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WORK TITLE: Lincoln’s Trident
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BIRTHDATE: 1955
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“Robert M. Browning Jr. is Chief Historian of the United States Coast Guard and author of Success Is All that Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War and From Cape Charles to Cape Fear:The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War.”
RESEARCHER NOTES:
PERSONAL
Born 1955.
EDUCATION:Ph.D.
ADDRESS
CAREER
Historian and writer. Chief historian of the United States Coast Guard.
WRITINGS
SIDELIGHTS
Success Is All That Was Expected
Robert M. Browning Jr. is chief historian of the United States Coast Guard and the author of numerous books focusing on the U.S. Civil War. He is especially noted for his study of the Union’s blockading squadron, beginning with his book From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War. In his next book Success Is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War, Browning examines the the role of the Union Navy in the Union’s efforts to stop supplies from reaching the Confederacy. Drawing fro the National Archives, personal papers, diaries, and letters, Browning addresses problems with effort, particularly the different strategies used by the Union Army and Navy hindered the blockade primarily because of a lack of coordination between the two military branches.
Browning pays special attention to the efforts to capture and control the port cities of Charleston and Savannah. In the case of Charleston, several attempts to capture the city failed precisely because of the lack of coordination between the army and the navy. Browning also addresses how the Civil War monitors, small war ships build by the Union during the Civil War. Despite opposition from from several commanders, these monitors were continually used to try to capture Southern coastal regions but largely failed in most instances.
“This is an often overlooked aspect of Civil War operations,” wrote James Dunphy in Military Review. Virginia J. Laas, writing for Journal of Southern History, remarked: “Coupled with his previous volume, he has produced what will be considered the standard account of Union naval activities on the Atlantic coast during the American Civil War.” Browning is also author of the introduction to Blockade Runners Of The Confederacy.
Lincoln's Trident
Having covered the blockading squadrons of the South Atlantic and the North Atlantic, Browning turns his attention to the West Gulf in his book titled Lincoln’s Trident: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron During the Civil War. The West Gulf Blockading Squadron, which was established by the Union Navy in 1862, focused on damaging the South’s economy via stopping both imports into Southern coastal locations and the export of cotton from these locations, from St. Andrews Bay (Panama City), Florida to the Rio Grande River. The squadron was headed by David Glasgow Farragut from January 1862 until November 1864, just eight months until the end of the Civil War. “The long tenure of his command imbued the entire squadron with Farragut’s own resourcefulness, diligence, and relentless determination to pursue the enemy,” noted Journal of Southern History contributor Samuel Negus.
Browning details Farragut’s legendary leadership that earned him the honor of being considered by many to be one of America’s greatest naval heroes. In the process, Browning details the role of numerous other players in the squadron and the variety missions they carried out over a Western Theater that covered an expanse of a thousand miles. Initially, writes Browning, the squadron did not fare well. It was disorganized and faced numerous setbacks. Farragut, however, had a dogged determination to make his command successful. Browning examines the strategic decisions that were made to meet both long-term goals while also taking advantage of immediate opportunities to damage the South’s economy in the short run. The book includes 35 maps and photos and a summary chapter that was called “thoughtful” by Choice contributor M.J. Smith, Jr.
“Though it is a dense and often technical work not easily accessible to neophytes, it is an engagingly written and informative treasure trove,” wrote Journal of Southern History contributor Negus. Civil War Book Review Web site contributor John Beeler remarked: “The fruits of his research efforts are manifest in the 133 pages of endnotes and twenty-eight pages of bibliography. For all but Civil War naval specialists, this will be the only work on the squadron’s doings that one need consult.”
BIOCRIT
PERIODICALS
Choice, December, 2015. M.J. Smith, Jr., review of Lincoln’s Trident: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron During the Civil War, p. 630.
Civil War History, March, 2005, Michael J. Bennett, review of Success Is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War, p. 102.
Journal of Southern History, February, 2005, Virginia J. Laas, review of Success Is All That Was Expected, p. 164; August, 2016, Samuel Negus , review of Lincoln’s Trident, p. 683.
Military Review, January-February, 2004. James Dunphy, review of Success Is All That Was Expected, p. 93.
Wisconsin Bookwatch, January, 2006 , review of Blockade Runners of the Confederacy.
