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WORK TITLE: The Battle of Petersburg
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http://www.civilwarmonitor.com/blogs/chick-the-battle-of-petersburg-2015
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Born in March 14, 1982.
EDUCATION:Southeastern Louisiana University, master’s degree.
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Historian, writer, and wargame designer. Contributor to The Emerging Civil War blog.
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Born in March 14, 1982, Lincoln, Nebraska-based Sean Michael Chick is a historian, writer, and wargame designer. He designed the Horse & Musket game and game pieces for the Victory in the Pacific board game. He also contributes to The Emerging Civil War blog. Chick holds a master’s degree in history from Southeastern Louisiana University.
Expanding his master’s thesis, Chick published the 2015 The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864 in which he discusses the second battle of Petersburg, Virginia, one of the biggest and most decisive battles of the Civil War, yet plagued by a series of miscalculations, poor communications, Grant’s confused command structure, bad luck, and missed opportunities. Chick focuses on the last four days of the campaign, explaining that when the Army of the Potomac approached the James River, Grant failed to inform key subordinates about the objective to take the Petersburg transportation hub, as well as informing William Farrar Smith who lead the assault. The Union missed their chance to launch a full scale assault at Petersburg, the army was exhausted from the Overland Campaign, and some units refused orders. Despite days of attack by Union forces, the Confederacy was able to hold Petersburg, winning its last strategic victory of the war.
Addressing an often overlooked episode in the war, Chick puts the battle into context of politics, battlefield preservation, role of African American soldiers, and the attack of the First Maine Heavy Artillery which suffered heavy casualties. Chick focuses on the generalships of Ulysses S. Grant, George Gordon Meade, Robert E. Lee, P. G. T. Beauregard, and Smith during the battle. “Although he is perhaps a bit too generous to some, Chick offers some useful critical assessments of many of the generals,” noted Strategy Page contributor A. A. Nofi. Writing in Journal of Southern History, Benjamin G. Cloyd commented: “Demonstrating a consistent talent for detail, Chick traces the context leading up to Petersburg with flair…Chick’s thesis is employed with such precision that it offers key insights into the events of Petersburg.”
Chick wrote the book in response to finding little information for his master’s thesis on Kemble Warren after learning that Grant’s Overland Campaign was a mistake and the second battle of Petersburg was one in which Grant stumbled badly. Chick admits that his book expands on Thomas J. Howe’s Wasted Valor, published in 1988, focusing more attention on tactics and nonmilitary matters. In an interview with Brett Schulte on the TOCWOC-A Civil War Blog, Chick explained why so little study has been made of the battle: “Mostly though it was because both sides were embarrassed. Grant looked pretty bad in this battle; he vacillated and did little. Lee was confused. After the war both sections wanted to make heroes of these men and Petersburg did not aid such mythologizing.”
Chick drew on historical documentation, such as regimental histories, published memoirs, and articles from veterans’ magazines. A. Wilson Greene observed online at Civil War Monitor: “While these sources are useful and sometimes indispensable, the lack of manuscript research to corroborate the recollections of soldiers penned several decades after the war detracts from the credibility of Chick’s version of events.” Despite lack of footnotes in some areas and redundancy, The Petersburg Campaign contributor John Horn said: “At the heart of this tome, though, remains a riveting story, compellingly told and brimming with new insights. It also has enough maps to help the reader understand the actions described.” On the Grant under Fire Web site, Joseph Rose praised the book for offering “a fresh and balanced look at an engagement that has been often draped in myth.” A History of War contributor remarked: “Chick’s accounts of the fighting are compelling, and his arguments convincing.”
BIOCRIT
PERIODICALS
Journal of Southern History, 2016, Benjamin G. Cloyd, review of The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864, p. 686.
ONLINE
Civil War Monitor, http://www.civilwarmonitor.com (January 6, 2016), A Wilson Greene, review of The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864.
Grant under Fire, http://www.grantunderfire.com (September 4, 2015), Joseph Rose, review of The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864.
History of War, http://www.historyofwar.org (March 10, 2017), review of The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864.
Petersburg Campaign, http://petersburgcampaign.blogspot.com (July 14, 2015), review of The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864.
