anecdote. Many classic episodes are described in these pages - for example, the last-minute discovery of Benedict Arnold's plan to deliver West Point to the British in 1780, or the workings of the ''Double Cross'' system under which so many German agents in Britain were ''turned'' during the Second World War.
Some less well-known stories are also used to good effect. It is nice to know, for example, that when Abraham Lincoln's spymaster (Alan Pinkerton) wanted to eaves-drop on a society hostess suspected of passing information to the enemy, he got his men to form a human pyramid, with the acrobat at the top poised outside the window of her first-floor salon. (And even nicer to learn that, when they had arrested her and were lying in wait for her visitors, the reason why none came was that, unbeknown to them, her small daughter had climbed a tree by the front gate and was shouting to passers-by, ''Mother 's been arrested!'')
For all its serious purpose, then, this is certainly an enjoyable romp through world history. But the enjoyment is qualified in several ways. HughesWilson's accuracy in matters of fact is not what one might hope for in an intelligence officer. Names are often misspelt, his command of foreign languages is shaky, and his grasp of history unsure. When, for example, he describes the Congress of Berlin as ''Bismarck 's diplomatic masterstroke to cement Prussia's victories and to lock all Europe into his new order'', it is clear that he has never even looked it up in any of the internet encyclopaedias to which he makes such frequent reference.
His breezy summaries of historical issues do not inspire confidence - for instance, his claim that the medieval Church had an ''almost total monopoly of literacy''. Or take this comment on the early Jesuits: ''In their fanatical pursuit of martyrdom and hatred for their opponents these religioncrazed Catholic youths appear to have been little different from their modern counterparts, the Islamic suicide bombers''. Some Jesuit missionaries may have found imaginative ways to get themselves martyred, but their methods did not include, so far as I know, suicide bombing.
When narration gives way to comment, a saloon-bar style creeps in. Thus: ''Even when governments struck back hard against killers and terrorists (as did the British Special Forces in Northern Ireland, London and Gibraltar), droves of well-paid lawyers and journalists strove to prove that their very own protector, the State, had in fact been acting outside the law''. Why ''droves'', one wonders, and what exactly is implied by dismissing those lawyers and journalists as ''well-paid''? But the greatest problem with this book is that its devotion to storytelling leaves no proper room for analysis at all. The stories cover a huge range of matters, all lumped together here as ''intelligence'': not just information-gathering, but also the use of ''agents of influence'', disinformation, and economic warfare. Little is said about the relative values of these things, or about possible conflicts between them.
Hughes-Wilson's most compelling examples belong to the field of military intelligence: again and again, he demonstrates that success on the battlefield has depended on it. He is rightly critical of the sort of peace-time intelligence systems that turned various European countries, from the mid-19th century onwards, into police states. But while he shows that, from Bismarck onwards, governments could benefit from combining aspects of the military and civilian systems, he nowhere tackles the difficult issue of how to keep them apart.
Nor, it seems, would he be well suited to do so. ''In matters of secret intelligence'', he blithely announces, ''high moral causes and lawyers' posturings should only rarely be allowed to obstruct the need for success. '' That use of the word ''posturings'' locates us, once again, in the saloon bar. Oh well, retired intelligence officers must spend their leisure hours somewhere, I suppose;and this one does have some good anecdotes to tell.
Noel Malcolm 's books include 'Bosnia:A Short History 'and 'Kosovo:A Short History '(Pan).
@apus.edu.
Recommended Citation
Makinde, Adeyinka (2016) "Book Review: On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret World," Global Security and
Intelligence Studies: Vol. 2 : No. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.apus.edu/gsis/vol2/iss1/8
103
John Hughes-Wilson (2016). On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret
World, First Edition. London: Constable. ISBN: 978-1-472-11353-5. 528 pages. £25.00
The field of intelligence studies is a relatively new academic discipline that has
developed an identifiable intellectual community. It has served as a conduit through
which the history of war, the development and decline of empire as well as the calibration
of foreign policy have been subjected to fresh formats of inquiry and analysis. The study
of the relationship between the practice of intelligence and its impact on state policy
in so far as military action is concerned is one, given the repercussions, respectively, of
the attack on 9/11 and the decision to go to war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, that is
of particular interest to scholars, policymakers and practitioners of the craft. It is also a
subject area of inestimable fascination to a general reading public with a ready appetite
for stories on espionage and accustomed to a market in which there has been a surge
in the popular history genre. This has meant that studies on the history of military
intelligence, as is the case with other genres of history, have been divided into those
that fit alternately into the academic and popular writing categories.