ONLINE
Civil War Book Review, http://www.cwbr.com/ (February 18, 2017), John Beeler, review of Lincoln’s Trident.
Civil Book Wars and Authors, http://cwba.blogspot.com/ (September 10, 2015), review of Lincoln’s Trident.
Strategy Page, https://www.strategypage.com/ (February 18, 2017), A. A. Nofi, review of Lincoln’s Trident.*
About the Author
Robert M. Browning Jr. is Chief Historian of the United States Coast Guard and author of Success Is All that Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War.
He lives in Dumfries, Virginia.
Success is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War
James Dunphy
Military Review. 84.1 (January-February 2004): p93.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2004 U.S. Army CGSC
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/
Full Text:
SUCCESS IS ALL THAT WAS EXPECTED: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War, Robert M. Browning, Jr., Brassey's Inc., Washington, DC, 2002, 495 pages, $34.95.
In Success is All That Was Expected, Robert M. Browning, Jr., the Coast Guard's chief historian, has completed his study of the Union's blockading squadrons. The study began with From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War (University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, 1993). In this new volume, Browning discusses the key role the Union Navy played in cutting off supplies for the Confederacy. Interestingly, he spends much of his time not in deep water but, rather, on the coasts, particularly around Charleston and Savannah. He eloquently demonstrates problems caused by the lack of a unified command, showing how the Union Army and Navy had vastly differing strategic designs and how a lack of cooperation and central control severely impeded the blockading squadron's success. Numerous attempts at capturing Charleston failed for these reasons, and Charleston fell only when Union General William Tecumseh Sherman's legions made its retention untenable.
Monitors were produced at the height of the Civil War, and over protests from commanders, the Navy Department continued the use of monitors to capture coastal cities. The monitors' failures played a key element in the South's retaining ports for blockade-runners.
Instead of emphasizing close coastal operations, Browning might have provided a better balance if he had spent more time discussing blue water, demonstrated successes, and the challenges Navy captains faced in stopping fast blockade-runners. Nevertheless, this is an often overlooked aspect of Civil War operations. The lessons Admirals Samuel DuPont and John A. Dahlgren learned in the Atlantic 140 years ago are still useful to planners today.
COL James Dunphy, USAR, Fairfax, Virginia
Dunphy, James
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Dunphy, James. "Success is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War." Military Review, Jan.-Feb. 2004, p. 93+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA116732510&it=r&asid=524a792750ad506186809484877a0aab. Accessed 23 Jan. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A116732510
Success is All that was Expected: the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War
James Dunphy
Military Review. 84.1 (January-February 2004): p93.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2004 U.S. Army CGSC
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/
Full Text:
SUCCESS IS ALL THAT WAS EXPECTED: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War, Robert M. Browning, Jr., Brassey's Inc., Washington, DC, 2002, 495 pages, $34.95.
In Success is All That Was Expected, Robert M. Browning, Jr., the Coast Guard's chief historian, has completed his study of the Union's blockading squadrons. The study began with From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War (University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, 1993). In this new volume, Browning discusses the key role the Union Navy played in cutting off supplies for the Confederacy. Interestingly, he spends much of his time not in deep water but, rather, on the coasts, particularly around Charleston and Savannah. He eloquently demonstrates problems caused by the lack of a unified command, showing how the Union Army and Navy had vastly differing strategic designs and how a lack of cooperation and central control severely impeded the blockading squadron's success. Numerous at tempts at capturing Charleston failed for these reasons, and Charleston fell only when Union General William Tecumseh Sherman's legions made its retention untenable.
Monitors were produced at the height of the Civil War, and over protests from commanders, the Navy Department continued the use of monitors to capture coastal cities. The monitors' failures played a key element in the South's retaining ports for blockade-runners.
Instead of emphasizing close coastal operations, Browning might have provided a better balance if he had spent more time discussing blue water, demonstrated successes, and the challenges Navy captains faced in stopping fast blockade-runners. Nevertheless, this is an often overlooked aspect of Civil War operations. The lessons Admirals Samuel DuPont and John A. Dahlgren learned in the Atlantic 140 years ago are still useful to planners today.