Strategy Page, https://www.strategypage.com (March 10, 2017), review of The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864 .
TOCWOC-A Civil War Blog, http://www.brettschulte.net (July 9, 2015), interview with Sean Chick.
Sean Michael Chick has a master’s degree in history from Southeastern Louisiana University.
LC control no.: n 2015000804
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Chick, Sean Michael, 1982-
Birth date: 19820314
Found in: The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864, 2015: ECIP t.p.
(Sean Michael Chick) data view ( b. Mar. 14, 1982)
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The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864
Benjamin G. Cloyd
Journal of Southern History. 82.3 (Aug. 2016): p686.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2016 Southern Historical Association
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The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864. By Sean Michael Chick. (Lincoln, Neb.: Potomac Books, 2015. Pp. [xviii], 459. $39.95, ISBN 978-1-61234-712-7.)
Given the complexity of the Civil War, it is unsurprising that certain aspects of the conflict remain underexplored. What is surprising is that this truth extends to the battlefields of the Civil War. As Sean Michael Chick persuasively shows, the story of the 1864 Union assault on Petersburg, Virginia--one of the biggest and certainly most important battles of the Civil War--deserves fresh analysis. There is more here than just an old tale. This quietly ambitious book mostly succeeds in claiming Petersburg's central place in historians' understanding of the Civil War.
For those historians drawn to military narrative, The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864 is compelling. Demonstrating a consistent talent for detail, Chick traces the context leading up to Petersburg with flair. Although his primary focus is on the Army of the Potomac's organizational struggles during the summer of 1864, he also does justice to Confederate counterefforts. The heart of the book is devoted to the four days of battle at Petersburg from June 15 to June 18. Reading these chapters is an immersive experience, as Chick faithfully and colorfully recreates the brutal struggle that preceded the ten-month siege of the critically strategic city. Chick's core argument is not seemingly revelatory (nor does he claim it to be). He posits that a reexamination of Petersburg offers one of the best windows on what the war had transformed into by 1864--an exhausting and inhumane mutual destruction.
Although not groundbreaking, Chick's thesis is employed with such precision that it offers key insights into the events of Petersburg. By consistently contrasting the human stories of both armies with the callous tactics of the Union high command, Chick makes a strong case that the slaughter of the Overland campaign eroded the ability of Ulysses S. Grant's army to function with cohesion. The Union army wasted numerous opportunities at the gates of Petersburg that could have hastened the end of the war. And even though Petersburg represented a crucial moment in the face-off between Grant and Robert E. Lee, the poor leadership displayed by both generals also contributed to the ongoing relative obscurity of this major battle. Ultimately, Chick believes that the sheer waste of Petersburg is why the battle remains largely ignored. Unlike the heroism of Gettysburg, or the strategy of Chancellorsville, what happened at Petersburg is not the story that most Americans want to consume about the Civil War, which makes this attempt to call new attention to the battle all the more important.
While an enjoyable and significant book, Chick's work is also somewhat uneven. At times his gift for flowery prose leads to awkward embellishments, such as "for all its virtues, the Confederacy failed" (p. 339). It is also odd that, after several chapters devoted to the battle itself, only one chapter is used to outline the long siege that followed, which also does not fit the traditional narrative of the war. More frustrating is the relatively brief treatment of the memory of the battle, which looks primarily at the postwar reputations of Grant and Lee. This focus on generals is characteristic of the entire work. However, these minor flaws should not discourage interest in the book. Chick has provided a needed, but not definitive, correction to the perception of Petersburg's importance. Any reader seeking to honestly confront what the Civil War had become by 1864--and why Americans often avoid the hard truths about the war--would do well to consult this book.
BENJAMIN G. CLOYD
Hinds Community College
Cloyd, Benjamin G.