John Hughes-Wilson, a retired British Army Intelligence Corps colonel whose
career spanned active service in the Falkland Islands and Northern Ireland as well
as administrative postings in Whitehall and NATO, is an author whose offerings on
military intelligence history fit into the popular writing category. His brief but robust
introduction offers no apologies for avoiding “getting completely lost in the thickets
of philosophy and Hegelian dialectic” as an academic text might tend to do. Instead,
his work adopts a case study approach to explain and analyze the operation of the
intelligence apparatus within the context of espionage and the conduct of war.
Before this, he takes the reader through preliminaries: a chapter on a condensed
history of the development of what he refers to as the “Second Oldest Profession” from
biblical times to the modern era, followed by a brief consolidating chapter stressing
the importance of intelligence in national self-defense by references to statements
written by Machiavelli and Sun Tzu while at the same time offering words of rebuke
for the shortcomings of Clausewitz’s 1832 masterwork, On War. He provides a lucid
overview of the fundamentals of the intelligence cycle, providing admittedly simplified
diagrammatic representations of the process, a collection plan as well as an indicator
and warning display. These are tools he deploys to function as key reference points
for analysis when he explores the different themes which he proceeds to set out. His
consideration of HUMINT and the factors typically enabling intelligence agencies to
penetrate their competitors is predicated on the traditional MICE acronym: Money,
Ideology, Compromise/Coercion and Ego. These factors provide the backdrop to his
retellings of major espionage failings and successes of American and British intelligence
agencies including that of the Walker family’s betrayal of U.S. Navy secrets and Oleg
Penkovsky’s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Review of On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and
the Secret World
doi: 10.18278/gsis.2.1.7
Global Security and Intelligence Studies - Volume 2, Number 1 - Fall 2016
104
Hughes-Wilson is particularly adept at fleshing out the historical development
of SIGNIT and IMINT from the most rudimentary technology to the highly advanced
equipment of today. His case study on how signals intelligence was crucial in ensuring
the victory of the U.S. Navy over the Imperial Japanese Navy at Midway is particularly
gripping. It is also enlightening about the organizational pathologies perpetually at
play in contemporary intelligence structures, one aspect of which relates to the vexed
question of the ownership of SIGNET: does it reside with the communicators and
signalers on the one hand or with the intelligence people?
Hughes-Wilson is an engaging writer who brings the reader inside the mind
of the prudent intelligence operative: consistently asking questions and performing
an officious bystander test as he sifts through large amounts of information. He is
very good at guiding the reader through the practical application of the theories
undergirding the intelligence process. This is particularly illuminating in regard to
his summation of the severe deficiencies in the American intelligence apparatus in
1941 on the eve of a war that all knew was coming. For it is the case that the problems
leading up to Pearl Harbor, including those of over compartmentalization and interorganizational
rivalries, are ones of enduring relevance and bring into focus the need
for all-source integration and assessment; an ideal which is difficult to achieve within
any national security establishment.
The choice of case studies tailored to fit a particular theme of the intelligence
process, whether related to failures or successes, provides the basis for a series of
illuminating deconstructions. For instance, the failure of the political leaders of the
Soviet Union and Israel to predict the oncoming onslaughts, respectively, of Operation
Barbarossa in 1941 and Operation Badr in 1973 was due, Hughes-Wilson argues,
not with nonpossession of the correct information predicting enemy intentions but
instead centered on the translation of information into intelligence. In the former
case, it hinged on a developed organizational culture of only reporting information
which the dictator found palatable while the latter was caused by the monopolization
of all-source intelligence by Israeli Military Intelligence. On the issue of protecting
state secrets, he uses the recent high-profile cases of Bradley Manning, Julian Assange,
and Edward Snowden as exemplars explaining the impact of an inadequate security
checking mechanism, the increasing difficulty of securing masses of electronically
collected data in the high-technology age and the eternal dilemma of balancing
national security concerns with that of protecting whistleblowers acting in the public
interest. For deception, the Allied planning of the highly risky, but ultimately successful,
D-Day landings is used while the area dealing with intelligence fiascos considers the
U.S. Special Forces operations in Son Tay, Vietnam and Iran at the time of the hostage
crisis. The author also provides an excoriating analysis of the role played by the leaders
of the British intelligence community in enabling the administration of Tony Blair to
produce a “dodgy dossier” which led the country into a war of dubious legality against
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003.
