Contemporary Authors

• Kant's Moral and Legal Philosophy Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 2009
• Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: The Foundation of Modern Philosophy Springer (New York, NY), 2010
• Political Justice: Foundations for a Critical Philosophy of Law and the State Polity (New York, NY), 2015
• Thomas Hobbes State University of New York Press (Albany, NY), 2015

1. Thomas Hobbes LCCN 2014040649 Type of material Book Personal name Höffe, Otfried. Uniform title Thomas Hobbes. English Main title Thomas Hobbes / Otfried Höffe ; translated by Nicholas Walker. Published/Produced Albany : State University of New York Press, 2015. Projected pub date 1510 Description pages cm ISBN 9781438457659 (hardcover : alk. paper) Library of Congress Holdings Information not available.

• LOC Authorities -

  LC control no.: n 81013611

  Descriptive conventions:
  rda

  Personal name heading:
  Höffe, Otfried

  Variant(s): Hoeffe, Otfried

  Associated place: Tübingen (Germany)

  Birth date: 19430912

  Field of activity: Ethics

  Affiliation: Universität Tübingen

  Profession or occupation:
  Philosophy teachers

  Found in: Lexikon der Ethik, 1977.
  Lebenskunst und Moral, c2007: title page (Otfried Höffe)
  jacket flap (professor of philosophy and director of the
  Forschungsstelle Politische Philosophie at Universität
  Tübingen)
  Kant's moral and legal philosophy, 2009: ECIP title page
  (Otfried Hoeffe, University of Tubingen) data view (born
  September 12, 1943)
  Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 2008: title page
  (Otfried Höffe) page 384 (Otfried Höffe; born 1943;
  taught at Duisburg, Germany, and Fribourg, Switzerland;
  professor of philosophy at Universität Tübingen from
  1992 to the present)

  Associated language:
  ger

  Invalid LCCN: n 2008071453

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• Wikipedia -

  Otfried Höffe
  From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  This article includes a list of references, related reading or external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (March 2016) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)

  Otfried Höffe (born 12 September 1943 in Leobschütz, Upper Silesia Province, Prussia) is a German philosopher and professor.

  From 1964 to 1970, he studied philosophy, history, sociology and theology at the universities of Münster, Tübingen, Saarbrücken and Munich. His 1971 dissertation was on the practical philosophy of Aristotle. In 1970 and 1971, he was visiting scholar at Columbia University. He qualified as a professor in Munich in 1974 with a dissertation on Strategies of Humanity. On the ethics of public decision-making. In 1976, Höffe got his first full professorship at the University of Duisburg. From 1978 until 1992, he was professor for social philosophy in Fribourg, Switzerland. Höffe also had a lectureship in social ethics at the ETH Zurich from 1986 to 1998. Since 1992, Höffe is a professor of philosophy at the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen. In 2002, he also became constant guest professor for philosophy of law at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. His main and most famous books deal with ethics, philosophy of law and economics, and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Aristotle.

  He resides in Tübingen.

• Amazon -

  Otfried Hoffe is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Director of the Research Center for Political Philosophy at the University of Tubingen. His many books include Aristotle (translated by Christine Salazar) and Immanuel Kant (translated by Marshall Farrier), both also published by SUNY Press.

Hoffe, Otfried. Thomas Hobbes
A. Martinich
53.8 (Apr. 2016): p1238.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2016 American Library Association CHOICE
http://www.ala.org/acrl/choice/about

Hoffe, Otfried. Thomas Hobbes, tr. by Nicholas Walker. SUNY Press, 2015. 258p bibl indexes afp ISBN 9781438457659 cloth, $80.00; ISBN 9781438457673 ebook, $80.00