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Cloyd, Benjamin G. "The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864." Journal of Southern History, vol. 82, no. 3, 2016, p. 686+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA460447782&it=r&asid=641c4c30068b1ab60d9ce5251a6e1b52. Accessed 23 Jan. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A460447782
Review of Sean M. Chick’s The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864
4 Sep, 2015 in Book reviews / Petersburg by Joseph Rose
The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864 offers a fresh and balanced look at an engagement that has been often draped in myth. From the start, Sean Michael Chick accurately summarizes the Overland Campaign, detailing the blunders on both sides. He doesn’t let Grant off easily, as many authors try to do, noting at one point his “almost obsessive preference for Sheridan.” When the Army of the Potomac finally reaches the James River, Chick describes how Grant failed to inform key subordinates about the programme to seize the vital transportation hub of Petersburg. Even William F. Smith, who was to lead the assault, learned of his role very belatedly. That the Union Army, demoralized and fatigued from the previous forty days, badly lost the four-day battle for control of the town should come as no surprise. This is a must read for students of the Virginia theatre of war and for those of the Civil War, as a whole.
The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864, by Sean Michael Chick
Lincoln: Nebraska Potomac Books, 2015. Pp. xviii, 460. Illus., maps, append., notes, biblio., index. $39.95. ISBN: 1612347126.
A Fresh Look at the Start of the Petersburg Campaign
Wargamer and historian Chick gives us a very detailed, somewhat revisionist account of the Union attempt to capture Petersburg in mid-July of 1864. In several ways one of the Civil War’s most unusual actions, Grant’s attempt to take Petersburg was plagued by more than the common run of miscalculations, “fog of war,” poor communications, quarrelsome generals, missed opportunities, strokes of good and bad luck; and yet also one of the most potentially decisive where a Union win could have shortened the war considerably.
Chick starts his account with three chapters that cover, in increasing detail, operations from March through early June of 1864, as Grant pressed Lee ever closer to the Richmond/Petersburg lines. The four days of maneuver and combat around Petersburg (June 15-18) each get their own chapter, and this is followed by a chapter giving an overview of events through to the end of the war.
Although he is perhaps a bit too generous to some, Chick offers some useful critical assessments of many of the generals. He is more favorable than usual in his views of P.G.T. Beauregard and Benjamin Butler, who in particular deserves a better reputation, while others usually viewed favorably, most notably U.S. Grant and even Robert E. Lee, are brought down a notch. Chick’s battle pieces are very well written, clear and careful, and accompanied by some very useful maps, which help make it much easier to follow the action.
This a good addition to the literature of the Campaign of ’64.
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Reviewer: A. A. Nofi, Review Editor
The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864, Sean Michael Chick
The battle of Petersburg was the last major battle in Grant's Overland Campaign of 1864. During the campaign Grant had repeatedly attempted to slip past Lee's right wing. Although the Union armies kept moving south, they also suffered a series of costly battlefield setbacks that slowly drained their strength. Finally, Grant leap south from Richmond towards Petersburg, and for once caught Lee napping. For several days the Union armies had a chance to capture Petersburg without having to face Lee's veterans, but they missed their chance and by the time they did launch a full scale assault Lee had finally woken up and had sent reinforcements.
This account makes you realise just how close the Union came to success at Petersburg. For three days Beauregard had to defend the city without any help, and any determined attack around his very weak right flank would probably have forced the Confederates to abandon the city, or at least cut it off from its main sources of supplies.
Two main reasons are given for the failure. First is the poor performance of Grant and most of his senior officers. Grant suffered from the confused command structure of the Union armies in Virginia, with Meade still in command of the Army of the Potomac and political generals of limited ability in high positions. Even so Grant didn't perform well at Petersburg. Meade was also under-par, as were most of his corps commanders. Lower down the scale plenty of officers did perform well, and achieved some potentially critical successes, but they were never properly support (on the Confederate side Lee also emerges poorly, failing to regain contact with the Union army after it moved south, and leaving Petersburg almost unsupported for three days but Beauregard performed well). The second problem was the exhaustion of the Union army after the earlier costly battles of the Overland Campaign. This took some of the sting out of their attacks, and in some cases led to units refusing orders to attack strong positions.
This is a very valuable account of this relatively unknown Civil War battle, the point at which the war of movement in Virginia ended, and the long siege of Richmond and Petersburg began. Chick's accounts of the fighting are compelling, and his arguments convincing.
CHICK: The Battle of Petersburg (2015)
Posted: 1/6/2016
Reviewed By: A. Wilson Greene
The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864 by Sean Michael Chick. Potomac Books, 2015. Cloth, ISBN: 978-1612347127. $39.95.