COL James Dunphy, USAR, Fairfax, Virginia
Dunphy, James
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Dunphy, James. "Success is All that was Expected: the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War." Military Review, Jan.-Feb. 2004, p. 93+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA117039124&it=r&asid=b01a3fc3f8b2342b0eea809af05c9ccc. Accessed 23 Jan. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A117039124
Lincoln's Trident: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron During the Civil War
Samuel Negus
Journal of Southern History. 82.3 (Aug. 2016): p683.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2016 Southern Historical Association
http://www.uga.edu/~sha
Full Text:
Lincoln's Trident: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron During the Civil War. By Robert M. Browning Jr. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2015. Pp. xii, 700. $69.95, ISBN 978-0-8173-1846-8.)
Robert M. Browning Jr.'s new book completes a planned trilogy chronicling in meticulous detail the Civil War service of the U.S. Navy's three most important deepwater commands: the blockading squadrons of the South Atlantic, the North Atlantic, and now the West Gulf. David Glasgow Farragut presided over the West Gulf squadron for all but eight of its forty-two months of existence, from its formation in January 1862 until November 1864. The long tenure of his command imbued the entire squadron with Farragut's own resourcefulness, diligence, and relentless determination to pursue the enemy. Perhaps no action better reflects these traits or so impacted the course of the war as the capture of New Orleans on May 1, 1862. In a week of intense river-borne fighting, Farragut's squadron, led by his foster brother David Dixon Porter's mortar-boat fleet, bombarded its way past Forts Jackson and St. Philip, forcing the surrender of the Confederacy's second city "without a siege that would have cost lives, time, and resources" (p. 111). Most remarkable, the squadron achieved this feat before acquiring a true navy yard for supply and repair anywhere within its field of operation.
With an unsurpassed mastery of technical detail, Browning describes the logistical challenges entailed in blockading a thousand-mile coastline from St. Andrew's Bay, Florida, to the mouth of the Rio Grande on the Texas coast. He charts the events of this campaign with an eye to points as fine as the relative inefficiency of refueling cruisers at sea in order to keep them on station, which required coaling vessels to retain a third of their cargo in ballast for stability. International law presented another set of constraints. U.S. courts expanded the doctrine of continuous voyage, condemning numerous neutral-flagged vessels seized for shipping cargoes from neutral ports in the Caribbean into Texas via Mexico. Despite these extended powers, the squadron remained "powerless to stop legal trade coming to Matamoros" (p. 408). Browning finds that of the at least 800,000 bales of cotton imported to New York during the Civil War, a significant portion came from the South. While it had little strategic impact on the wider war, this trade in the West Gulf so frustrated squadron commanders that they perpetually tested the limits of belligerent rights and thereby "continually flirted with creating a foreign crisis" (p. 514).
The squadron provided more decisive service in offensive operations against Confederate coastal positions, including the battle of Mobile Bay on August 5, 1864, where Farragut reputedly uttered his infamous order for Captain James Alden of the USS Brooklyn to "Go ahead, sir, d--n the torpedoes" (p. 451). Browning describes every action of even the slightest significance in elegant yet unforced prose, vividly capturing both the minute detail and the overall spirit of events. His account is punctuated with illuminating character sketches of the most important actors. The magisterial breadth and thoroughness of Browning's narrative reflects more than a decade of research in the private papers of individual participants, the published Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Navy Department records in the National Archives, and a host of other archival resources. The University of Alabama Press has produced a volume of the highest quality, including nine helpful maps of the Gulf Coast, making Lincoln's Trident: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron During the Civil War an essential resource for any serious researcher or library interested in Civil War naval history. Though it is a dense and often technical work not easily accessible to neophytes, it is an engagingly written and informative treasure trove.
SAMUEL NEGUS
Hillsdale College
Negus, Samuel
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Negus, Samuel. "Lincoln's Trident: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron During the Civil War." Journal of Southern History, vol. 82, no. 3, 2016, p. 683+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA460447780&it=r&asid=623876a8015aec42a67f2b03ec3f4fe3. Accessed 23 Jan. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A460447780
Browning, Robert M, Jr.: Lincoln's trident: the West Gulf Blockading Squadron during the Civil War
M.J. Smith, Jr.
CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries. 53.04 (Dec. 2015): p630.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2015 American Library Association CHOICE
http://www.ala.org/acrl/choice/about
Full Text:
Browning, Robert M, Jr. Lincoln's trident: the West Gulf Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Alabama, 2015. 700p bibl index afp ISBN 9780817318468 cloth, $69.95
(cc) 53-1908
E600
2014-19856 CIP
Historian Browning (US Coast Guard) here continues his multivolume review of the US Navy fleets involved in the coastal blockade of the Confederacy during the Civil War (e.g., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War, 1993). The West Gulf Squadron, under the brilliant leadership of Adm. David G. Farragut, was a key participant in the Union's efforts to halt Southern trade over a thousand mile stretch from Florida to Texas, while aiding (or trying to aid) US Army operations on the coasts and rivers of the western theater. Browning examines in detail the squadron's men, strategic opportunities, economic versus logistical interdiction questions, and campaigns on the oceans and streams from New Orleans and Vicksburg in 1862 to Mobile Bay in 1864-65, as well as on many of the inland bayous from Florida to Texas and out in the Gulf of Mexico. Illustrated by 35 maps and photos, the work finishes with a thoughtful summary chapter entitled "Conclusions." Heavily documented with notes, given a select bibliography, and thoroughly indexed, this comprehensive work will stand as the definitive treatment of its topic. Especially for collections in Civil War or business history. Summing Up: ** Recommended. All levels/libraries.--M. J. Smith Jr., Tusculum College
Smith, M.J., Jr.
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Smith, M.J., Jr. "Browning, Robert M, Jr.: Lincoln's trident: the West Gulf Blockading Squadron during the Civil War." CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, Dec. 2015, p. 630. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA437506094&it=r&asid=c5757cd5005b8ba1898716707561222e. Accessed 23 Jan. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A437506094
Success Is All That Was Expected: the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War
Michael J. Bennett
Civil War History. 51.1 (Mar. 2005): p102.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2005 Kent State University Press
http://upress.kent.edu/
Bennett, Michael J.
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Bennett, Michael J. "Success Is All That Was Expected: the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War." Civil War History, vol. 51, no. 1, 2005, p. 102+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA131041498&it=r&asid=b6ad3675fd03702b18ea2630da728d58. Accessed 23 Jan. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A131041498
Success Is All That Was Expected: the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War
Virginia J. Laas
Journal of Southern History. 71.1 (Feb. 2005): p164.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2005 Southern Historical Association
http://www.uga.edu/~sha
Full Text:
Success Is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. By Robert M. Browning Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 2002. Pp. xii, 497. $34.95, ISBN 1-57488-514-6.)
With the publication of this volume, Robert M. Browning Jr. completes the best and most thorough history of the U.S. naval squadrons on the Atlantic coast during the American Civil War. His first volume, Front Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War (Tuscaloosa, 1993), won the North American Society of Oceanic History's John Lyman Book Award. The present work, more analytical, sustains the high standards of scholarship established by the first.
Once again, the explication of logistics forms one of the real strengths of Browning's work. Administrative organization, provisioning ships with food and coal (including the adverse effect of Gettysburg on coal supplies), difficulties of securing sufficient crew members, creation of repair facilities, and the changes in ships" armament are only some of the usually overlooked topics that are covered here in abundant detail. In addition, Browning provides a comprehensive study of the duties, responsibilities, and actions of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, a command that stretched from Key West, Florida, to the northern border of South Carolina. A real help in following strategy and naval actions are the modern, clear, and concise maps of a complicated coastline and river system.
While historians of the war will be grateful for the operational details, the larger themes that Browning addresses are also important, especially in his concluding chapter. The army and navy never overcame interservice rivalries or developed cooperative command structures so that the two branches could effectively carry out combined operations. The naval high command, especially Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Vasa Fox, never gave up wishfully thinking that ironclads could bombard fortifications into submission. The Navy Department undermined the ability of both squadron commanders, Samuel F. DuPont and John Dahlgren, to capture Charleston. While they urged the capture of the city, they also required a guarantee of victory as a condition of attack. More importantly, according to Browning, the Union command never developed a larger strategy for exploiting their superiority in men and materiel on the South Atlantic coast. Beyond strategic matters, Browning offers astute assessments of commanders. Acknowledging throughout the book that there were a variety of factors and personnel that hampered naval efficiency, Browning finds significant weaknesses in the leadership of both Fox and Dahlgren.