The issue of intelligence and the challenges posed to national security by
terrorism and by cyber warfare are also given consideration by the author. He provides
a thoughtful summary on the grievances and “catalysts for conflict” that often form the
Global Security and Intelligence Studies
105
backdrop to terror campaigns before focusing on the contemporary security concerns
associated with the “War on Terror”. He is adept at summarizing the interrelatedness
of cyber war, cyber terrorism, and cybercrime. Here, the threats posed by China, the
Russian Federation, and North Korea are pointedly noted as he stresses the complexities
associated with tracing the source of attacks and the severe consequences that could
impinge on civil and military capacities in the event of an all-out war.
Hughes-Wilson provides a lengthy but highly readable consideration of
military intelligence that succeeds in giving the reader a fairly comprehensive overview
of the practice of intelligence and security. While it falls short of the rigor expected of
an academic text in terms of theoretical detail and the provision of a comprehensive
bibliography and citations, it cannot be faulted for being unchallenging or lacking in
analytical content. The revolutionizing effect of technological advancement on the
gathering, dissemination, and evaluation of intelligence is cogently explained as indeed
is the underpinning rationale of his assessment that Julian Assange’s “Wikileaks”
project has succeeded in redefining security.
But it does have its shortcomings. For instance, there is no discernible standard
regarding the selection or non-inclusion of case studies. Also, given the contemporary
prevalence of asymmetric warfare, an examination of the role of intelligence in
conflicts between state and nonstate militaries would have been apt. The conflict in
2006 between Israel and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah would have presented an ideal
case study. It is clear to military analysts that a series of skillfully planned deceptions
and security strategies on the part of Hezbollah provided the means for the militia
to withstand the might of the Israeli Defence Force. A thorough consideration of
intelligence ought arguably to have included an appraisal of the darker aspects of the
use of intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency strategies. U.S. military intelligence
covertly orchestrated death squads using a recurring modus operandi to tackle
insurgencies in Vietnam, Central America, and Iraq while British army officer Frank
Kitson’s concept of “gangs and counter-gangs” was ruthlessly employed in Kenya and
Northern Ireland. In a similar vein, the use of anti-Warsaw Pact “stay behind” cells
under the command of NATO during the Cold War-era communist containment
strategy is not mentioned. Still, as a work which covers a great deal of ground and one
that attempts to synthesize a narrative and analysis of the broad aspects of process
and organizational efficacy within the political contexts of the day, it is likely to be
of interest not only to the connoisseurs of popular history, but also to scholars and
practitioners in the field of intelligence.
QUOTE:
This is a powerful, forcefully argued and necessary book,
Overall I welcome and applaud this excellently researched and compulsively readable book. I entirely endorse its argument that we should be wary of applying modern civilian peacetime values to a time when the death penalty was almost universal, psychiatry scarcely existed and the resilience and reliability of her forces in the field was seen as crucial to Britain's national survival. I sense this subject will remain on the agenda for some time yet.
Malcolm Brown
Friday 24 August 2001 19.56 EDT First published on Friday 24 August 2001 19.56 EDT
Blindfold and Alone: British Military Executions in the Great War
Cathryn M Corns and John Hughes-Wilson
543pp, Cassell, £25
This is a powerful, forcefully argued and necessary book, but it will not have an easy ride. It appears shortly after the unveiling at the National Memorial Arboretum at Alrewas, Staffordshire, of the haunting statue of a teenage soldier shot for desertion in 1915: almost the equivalent of going over the top into hostile fire. The government's decision in 1998 to acknowledge the executed soldiers of the first world war as victims, but to stop short of pardon, has not settled this contentious issue, and the campaign for pardon continues. That the authors of this book aim to take a cool, balanced look at the subject - above all, to see it in its historical context - will not necessarily endear it to those for whom this has become a lifelong cause.