The combat east of Petersburg, Virginia, between June 15 and 18, 1864, “shows two titanic commanders of war, Grant and Lee, at their absolute worst” (369). Thus concludes Sean Michael Chick, whose expanded master’s thesis at Southeastern Louisiana University is the first study of these four fateful days since Thomas Howe’s groundbreaking Wasted Valor, published in 1988.
Chick freely confesses that his work is merely an attempt to “present Howe’s story with more flourish and attention to tactics and nonmilitary matters” and, to a large degree, he succeeds. His four central chapters provide a detailed and lively tactical account of each of those four June days, which he provocatively places within the Overland Campaign rather than as the commencement of the Petersburg operations, during which an ever expanding Army of the Potomac attempts to conquer the outmanned but well-managed Confederates under General P.G.T. Beauregard. The federal failure to do so—an outcome that Chick largely ascribes to shortcomings in the generalship of Ulysses S. Grant—led to more than nine more months of grinding warfare before Petersburg at last succumbed and with it, in short order, the Army of Northern Virginia.
Unfortunately, most of the virtues of Chick’s study end with his spritely battle narrative. He bases his work almost exclusively on regimental histories, published memoirs, and articles from veterans’ magazines. While these sources are useful and sometimes indispensable, the lack of manuscript research to corroborate the recollections of soldiers penned several decades after the war detracts from the credibility of Chick’s version of events (although in broad strokes his interpretation is accurate and similar to that of Howe’s). Equally troubling is the author’s penchant for making undocumented assertions of fact and interpretation. Often, explicit statements go unsourced. Moreover, Chick insists on citing secondary titles for direct quotations rather than informing readers of the original documentation. All of this undermines the scholarship that informed his narrative. Small factual errors pepper the pages, few of which are particularly significant, but cumulatively, they compromise confidence in the author’s grasp of the material. Poor editing, the fault of the publisher as much as the author, further disappoints. Readers might be mystified as to why Chick insists on referring to ordnance as “artillery guns.”
More than one-third of the book, comprising the opening and closing pairs of chapters, provides context for the four days of fighting at Petersburg and perspective on its consequences. These one-hundred seventy pages might easily have been reduced by a factor of five. Understanding the author’s focus on the opening offensive at Petersburg certainly does not require an extensive review of the war in the East from Gettysburg to Cold Harbor. Nor does Chick’s chapter on the remainder of the Petersburg Campaign, sprinkled with misapprehensions and factual miscues, require such a lengthy treatment. This extraneous material detracts from more than it adds to the monograph’s value.
Readers will also be struck by a plethora of extravagant conclusions regarding the commanders, their decisions, and the performance of units during the June 15-18 actions. For example, we are told that Benjamin Butler acted out of “debilitating paranoia” (203); that Robert E. Lee’s failure to dispatch the bulk of his army to Petersburg on June 17 bordered on the “ludicrous” (240); and that the admirable but all but anonymous defensive stand made by Colonel John Thomas Goode’s brigade on June 18 “ranks among the most heroic and effective of the entire war” (257). Such liberal use of hyperbole stretches credulity.
No figure emerges more tarnished in Chick’s narrative than Grant. The Union general-in-chief, to be sure, deserves a measure of criticism not always dispensed for his actions during Petersburg’s opening conflict. As Chick rightly illuminates, it was Grant’s poor communications with his subordinates that handicapped the cooperation and alacrity with which William Smith, Winfield Scott Hancock, and George Meade went about the business of capturing Petersburg on June 15. The Union commander remained strangely detached from the battle, seemingly content with his unchallenged crossing of the James while Meade attempted to exploit that accomplishment, understanding it as a means to an end. Perhaps, as Chick asserts, these days applied “a nasty blotch on Grant’s record” (2), but to accuse Grant of being “a glory hound,” (25) and possessing “a subtle kind of arrogance” and “an insipid favoritism” (20) requires a bit more substantiation than is provided.