53-3724

JC153

CIP

Thomas Hobbes, by Hoffe (emer., philosophy, Univ. of Tubingen, Germany), is an introductory book about Hobbes's philosophy. Organized into three parts, the first, which introduces Hobbes's philosophical development and career, and the third, which evaluates Hobbes's influence, are bookends for the second, main part, "The Encyclopedic Character of Hobbes's Philosophy." Logic, metaphysics, anthropology, political philosophy, religion, historical works, and more are treated. Hoffe's primary intention is to take Hobbes's "philosophical work seriously," to judge whether it "genuinely extends our knowledge." The book is flawed in several ways. One is occasional vagueness. To set the context, Hoffe says that the 17th century "witnessed momentous advances in mathematics and the natural science" but also was "a period of political insecurity." This description does not distinguish it from the 18th and 20th centuries. Another problem is contradictions, some on the same page, as when Hoffe says that for Hobbes "absolute knowledge" is not part of "science itself" and presents a chart in which science is divided into "absolute knowledge" and knowledge of consequence. It is not clear whether some of these problems are the result of translation. Several single-authored and collaborative books published over the last 25 years would serve students better. Summing Up: Not recommended.--A. Martinich, University of Texas at Austin
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Martinich, A. "Hoffe, Otfried. Thomas Hobbes." CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, Apr. 2016, p. 1238. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA449661855&it=r&asid=1c69062dcfa1a5923076a8e6ebb79327. Accessed 1 Mar. 2017.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A449661855

Guyer, Paul1
Ethics. Jul2010, Vol. 120 Issue 4, p820-826. 7p.