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There is a tiny village in deep country near Arras called Bailleulmont. In low ground nearby is the municipal cemetery, with a handful of British war graves attached. The headstone of one of them, that of Private A Ingham of the Manchester Regiment, bears the unique inscription "Shot at Dawn / One of the First to Enlist / A Worthy Son of his Father". Private Ingham and the soldier buried next to him, Private Longshaw, were executed for desertion, probably in this dour little valley, on 1 December 1916. Geoff Dyer wrote movingly of Ingham's fate in his book The Missing of the Somme. He praised the father who, learning the truth about his son's death, chose to celebrate it rather than conceal it. Dyer also saw courage in Ingham's opting out from a brutal war, claiming: "The deserter's grave has become a hero's grave."
Corns and Hughes-Wilson tell us the story behind this double execution. Ingham and Longshaw were discovered on a Swedish ship at Dieppe, having discarded their uniforms and claiming to be American citizens. No army on active service and under appalling pressure - the men were arrested during the Battle of the Somme, in which they had themselves taken part - could overlook such behaviour, especially at a time when many saw prison or penal servitude as an appealing alternative to the hazards of the field.
An often ignored element in this equation is the attitude to deserters of their comrades-in-arms. The authors quote tellingly from Frederic Manning's classic novel of the Somme, The Middle Parts of Fortune: "When Miller disappeared just before the Hun attack, many of the men... were bitter and summary in their judgment... They were to go through it while he saved his skin... [I]f one were to ask any man who had been through that spell of fighting what ought to have been done in the case of Miller, there would have been only one answer. Shoot the bugger!"
A basic argument of the book is that, far more than has been acknowledged, there was a genuine attempt in the case of most courts martial to observe required legal processes. That judgment was often swift and harsh reflects the fact that military law, by common understanding, was especially stringent during active service. Yet the figures do not bear out the popular notion that effectively the military establishment saw the firing squad as a convenient means of culling anybody who stepped out of line. Statistics for desertion show that as many as 38,000 men were brought to trial, of whom just over 2,000 were sentenced to death, yet almost 90% of these were reprieved. Those executed totalled 266.
That figure inevitably includes cases where few would argue fiercely for a pardon. One deserter was shot in 1915 after being shopped by a French madame who had given him home and comfort, when he left her for the solace of another madame in the same street. In this instance, execution was clearly a crime passionnel by proxy. Yet undoubtedly, many who died in these dismal dawn rituals were men who were disoriented, confused or out of their depth, or whose stamina and commitment had been eroded by circumstances they could never have imagined when they enlisted.
I admit one regret in reading this book: I grieve at finding A P Herbert's 1919 novel The Secret Battle - arguably the first public adumbration of this subject - dismissed as a "fictional pastiche cameo". Herbert is generally assumed to have based his plot on the case of a feeble fellow officer of the Royal Naval Division, Edwin Dyett, executed in January 1917; but his invented hero, Harry Penrose, is a far more admirable figure who ultimately fails through sheer psychological exhaustion. Herbert thus focused on some of the most unfortunate victims of the execution process: those who had striven hard and long only to find their bank balance of courage so paid out that they lost all motivation.
Significantly, one of The Secret Battle 's greatest admirers was Winston Churchill, who called it "a soldier's tale cut in stone to melt all hearts". It is therefore fascinating to find that Churchill intervened at a crucial phase in this story. Rightly, the authors take their subject through to the abolition of the death penalty for desertion and similar crimes in 1929, and on to the second world war, when certain powerful lobbyists begged for its return. By March 1940 the British commander in France, Lord Gort, was arguing that penal servitude was an insufficient deterrent against desertion, while in 1942 the Commander in Chief Middle East, Sir Claude Auchinleck, was pleading "in strongest possible terms for earliest possible agreement to reintroduce death penalty for specified offences". In this case too, desertion headed the sin-list.