Lee appears only slightly more favorably. The author takes the Confederate leader to task for failing to decipher Grant’s decision to target Petersburg, even though Chick quite perceptively acknowledges that Beauregard’s communications left Lee confused and uncertain as to the whereabouts of the blue clad corps. Despite this fundamental flaw, Beauregard emerges as the unsung hero of the battle, while Lee is faulted for exercising what might logically be considered reasonable judgment considering the circumstances he confronted at the time, hindsight notwithstanding.
The book contains many helpful illustrations and the accompanying maps, despite a few minor errors, are nicely rendered and useful in following the troop dispositions and geography provided in the text. Readers will particularly appreciate the biographical information that Chick includes when introducing the various commanders—some of whom relatively obscure—that play prominent roles in the fighting.
The Battle of Petersburg unquestionably contributes to our knowledge of the massive and underappreciated story of the long and arduous fighting around the Cockade City. Chick’s tactical chapters dealing with his primary subject, despite the reservations expressed above, should be mandatory reading for anyone wishing to gain a detailed understanding of how the combat unfolded between June 15 and June 18, 1864. Regrettably, sketchy scholarship, sweeping, unsubstantiated judgments, and factual hiccups leave this book only the second best treatment of its topic.
A. Wilson Greene is at work on a three-volume history of the Petersburg Campaign in the University of North Carolina Press’s Civil War America series.
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
Review: The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864
Sean Michael Chick has stood upon Thomas J. Howe’s shoulders and written a new history of the initial Union assaults on Petersburg. In The Battle of Petersburg; June 15-18, 1864, Chick has written more of a page-turner than Howe’s Wasted Valor. Chick delights in his subject and the Cockade City.
After a lengthy introduction insightful into the characters of Grant and Lee, Chick recounts Grant’s crossing of the James and initial offensive against Petersburg more vividly than Howe. Like Howe, Chick mentions in passing the Federal errors that permitted the outmaneuvered, heavily outnumbered Confederates to work a minor miracle and defend the Cockade City successfully. Given that Chick mentions Albert D. Castel (Decision in the West) at the beginning of the book, I was surprised that Chick did not make explicit the possibility of an altogether different approach to Petersburg—a flanking approach a la Sherman rather than a head-butting approach a la Meade (yes, Meade, not Grant). Chick leaves this flanking idea implicit in his passing criticisms of Smith for shortening his line on the evening of June 15, of Meade for failing to employ Kautz’s cavalry division for reconnaissance after June 15, and of Meade and Warren for failing to support Burnside on June 17.
Unlike Howe, Chick analyzes only in passing the causes of the Unionist defeat. Howe, at least, spent a few pages at the end of his book demolishing the theory of the Cold Harbor Syndrome—the idea that the Federal soldiers could not face the prospect of attacking fortifications after the horrific losses of the Overland Campaign. Instead, Chick spends sixty pages on a comparatively uninspired history of the Civil War after the failure of Grant’s First Offensive at Petersburg. Only then does Chick get back on track, and it is to explain why this dramatic battle has drawn so little attention over the years—Grant and Lee were at their “absolute worst” and the battle did not provide grist for the mills of any of the partisans of the postwar mythologies of the Lost Cause or the Just Cause.
Chick must find a friend who will read his next manuscript carefully. Misspelled words, misused words, and redundancies appeared too frequently. For example, “hurtled” is used when “hurled” is meant, and “artillery guns” is redundant. His friend should have editorial talent as well, because this book rambled on at least twenty percent too long. There should also be footnotes for every quotation and all statistics.
At the heart of this tome, though, remains a riveting story, compellingly told and brimming with new insights. It also has enough maps to help the reader understand the actions described. I look forward to reading Chick’s next book. All students of the siege of Petersburg ought to read this volume. It certainly added to my knowledge of the subject.
John Horn
Author, The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August
_____, The Petersburg Campaign
petersburgcampaign@blogspot.com
Author Interview: Sean Chick, Author of The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864
by BRETT SCHULTE on JULY 9, 2015 · 0 COMMENTS
Sean Chick, author of The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864, recently agreed to answer some questions about the new book. Sean’s book is only the second modern monograph on this battle, with Thomas Howe’s H. E. Howard volume the other. Chick was quite gracious in complimenting his predecessor’s work in the foreword of his own book. Combine Chick’s text and Hal Jespersen’s maps, and you have an important new book on Grant’s First Offensive.