Ameriks, Karl, and Hoffe, Otfried, eds. Translated by Nicholas Walker. Kant's
Moral and Legal Philosophy.
Catnbridge: Catnbddge University Press, 2009. Pp. xviii+324. |85.00 (cloth);
168.00 (Adobe eBook Reader).
This collection offers translations of fourteen articles on Kant's moral and political
(surely this term is more accurate than "legal") philosophy and is aimed
to make possible "an appreciation of the distinctive contributions of contemporary
German Kant scholarship" (1). "Contemporary" is used loosely here: the
selections range from Dieter Henrich's article "Hutcheson and Kant," originally
published in Kant-Studien for 1957-58, to papers by Eckart Förster, Otfried Hoffe,
and Annemarie Pieper from 2002; so contemporary means from the last halfcentury.
Although a number of the articles are valuable, I am hard pressed to
say that as a whole the collection shows there to be anything particularly "distitictive"
about recent German Kant scholarship. Actually, ten out of the fourteen
papers included come from previous German collections commissioned and
edited by Otfried Hoffe, namely, his 1989 volume Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der
Sitten: Ein kooperativer Kommentar (Frankfurt am Main; Vittorio Klostermann) and
three volumes in the Klassiker Auslegen series, of which Hoffe is also the general
editor, namely. Zum etvigen Frieden (Berlin; Akademie, 1995), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe
der Rechstkhre (Berlin: Akademie, 1999), and Kritik der praktischen
Vemunfi (Berlin; Akademie, 2002). While the Kooperativer Kommentar was an ambitious
volume of original scholarship by leaditig German, Amedcan, and British
Kant scholars at the time (only the first of whom are represented in the present
volume, naturally), the volumes in the Klassiker Auslegen series are of a somewhat
more introductory nature, aimed at least as much at a student market as at a
scholarly audience. So the selections from these volumes do not necessarily represent
the cutting edge of contemporary German Kant scholarship. The selection
of articles also omits a number of authors whom otie would have thought would
be included in any representation of the best contemporary Germati Kant scholarship.
The omission of any work by Reitihard Brandt is particularly surprising,
since Hoffe included three of his articles in the Klassiker Auslegen volumes on
Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of Right. And one would have thought that any
representation of the best work currently being done on Kant's practical philosophy
in German would have included samples of the work of Heiner Klemme,
Marcus Willaschek, Jens Timmermann, Ghristoph Horn, and Andrea Marien Esser,
in addition to Dieter Schönecker. Frankly, work by some of those authors might
have given a better impression of contemporary German Katit scholarship than
some of the papers that have been included iti this volume.
Having said that, let me describe what is contained in this volume. It is
divided into an opening section, containing two articles on the development of
© 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
For permission to reuse, please contactjournalperTnissions@press.uchicago.edu.
820
Book Reviews 821
Kant's moral philosophy, and this is followed by three sections, containing articles
on two and a half of Kant's three main works in practical philosophy, that
is, the Groundiuork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), the Critique of Practical
Reason (1788), and the Doctrine of Right but not the Doctrine of Virtue from the
Metaphysics of Morals (1797). The omission of anything concerning the Doctrine
of Virtue, Kant's most complete account of all of our non-Juridically enforceable
ethical duties, is unfortunate; this seems to be another consequence of the
reliance on HöfFe's previously edited German volumes, since there is not (or
at least not yet) one devoted to this second half of the Metaphysics of Morals.
The two articles on Kant's development, the article on Hutcheson and Kant
by Dieter Henrich already mentioned and the article "The Theory of Obligation
in 'Wolff, Baumgarten, and the Early Kant" by Clement Schwaiger, are separated
by a span of forty years, Schwaiger's article dating from 1999, and they are both
valuable. The translation of Schwaiger's article is particularly welcome, since it
was originally publisbed in Italian and was tbus previously inaccessible to many
Anglophone Kant scholars, let alone students. Tbe article on Hutcheson and
Kant was a very early work by Henrich, wbo, of course, went on to become
perhaps the single most important scholar of Kant and subsequent German
idealism of postwar Germany and wbo in his later years in particular has
produced immensely detailed work on the origins of German idealism, culminating
(at least for now), in bis two-volume work Grundlegung aus dem Ich:
Untersuchungen zur Vorgeschichte des Idealismus, Tübingen-Jena, 1790-1794 (Frankfurt
am Main: Subrkamp, 2004). In tbe article included here, Henrich argues
that tbe importance for Kant of Hutcheson was not tbe idea of tbe moral sense,
with which Kant supposedly dallied for several years in tbe 1760s, but rather
Hutcheson's clear grasp of "the categorically binding character of morality" (49),
"the particular achievement of tbis Scottish thinker in identifying and defending
the essentially internal and original character of morality over against any attempt
to derive it from something else" (50), and Kant's inference from Hutcbeson's
unsuccessful attempt to ground the binding character of morality in a
moral sense that "moral consciousness" must instead be grasped "entirely in
terms of tbe essence of the will" (52). I endrely agree with Henrich tbat Kant's
attempt to ground tbe moral law in the conditions of the perfection or "consensus"
of tbe will goes back to the time of his engagement with Hutcheson,