Having conducted exhaustive research in every pertinent record group of the National Archives (from ships' logs to official correspondence with the Navy Department), the personal papers of most of the major players, and a host of collections of diaries and letters (both manuscript and published), Browning has demonstrated his command of the primary materials. Coupled with his previous volume, he has produced what will be considered the standard account of Union naval activities on the Atlantic coast during the American Civil War.
Missouri Southern State University
VIRGINIA J. LAAS
Laas, Virginia J.
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Laas, Virginia J. "Success Is All That Was Expected: the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War." Journal of Southern History, vol. 71, no. 1, 2005, p. 164+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA129014353&it=r&asid=031f4f8733adcf3c5f221ebc7481cd61. Accessed 23 Jan. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A129014353
Blockade Runners of the Confederacy
Wisconsin Bookwatch. (Jan. 2006):
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2006 Midwest Book Review
http://www.midwestbookreview.com
Full Text:
Blockade Runners Of The Confederacy
Hamilton Cochran
The University of Alabama Press
Box 870380, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0380
www.uapress.ua.edu
0817351698 $22.95 1-800-621-2736
Now with a new introduction by Robert M. Browning Jr., Blockade Runners Of The Confederacy is a highly readable, historical chronicle of the men and ships who dared to run Union naval blockades during the Civil War, bringing munitions, medicine, champagne, and silk to the Confederacy. Packed with true stories of daring and excitement, Blockade Runners Of The Confederacy numerous quotes and testimonies from primary sources as well as an in-depth assessment of what life was like for blockade runners and their ultimate contribution to how the war progressed. A handful of black-and-white photographs and an index for quick reference rounds out this fascinating scrutiny of the Civil War on the high seas.
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
"Blockade Runners of the Confederacy." Wisconsin Bookwatch, Jan. 2006. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA144437693&it=r&asid=7ab9d8def178927a2f3dccb0cde0c173. Accessed 23 Jan. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A144437693
Lincoln's Trident: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron during the Civil War, by Robert M. Browning Jr.
Tuscaloosa: University Alabama Press, 2015. Pp. xii, 700. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. $69.95. ISBN: 0817318461.
Blockading the Gulf
Browning, the Chief of Coast Guard History, and the author of a number of notable books on naval history, including two excellent works on the blockade of the Confederate Atlantic coast, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War and Success Is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War, takes up the subject of the blockade of the western Gulf of Mexico, from Pensacola to the Rio Grande.
This is a well-written, very detailed account, with many fine battle pieces, such as David Farragut’s running of the Confederate batteries on the Mississippi below New Orleans and at again at Vicksburg, as well as the Battle of Mobile Bay. While the treatment naturally tends to be dominated by the figure of Farragut, Browning does give us looks at the many other commanders on both sides, such as his foster brother David Dixon Porter or Confederate Adm. Franklin Buchanan. At times, Browning shows how the personalities of these and other officers affected operations or command relationships, often negatively.
Browning covers strategic planning, technical problems, such as the limitations of the engines of the day and the armoring of the “iron clads”, as well as logistical management, most notably the continuing problem of procuring coal, but also keeping the fleet fed and healthy and coping with large numbers of fugitive slaves. We also get insights into intelligence operations, ship handling, and more, including a great deal about “prize”, a subject dear to most Navy men’s hearts at time. Browning manages to cover these subjects while avoiding technicalese, neatly fitting these often slighted aspects of naval operations into the narrative.
Lincoln’s Trident is an excellent treatment of the blockade.
---///---
Reviewer: A. A. Nofi, Review Editor
Thursday, September 10, 2015
Browning: "LINCOLN'S TRIDENT: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron during the Civil War"
[Lincoln's Trident: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron during the Civil War by Robert M. Browning, Jr. (University of Alabama Press, 2015). Hardcover, maps, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:527/712. ISBN:978-0-8173-1846-8 $69.95]
The naval history of the Civil War has long been a popular avenue for serious study by professional historians and enthusiasts alike and the resulting body of literature ranges deep and wide. Numerous single volume histories of the Civil War afloat have been written, as have a solid collection of ship profiles, blockade and foreign relation studies, industry and design/technology investigations, battle and campaign histories, and officer biographies. Firsthand accounts have also been published, although at a pace and scale far less than that associated with the army participants of both sides. In recent years, some of the most valuable contributions to the naval bookshelf have been authored by U.S. Coast Guard chief historian Robert Browning, whose Union blockading squadron studies remain unmatched in magnitude of research and content. Each new release in his series is a significant event in Civil War publishing and Browning's newest book, Lincoln's Trident: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron during the Civil War, is more than the qualitative equal of its North and South Atlantic squadron predecessors*.