Battle of Petersburg Interview with Sean Chick
1. Sean, thanks for agreeing to do this interview on your new book, The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864. Tell us a little bit about yourself? How did you become interested in the Civil War?
I saw the movie Glory in 1990 on HBO with my grandfather and brother. I was caught up in the whole story and then I felt a wave of excitement when grandfather said it was real. That it did happen. I grew up on a steady diet of movies like Jaws and The Monster Squad and Robocop. I knew those were fiction. This was different.
Then I told my father about it and he gave me his take on the war as we skimmed through Robert Paul Jordan’s The Civil War. The pictures were lovely and dramatic. I fell in love. Bad thing was my father was really into the Lost Cause. His view of the war was reactionary, racist, and filled with hatred for the North. I mean deep and bitter hatred; he still thinks New England is God’s scourge on America. I believed him then. It took me many long years to snap out of that view of the war. One important step was going to Vicksburg and seeing the Union graves. Watching Gettysburg helped too, because I was really taken with Buford and Chamberlain in the film. Then there was reading about Sherman. Even in my Lost Cause phase I had an odd fascination for the man. His grisly visage scared me as a child and I loved horror movies. Reading the works by Bruce Catton and David Blight completed my rejection of the Lost Cause.
Yet, my father exuded a demented pain over the war, the feeling that something grand had been lost. I knew then that the past hurt, even the distant past of which we have no memory. My father still reminds me of Amory Blaine in This Side of Paradise when he says he was for all the lost causes of history: Bonnie Prince Charlie, Hannibal, the Southern Confederacy. I suffer the same affliction to a degree. I can’t bring myself to play the Roundheads in any wargame nor play against the Jacobites even though my politics is firmly on the left.
2. My second question is a simple one: Why write a book about the Second Battle of Petersburg?
I was writing a master’s thesis on Kemble Warren, trying to argue that Grant’s Overland Campaign was a mistake. I read about this large battle at Petersburg where he bungled. Thing was I knew nothing of the battle and could find little. That is how I work as a historian. My future topics include such forgotten things as Mine Run and Tullahoma.
3. Prior to your book’s appearance, I count only one modern battle study of this fight, an H. E. Howard Battles and Leaders series book by Thomas Howe. Why do you think the battle has waited so long to see dedicated studies given its potential as a possible war winner for Grant?
A lot of reasons. One is a lack of records. By this point both sides were exhausted and few reports were written. So you have some actions that are completely lacking in detail. My own situation made it to where I could not be an archive rat like my mentor, Mark Summers. I am sure another historian will follow me up and fill in some of the details. Mostly though it was because both sides were embarrassed. Grant looked pretty bad in this battle; he vacillated and did little. Lee was confused. After the war both sections wanted to make heroes of these men and Petersburg did not aid such mythologizing. The exception was Beauregard. He wrote a lot about the battle after the war. No other Southerner did. It made Lee look bad and Beauregard’s subordinates were men like Hoke and Bushrod Johnson. Neither man was a glory hound. If Gordon, Early, or Longstreet had been there we would have heard of the battle in greater detail.
4. Let’s talk about each day and the measures and countermeasures which ensued. Day 1 is June 15, 1864. Grant’s army is crossing the James and heading southwest towards Petersburg. Baldy Smith’s XVIII Corps, Army of the James is in the lead. The Confederates have a minor force in Petersburg, Wise’s Virginia Brigade, some reserves and some artillery. Can you briefly take us through why Baldy Smith failed to take the City?
Smith was exhausted and sick. The heat was unbearable by all accounts. He was by nature cautious and the experience at Cold Harbor rattled him; he was bitter about the battle until his dying day. This is hardly the man to drive hard and fast. That being said, he did some things right. His attack plan on June 15 was very good. Having just read about his actions at Drewry’s Bluff and comparing them to Petersburg, it seems to me he was getting better at high command. Grant was also pleased with his part in the battle. All around he failed on June 15, but his failure was out done by those who followed.
5. The second day, June 16, 1864, sees reinforcements arrive on both sides. Hancock’s Second Corps is already on the field on the night of the 15th, and Burnside’s Ninth Corps arrives late on the morning of the 16th. Hoke’s Division, and then Johnson’s Division, both of Beauregard’s Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia, help bolster the Confederate defense. Walk us through the action as the battle grows larger.