but I would add tbat Kant must also have recognized the importance of Hutcheson's
conception of the moral sense, since be always tried to find a proper
place for it in the etiology of moral conduct, in the form of the feeling of respect
( Groundxvork and Critique of Practical Reason) or a complex of moral feelings
(Doctrine of Virtue). This caveat aside, Henricb's article remains an important
reminder of the importance of Hutcheson for Kant even after all these years.
Henrich's emphasis on Hutcheson's influence on Kant's conception of obligation
has to be weighed against Glement Schwaiger's argument for the
German influence on Kant's conception of obligation. Schwaiger, who is the
author of a book on tbe etbics of Ghristian Wolff, Das Problem des Glücks in den
Denken Christian Wolffs (Stuttgart-Bad Ganstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1995) and
also one on the development of Kant's moral philosophy. Kategorische und andere
Imperative: Zur Entwicklung von Kants praktischer Phibsophie bis 1785 (Stuttgart-Bad
Ganstatt: Frommann Holzboog, 1999), argues tbat WolfF prepared the way for
822 Ethics July 2010
Kant's conception of obligation by removing the need for an external source
of authority for obligations that was present in Samuel Pufendorf s influential
account, thus preparing the way for Kant's account of the internal source of
moral obligation. He then argues that Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, who is
well known as the author of the textbooks that Kant used for his lectures on
ethics, further prepared the way for Kant by completely severing any concern
for happiness from the concept of obligation and displacing the topic of happiness
"from the realm of morality into that of religion" (69). This ohviously
prepares the way for Kant's own separation of the fundamental principle of
morality from that of happiness, although it then needs to be explained how
for Kant happiness does in the end become a proper part of the complete good
for human heings, the so-called highest good, and the foundation for his own
practical rather than theoretical philosophy of religion by means of the postulates
of pure practical reason. To discuss all this would, of course, go well
beyond the confines of Schwaiger's hrief paper, and indeed beyond his hook
on Kant's development to 1785, hut his paper does correctly suggest that Kant's
engagement with Baumgarten was fundamental to the entire structure of his
practical philosophy, and this needs more study than it has received.
Each of the next three parts of the collection, on the Groundwork, the Critique
of Practicat Reason, and the Doctrine of Right, contains four essays. Ludwig Siep
addresses the question of the purity of the moral law and of morally worthy
motivation in his chapter in the preface to the Groundwork, "What Is the Purpose
of a Metaphysics of Morals?" I think that his assertion that "Kant's original
demand for absolute 'purity' in the Groundwork has been moderated hy the time
of the later Metaphysics of Morals" (83) is a misleading inference from the complexity
of Kant's use of his own terminology; Siep infers that Kant has weakened
his insistence on purity because of his use of the term "metaphysics of morals"
in his later work to designate his derivation of "principles of application" from
the fundamental law of morality plus certain basic empirical assumptions ahout
human nature and circumstances, but I think Kantjust uses the term in a twofold
sense, to include both the derivation of the fundamental law of morality (which
is said to require a "step" into metaphysics at Groundwork 4:426-27) and the
derivation of specific dudes from that law plus those basic empirical assumptions
(called "metaphysics" in analogy with the conception of a metaphysics of nature
in the 1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Naturat Science). Kant certainly never
changes his mind about the nonempirical character of the moral law or of sheer
respect for that law as the only morally worthy motivation. Dieter Schönecker's
1997 article "The Transition from Common Rational Knowledge to Philosophical
Moral Knowledge in the Groundwork" emphasizes that there is not a single transition
between the first two sections of the Groundwork, hut rather a transition
within each one that ends at the same conclusion (the moral law) from a different
starting point: "Whereas Groundwork I advances from" sound "common
moral rational knowledge to philosophical rational knowledge . . . Groundwork
II itself advances . . . from" unsound "popular moral philosophy to metaphysics,"
thus replacing popular moral philosophy hut not common sense with sound
metaphysics of morals. This is certainly correct, as I argued at around the same
time in "Self-Understanding and Philosophy: The Strategy of Kant's Groundwork,"
in Philosophie in synthetischer Absicht, edited hy Marcelo Stamm (Stuttgart: Klett-
Book Reviews 823
Cotta, 1998), which was reprinted in my Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Section III of the Groundwork,
with its notorious argument for the validity of the moral law analyzed in the
previous two sections, is addressed by Gerold Prauss in "Reason Practical in Its
Own Right." Prauss wrote two important and clear, even if controversial, books
in the 1970s on Kant's theoretical philosophy, Erscheinung bm Kant (Berlin: de
Grtiyter, 1971) and Kant und das Problem der Ding an sich (Bonn; Bouvier, 1974),
but I found this essay tbe most obscure and least convincing in the present
collection. Prauss makes the bold claim that "the Groundworkis concerned, from
tbe very beginning, with nothing less than [the] theoretically and practically
complex self-relation of subjectivity itself" (124). I never understood this claim.
What I did understand is that Prauss seems to accept Kant's equation of our
real will with autonomy in Groundwork III, which seems open to the objection