In the end it was seen that, whatever the arguments from the field, the political dimension made reintroduction impossible. Legislation would be unavoidable and the mere fact of it would be counter-productive. "If the situation was really as bad as claimed, advertising the army's problems would only make it worse and give Britain's enemies - and even its allies - a deeply damaging propaganda coup. Churchill said 'no' and there the matter rested." Somehow one can't help feeling that Churchill's outright negative was more than a political gesture; it was recognition that this was a practice due for the historical dustbin.
Overall I welcome and applaud this excellently researched and compulsively readable book. I entirely endorse its argument that we should be wary of applying modern civilian peacetime values to a time when the death penalty was almost universal, psychiatry scarcely existed and the resilience and reliability of her forces in the field was seen as crucial to Britain's national survival. I accept the claim that this book "brings a real understanding to the reader of how and why these sad and bitter executions took place". Yet I still harbour certain anxieties about this most disturbing of issues. The Australians refused to impose the death penalty, and fought magnificently. The Indian army preferred the old penalty of flogging, which allowed a guilty man the chance to redeem himself and fight on. The Germans executed just 18 soldiers in the first world war, fought superbly, and yet lost. They executed hundreds under Hitler's brutal regime in the second world war, and still lost. I sense this subject will remain on the agenda for some time yet.
Malcolm Brown is a freelance historian at the Imperial War Museum; his revised Imperial War Museum Book of the Western Front will be published by Pan in November.
Since you’re he
QUOTE:
Many of Hughes-Wilson’s balder statements are calculated to stimulate debate and get the heart racing, and in this objective he undoubtedly succeeds.
June 25, 2010 1 note
The Puppet Masters book review
There are three broad categories of books on intelligence. Firstly there are the personal memoirs and accounts of participation in intelligence operations. Secondly, there are the studies of particular events and operations, and thirdly there are what might be termed the philosophical treatises, not all of which have to be dry academic documents. Colonel Hughes-Wilson, a veteran of more than thirty years in the military intelligence world, has produced a contribution to this third kind of publication, and it is readable, entertaining and deliberately provocative.
The author developed a taste for this field with his Military Intelligence Blunders, a splendid selection of episodes which the participants might have preferred to have forgotten. Indeed, with his survey of intelligence in The Puppet Masters beginning with Moses, probably many have, but his message is that espionage has played a vital, often unseen role in many of the historical events that have shaped the modern world, and that in this era of a global war on terrorism, intelligence continues to be a key component in political decision-making.
Few would argue with this thesis, so to make slightly more controversial Hughes-Wilson has strayed deliberately into the first and second categories of intelligence books by revealing details of a security breach while he was based at NATO headquarters involving a Mossad recruitment of a Dutch officer. Evidently the Israelis were anxious to acquire NATO assessments of Soviet tanks, and the Dutch officer was caught red-handed and imprisoned. During the course of his research the author also stumbled across a very curious contingency plan, to swamp Northern Ireland with so many British troops, with up to forty-seven battalions, that only two infantry battalions would have been left in Germany.
More controversial will be the author’s bold views on previously well-documented events, such as the arrival of eight Nazi saboteurs off a U-boat in the United States in 1942. Two of them, Georg Dasch and Johan Berger, contacted the FBI and betrayed their colleagues, and for this they were rewarded with short prison sentences and deportation to Germany after the war, while the hapless six were executed. However, Hughes-Wilson asserts that “J. Edgar Hoover deliberately conspired to send two innocent men to the electric chair” and that he was therefore “a truly evil man”. Certainly the FBI Director has his detractors, but the accusation that the two self-confessed Abwehr spies were ‘innocent men’ seems a little hard to swallow.
There are other assertions that will be challenged. Was the IRA really responsible for the huge explosion at the Waltham Abbey ordnance factory in 1940? Did the double agent Dusko Popov ever meet J. Edgar Hoover? Did SOE’s sabotage of the Norsk Hydro deny Hitler a nuclear device? Is a nuclear reactor required to develop an atomic bomb? Did MI5 deliberately entrap Rudolf Hess in 1941? Many of Hughes-Wilson’s balder statements are calculated to stimulate debate and get the heart acing, and in this objective he undoubtedly succeeds.
To acquire John Hughes-Wilson’s new book, The Puppet Masters: Spies, Traitors, and Real Forces Behind World Events, click here