Meade rushed over and prepared to attack. Trouble was he lacked cavalry. Only Kautz was on hand and he was not a good commander. So Meade did not know the Rebel right flank was open. So he makes a concentrated push that is as bad for II Corps as the June 3 attack at Cold Harbor. They lost four brigade commanders this day, three in the main attack. Petersburg was one of the most costly battles of the war in terms of brigade commanders. 11 were killed or wounded. Christ’s brigade in IX Corps went through 3 commanders in about 24 hours.
6. The third day, June 17, 1864, saw even more reinforcements, with Warren’s Fifth Corps coming into the fold on the Northern side. Lee, still unsure this was the main Union effort, could not be convinced by Beauregard to send a large force to his support. It would seem the Federals had a significant advantage on this day. Take us through the events of this day.
This is really the day the Union lost the battle. Meade succumbed to exhaustion. He was probably despondent after the June 16 attacks failed. So he does nothing. Burnside makes three attacks on the right flank. He fails to coordinate, but his commanders show some skill. Potter’s morning assault was a smashing success, an example of what might have been if Union commanders had paid more attention to proper assault tactics. I am firmly in the Paddy Griffith camp that says the war tactically speaking was more Napoleonic than modern. Potter’s assault is one example of this.
The most dramatic moment was Gould’s Charge. This was one of the longest and most bitter fights of the war and extremely confusing. Piecing together this failed attack was a research nightmare. I am still not sure exactly what happened, but the same is true of the participants.
If Meade had hurled his army forward on June 17 or if Warren had attacked boldly, the battle would have been won.
7. The last day, June 18, 1865, finally saw the arrival of most of the Army of Northern Virginia. The Union Sixth Corps had been sent to Bermuda Hundred rather than to Petersburg, so they did not factor into this battle. Take us through the final actions prior to this becoming a siege.
The battle was all but lost on June 18. Beauregard withdrew to a rear line that he had set up on June 17. The only hope was if V Corps had pressed forward quickly or used a bit of maneuver. Once again, the lack of cavalry played a part; a hard driving battle cavalry would have exposed the weak Rebel right. The attacks that came after 10am were a waste of lives, but Meade was not so sure. So he pressed on a series of attacks took place, every bit as bloody as Cold Harbor. Whether we blame Meade for that or the fog of war is a worthy debate. I want to be careful here. I do not want to be one of Richard Taylor’s “heaven-born, who from their closets scan with eagle glance fields of battle, whose mighty pens slay their thousands and their tens of thousands, and in whose Serbonian inkstands armies whole disappear.” Meade was not sure all was lost until he heard of the destruction of the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery.
8. Your maps were created by Hal Jespersen, who routinely does great work. I noted at the time and now that the book is out that you used Kickstarter to help pay for the maps. Tell us about that experience. How did it work out for you?
Just fine actually. I was a bit embarrassed to seek money but I simply did not have the funds at the time. Raising the money was a wonderful experience. I have a good support network for my work.
9. Speaking of maps, I’ve noticed that this battle suffers from a lack of good maps, especially for the days following June 15. Even Ed Bearss’ extensive Petersburg map series for the National Park Service doesn’t cover the events of this day. What are your thoughts on why this happened? Are the reasons similar to the lack of modern studies up until your book and Thomas Howe’s book?
My theory is Bearss was discussing what the Petersburg battlefield covered. There are markers and monuments for the events of June 15 and 18. Not so much for the 16 and 17. Then there are the lack of records. I love Howe’s book on the battle, but even he had few Rebel sources. I had to really scrap the bottom of the barrel on the Internet to get the Confederate perspective.
10. If you had to pick just one person on each side who was most responsible for the battle’s eventual outcome, who would you pick? Why?