raised by Karl Leonbard Reinhold in 1792, and then Henry Sidgwick a hundred
years later, that if tbe viill is really autonomous, then tbere is no possibility for
immoral willing, and Prauss then tries to resolve tbis by supposing that Kant
introduces a second "specifically moral autonomy," a "further and additional
ground that must somehow reveal itself through [an] autonomous willing and
acting," in a "synthetic fashion" (132). This seems a disastrous solution to Kant's
problem: wbat would the source of this second morally significant sense of
autonomy be if not tbe idea of the pure will itself? Kant's own solution, of
course, is to distinguish in works after the Groundwork between the actual power
of choice ( Willkür) and the ideal of a pure will ( Wille) that is the source of the
moral law. By contrast with Prauss's paper, Michael Albrecht's 1994 KantStudien
article, "Kant's Justification of the Role of Maxims," is a valtiable contribution.
Albrecht, an accomplished scholar who began his career with the book Kants
Antinomie der praktischen Vemunfi (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1978) and whose
other works include superb editions of Wolffs rectoral oration On the Practical
Philosophy of the Chinese and Moses Mendelssohn's/ifnwflfejn, two vital documents
of the German Enlightenment, argues that on Kant's conception of maxims
they are not whatever specific proposals for action tbat it might occur to an
agent to act upon, but rather much more general principles of conduct tbat
"are formed through rational reflection, [which] relates them immediately to
tbe intrinsic moral demand of reason itself" (149). This understanding of maxims
anticipates that which Manfred Kuehn would develop several years later in
his magisterial biography of Kant (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press,
2001).
Tbe four papers on the Critique of Practical Reason are by Otfried HöfTe,
Annemarie Pieper, Eckart Förster (who has spent most of his career in the United
States and published most of his work in English), and Friedo Ricken. HöfFe
gives a straightforward account of the opening argument of tbe second Critique
for the categorical imperative as the formula of universal law, whicb none too
convincingly insists on an interpretation of tbe contradiction tbat must be
avoided in the universalization of a maxim as "self-annihilation" (170) or tbe
logical contradiction attacked by Hegel, rather than as tbe pragmatic contradiction—contradiction
between one's own intention and tbe universalization of
one's maxim—well argued for by Onora O'Neill and Christine Korsgaard. In
ber chapter "On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason," Pieper
824 Ethics July 2010
combines a useful account of Kant's application of the twelve categories of the
understanding from the first Critique to the case of moral judgments with a less
convincing argument that Kant's idea in the second Critique of the "typic" of
the moral law represents a new form of judgment, alternative to both determinant
and reflective judgment (a distinction Kant introduced only in the third
Critique) (190). But "typification," which is Just Kant's new name for the requirement
in the Groundwork that one test whether one could still will one's
maxim if it were to become an actual law of nature and therefore universal, fits
the model of what Kant subsequently called determinant judgment pretty well.
Kant defines determinant judgment as that in which we seek to apply a given
universal to a particular, and that is precisely what we are doing when we ask
whether the universalization of our maxim would be consistent with the particular
consisting in our proposed action on the maxim. The relevant difference
between moral judgment and theoretical judgment is just that the particular is
a proposed action rather than an already extant object. In his chapter "The
Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason," Förster argues that "the alleged antinomy"
of pure practical reason, that is, the conflict between the position that virtue as
worthiness to be happy must be accompanied by happiness and the position
that it does not appear to be in the sensible world vsith which we are actually
familiar, "does not represent a genuine internal conflict within the laws of practical
reason, but merely an apparent conflict between the legislative powers of
theoretical and practical reason" (208), which can be resolved simply by showing
"that it is 'not impossible' for a virtuous disposition to possess a proportional
and corresponding 'happiness as an effect in the sensible world'" (206). This
seems a weaker result than Kant actually wants, for this result could be obtained
from mere logic—from the absence of self-contradiction in the conjunction of
the two thoughts—and would not require a real ground, namely, the postulated
existence of God. The doctrine of the postulates of pure practical reason is
actually Kant's practical replacement for his theoretical argument in The Only
Possible Basis for a Proof of the Existence of God (1763) that any real possibility
requires a ground in an actual and indeed necessary existence. In his chapter
on the postulates, Friedo Ricken tries to save Kaut from the objection that "duty
can only command us to 'realise the highest good according to the utmost of
our capacity'" (222), which would not require us to posit anything beyond our
natural capacity to act in accordance with the moral law alone and thus undermine
even Kant's practical argument for the existence of God, with the idea
of a twofold concept of nature including a "super-sensible concept of nature"
with "one sovereign" for both the "kingdom of nature" and the "kingdom of
ends" (223). This does seem to be Kant's own interpretation of the postulate
of the existence of God in the second Critique, but I fail to see how it solves the