The research that went into Lincoln's Trident is broad ranging with a heavy emphasis on primary sources, especially manuscript resources and navy records. All of this went into crafting a remarkably expansive historical narrative. Over five hundred pages are devoted to every conceivable aspect of the men, ships, and operations of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron. In addition to describing major battles fought at New Orleans, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, Galveston, Sabine Pass, and Mobile, Browning packs into his book a seemingly exhaustive series of accounts detailing smaller naval engagements of all types, including ship vs. ship duels, ship vs. shore bombardments, contested fort passages, shore raids, and all manner of operations in support of the Union army. The geographical area covered is immense, from Pensacola, Florida all the way west to the mouth of the Rio Grande River (and all the bays and inland rivers in between). Devoting significant attention as well to Confederate plans and perspectives, these accounts are fully fleshed out, in many cases rivaling those found in specialized histories. Shipboard life on blockading vessels is also discussed in the book as are many of the blockade's economic and international political dimensions.
While the human focus is understandably centered on the famous figure of David Glasgow Farragut, who led the squadron through most of the war, the book also draws needed attention toward many ranking Union naval officers of ability and distinction that have been largely overlooked, men like Henry Thatcher, Henry Bell, James Alden and many others. The command portrait of Farragut painted by the author is broadly in line with convention. If there was any single necessary man it was Farragut, who was highly aggressive, tactically sound, single minded in purpose, and determined to lead from the front. The native southerner also proved a strong judge of character when it came to selecting subordinates for commanding blockade stations, although his criticisms of many of those same officers sometimes seemed unfair, especially when judged from afar. In terms of command faults, Browning does note that Farragut developed a reputation in some quarters for being a poor administrator but the author doesn't delve into the substance of the charge much himself.
Given its status as the farthest blockading station from northern ports (by far), it's not surprising that logistics became a major concern for the West Gulf Blockading Squadron and Browning devotes a great deal of attention to the matter. Adequate supply and coaling supports were built up at an exasperatingly measured pace and, with Navy Department priorities seemingly always directed elsewhere, steam powered ships numerous enough to cover the major ports and fast enough to overtake blockade runners were always in short supply. The failure to hold Galveston after its capture in 1862 also meant that logistics would always be stretched along the Texas coast, so much so that the squadron was often forced to rely upon sailing ships. Coaling at sea was problematic and New Orleans and Pensacola were too far away to repair and coal steamers without taking the vessels assigned to Texas off station for unacceptably long periods of time.
Browning astutely observes, and argues persuasively throughout the book, that army-navy cooperation excelled on the tactical and operational levels but failed badly at the strategic level. Farragut and his officers worked harmoniously with Gulf Department army commanders Benjamin Butler and Nathaniel Banks but the cabinet heads of the army and navy together with the chief executive never developed any joint strategies in the Gulf. This oversight was far from inconsequential, as events at Vicksburg and especially Galveston would demonstrate. Also, the navy was prepared to attack Mobile at several points during the war only to have each prospective campaign derailed by shifting army priorities. Galveston offered the clearest and most appalling example of how useless it was for the navy to capture key points if army resources were absent or insufficient to hold the gains.
The navy could also be the author of its own problems, its overarching obsession with Charleston keeping Confederate Mobile active far longer than the port city had any reason to expect. Union ironclads were kept from joining Farragut's fleet off Mobile Bay until the middle of summer 1864. Within the navy command structure, there was also a constant push and pull between tightening up the blockade and supporting offensive operations up the Mississippi River and other inland Gulf waterways. Contrary to the oft voiced expectations of Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, resources were never adequate for both initiatives and the blockade often suffered. Shallow draft steamers were also in such short supply to the Gulf squadron that Confederate sailing vessels could carry on coastal trade and penetrate the blockade with near impunity.