In battle the most important single man is almost always the army commander. So for the South it is Beauregard, for standing firm and creating the second line of defense. For the North it is Meade for making a bad attack plan on June 16, not attacking on June 17 (Burnside took the initiative here), and then for attacking on June 18 when all was lost. Beyond these two I will go with Warren and Wise. Warren had a golden chance to win on June 17. On June 18 he was the only man capable of possibly gaining a victory. He failed on both counts. Indeed, his inactivity on June 17 is among the worst blunders of the war. I go with Wise for the Rebels because held firm on June 15. On June 17 he failed to cover a gap that allowed Potter to destroy Fulton’s brigade, so he nearly lost the battle. His men though made a counterattack that helped stem Gould’s Charge. Wise was neither a good man nor a good general, but even a broken clock is right twice a day. Petersburg, June 9 and 15, was his finest hour.
11. What were the three most important turning points? How did they shape the way the battle turned out?
The first is Smith’s pause at noon on June 15. His night time pause was understandable, but this one was less so. He spent too much time scouting and planning. If he had attacked earlier he would have had enough daylight to take the city. Second would be Warren’s pause on June 17 although his roughly 15,000 troops confronted no more than 2,000. Lastly is Beauregard’s decision to create a third defensive line on June 16. His withdrawal to this line was masterful, and given Lee’s tardiness, a bold move. After all, he risked having his whole command destroyed on June 17 by standing firm to give the slaves and militia time to construct the final line.
12. We’ve covered some of the reasons why this battle was less well remembered after the war due to the way postwar politics played out. Tell us a little more about how Civil War memory shaped how we view the Second Battle of Petersburg today.
Partisans on each side tout Lee or Grant as the military hero of their respective side. Both men look quite bad here. Lee was very slow to react. In fact, this might have been his gravest operational blunder of the war. Grant though did nothing to press his attacks. By sending VI Corps to Butler, then swapping VI Corps out for XVIII Corps he wasted time and took troops away from the decisive point of action. Petersburg dispels the myth of Lee the prescient and Grant the hard-driver. It at least shows a glaring exception to those rules.
13. I loved the way you utilized excerpts from Civil War veteran and noted author Ambrose Bierce’s book The Devil’s Dictionary. Can you tell us a little about why you chose to do this?
I like tying things to other aspects of life. A lot of Civil War books are not informed by art or even warfare outside of America. We need more books that examine the Civil War as compared to the battles of men like Marlborough and Maurice de Saxe.
Civil War books in the classic vein are valuable for the information they contain. Yet they remind me of the Pink Floyd song “Us and Them,” and the lyrics “Forward he cried from the rear/ and the front rank died/ And the general sat and the lines on the map/moved from side to side/Black and blue/And who knows which is which and who is who.” I did not wholly avoid this. It might be just too ingrained in the DNA of battlefield histories. But I wanted the book to be different. Ambrose Bierce seemed like a good man to invoke the cynicism and tragedy of the whole thing. The battles he fought in reads like a greatest hit list from the Army of the Cumberland: Shiloh, Corinth, Stones River, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Pickett’s Mill, Kennesaw Mountain, and Franklin. He seemed appropriate and irreproachable due to his record.
This by the way was the only part of Blight’s Race and Reunion I thought was wrong. Blight saw in Bierce the embodiment of the war’s meaning growing hollow in the North. This misreads the North, who celebrated their victory with gusto. Blight’s contention is that blacks were excluded from that celebration which is true. But it was always a war for union first and foremost. Slavery was the rock that shattered the union which is why even hardcore racists in Pennsylvania backed emancipation but would not go farther. I mention this because Union war memory, which I call The Just Cause, should be dealt with by historians and understood on its terms. I still toy with writing such an account, but I feel it is better left to more scholastic hands than mine.
Bierce was a cynic before the war; he was the kid who asked for a pet snake instead of a dog. There is a reason he wrote mostly short stories of war and horror. He seemed the perfect man to invoke the tragedy of lives wasted in a battle the North should have won.
14. Thanks for your time, and best wishes on the success of The Battle of Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864. Do you have any plans to write about other Siege of Petersburg topics in the future?
I have started work on the Bermuda Hundred campaign, partially to address the paucity of information on Butler’s actions in conjunction with Petersburg. I have some new information and hope to include it, making the book a kind of prequel and supplement to The Battle of Petersburg. After that I will go west, the part of the war I have more interest in actually. If I do another Virginia book it will be on Meade and Lee in fall 1863.