powerful objection to the premise of the postulate that Ricken has raised. Kant
himself seems ultimately to have solved the problem, in the unpublished Opus
postumum, by dropping the argument for the existence of God as the condition
of the possibility of the realization of the highest good in favor of an interpretation
of the idea of God as simply a projection of our own power to give ourselves
the moral law (see "The Unity of Nature and Freedom" in my Kant's System of
Nature and Ereedom [Oxford: Clarendon, 2005], 277-313).
The articles by Kristian Kühl, Wolfgang Kersting, Bernd Ludwig, and Volker
Book Reviews 825
Gerhardt in the final part of the collection all concern Kant's political philosophy.
In fact, the articles by Kersting, Ludwig, and Gerhardt all concern Kant's
theory of perpetual peace to a greater or lesser degree, and while these three
are all important German scholars of Kant's political philosophy, and indeed of
historical and contemporary political philosophy in general, avoiding overlap
here could have left room for some representative work on the Doctrine of Virtue.
Kühl, a professor of jurisprudence and a colleague of HöfFe's at Tübingen,
provides a useful analysis of Kant's theory of private property in the Doctrine of
Right, which may be particularly helpful to Anglophone students because it
associates Kant's conception of property with specific features of the Civil Law
Code, that is, Roman-based law, which may be unfamiliar to those brought up
in the common law tradition. However, Kühl seems to treat Kant's idea that only
consent to detach a piece of property from an original cotnmon possession can
make it rightful or just as if this stated a requirement of actual consent rather
than an ideal test of justice (236). He also argues that Kant's theory of property
entails a requirement of equality of opportunity (244), which seeins too strong
an interpretation of Kant's insistence upon the right for anyone to acquire
property as part of a just system of property—surely equality of opportunity
requires much more than that, such as rights to an education, which Kant does
not argue for (he argues only for the duty of parents to educate their own
children). Both Kersting, who published the important book on Kant's political
philosophy Wohlgeordnete Freiheit (1984), and Ludwig, who produced an indispensable
edition of the Rechtslehre, a valuable commentary on it, and an important
book on Hobbes {Die Wiederentdeckung des Epikureischen Naturrechts [Frankfurt
atn Main; Vittorio Klostermann, 1998]), discuss the relation between republican
government and the tendency toward peace rather than war, and both emphasize
that Kant really required only that governments govern like republics rather
than actually having all the institutions of genuine republics (258, 270-71). But
Kersting in particular seems to me to fail to see that, in spite of some initial
misleading language, Kant does not and cannot suppose that republican governments,
whether in letter or in spidt, can guarantee restraint from war and thus
fails to emphasize the importance of the concept of "moral politicians" that Kant
introduces in an appendix to Toward Perpetual Peace: the only position that Kant
can take that is consistent vnih his conception of human freedom is that natural
and external condidons, such as the character of governments, can create conditions
necessary for realization of jusdce or any other moral goals but that only
the free choice of human beings can actually be sufficient for the realizadon of
such goals. Gerhardt hints at this point in his interesting reflecdon on Kant's
prohibidon of "secret árdeles" in peace treades (286) as part of his argument for
the necessity of the "free use of the powers of human understanding itself" as a
condidon for polidcal as well as moral progress (291). This árdele could point
the way toward Gerhard's important work Partizipation: Das Prinzip der Politik
(Munich; Beck, 2007), which might fruitfully be brought into the American
discourse on participatory and deliberative democracy led by such thinkers as
Joshua Cohen and Amy Gutmann.
In sum, I do not think this collecdon is a great success. Several of the
árdeles, such as those by Schwaiger and Kühl, usefully point readers toward
some of the German context of Kant's wot k, but I do not think that even they
826 Ethics July 2010
demonstrate a distinctively German approach to the interpretation of Kant's
practical philosophy. The selection of articles on Kant's political philosophy
might point the reader to two of the most accomplished interpreters of Kant's
political philosophy active in Germany, Kersting and Ludwig, and to one of the
most interesting political philosophers (and public intellectuals) on the German
scene, Gerhardt. The articles on the Groundworkznà the Critique of Practical Reason
might point readers to scholars whose work they should know, for example.
Hoffe, Siep, and Förster, but the present selections do not give an adequate
impression of their best work.
The translator, Nicholas Walker, had to contend mth a wide variety of
individual styles, and he seems to have done a very good job. The bibliography
simply brings together the works cited in the several chapters, and thus it includes
nothing published after 2002 or other works from before that date that might
usefully have been added. Although I should be careful about throwing stones
from my own glass house, the book contains a large number of typographical
errors, although none that should stymie the attentive reader.
PAUL GUVER
University of Pennsylvania

Martinich, A. "Hoffe, Otfried. Thomas Hobbes." CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, Apr. 2016, p. 1238. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA449661855&asid=1c69062dcfa1a5923076a8e6ebb79327. Accessed 1 Mar. 2017.

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