There are some wish list items missing from the volume. Near the front of the book is a collection of area maps tracing the southern Gulf coastline and identifying the major forts and ports targeted by the Union navy. While these are fine tools for general reader orientation, the narrative describes the squadron's operations in great detail and there are no maps to accompany the chapters covering fleet battles, ship vs. shore engagements, and key fort passages. Many of these naval actions documented in Lincoln's Trident could be quite involved and consequently difficult to visualize without the aid of tactical scale maps. Supplementary reference information that one might expect from comprehensive studies of this type, such as lists of officers, squadron vessels and enemy ship captures, are also absent. Finally, while the final chapter provides a solid summary of the achievements, failures, and challenges of the West Gulf Blockading squadron, it does seem a bit rushed in marking out its conclusions, especially in its assessment of blockade effectiveness. On the other hand, Browning's study is primarily operational in nature and works analyzing the blockade do already exist. In the end, the book's immense strengths far outweigh any complaints. Browning's exhaustive and original squadron study is a clear front-runner for the best Civil War naval study of 2015.
Notes:
* - From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War (Univ of Alabama Pr, 1993) and Success Is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War (Brassey's, 2002).
Lincoln's Trident: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron during the Civil Ward
by Browning, Robert M., Jr.
Publisher: University of Alabama Press
Retail Price: $69.95
Issue: Winter 2016
ISBN: 9780817318468
Prosecuting the Union Naval Blockade
This book is the third installment of Robert Browning Jr.’s exhaustive history of the Union Navy’s Civil War blockade of the South, previous volumes having surveyed the activities of the North Atlantic (1993) and South Atlantic (2002) Blockading Squadrons. Although Browning was the Coast Guard’s official historian for the past three decades (he retired in 2015), the blockade has been the chief focus of his scholarly life’s work: certainly he knows more about the subject than anyone else now alive, and probably more than anyone in the past, save perhaps Edward K. Rawson, and Charles W. Stewart, who between them were responsible for compiling and editing the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of Rebellion (ORN) volumes pertaining to the blockade.
Although both of the Atlantic Blockading Squadrons undertook major coastal assaults—Fort Fisher by the North Atlantic Squadron and Port Royal and Charleston by the South Atlantic Squadron—the West Gulf Squadron’s service history was by a considerable margin the most eventful of the four squadrons, encompassing not only the assault on the forts guarding New Orleans and the Battle of Mobile Bay, but also prolonged and extensive operations on the Mississippi River in 1862-63. During the course of the latter the squadron’s activities extended as far upriver as Vicksburg, Mississippi, some 350 miles north of New Orleans.
As has been the case with Browning’s previous volumes, the greatest value of Lincoln’s Trident rests less in his account of the squadron’s best-known undertakings—the assault on Forts St. Philip and Jackson (April 1862), running the gauntlet at Vicksburg (July 1863) and Port Hudson (March 1863), and the Battle of Mobile Bay (August 1864)—which have been recounted numerous times by other authors, but in the more mundane, but no less significant activities bound up in attempting to blockade more than 1,000 miles of the Gulf of Mexico’s coastline from St. Andrews Bay, Florida to the Mexican border at the mouth of the Rio Grande River.
Moreover, while the blockade of the mouths of the Mississippi prior to New Orleans’ fall, that of Mobile Bay until August 1864, and of Galveston, Texas have hitherto attracted the lion’s share of historical attention, Browning’s survey makes clear that the squadron’s blockade was not confined to the major ports in the western Gulf of Mexico. Indeed, many of its activities focused on passes or inlets giving access to the interior via lakes, rivers, or sounds: Grant’s Pass, east of the entrance to Mobile Bay, the mouth of the Atchafalaya River and Calcasieu Pass on the Louisiana coast, Sabine Pass on the Louisiana-Texas border, and San Luis Pass, Pass Cavallo, and Corpus Christi Pass on the Texas Coast.
Nor was blockading the sole, or even the principal undertaking of the vessels assigned to guard these outlets to the sea: in many cases Confederate naval forces were based in and operated from the interior, as was the case on Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds in North Carolina Sounds—as detailed in From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, Browning’s study of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron—and Union efforts centered on eliminating these threats. As a consequence, much of Browning’s narrative of the squadron’s activities in the Atchafalaya River, the Sabine Pass, and Matagorda Bay is devoted to small-scale naval and amphibious operations—raids, cutting-out expeditions and the like—rather than to blockading per se.
Another of the squadron’s responsibilities falling outside the realm of blockading was monitoring activity at the mouth of the Rio Grande. Much of the trans-Mississippi Confederacy’s external trade was conducted through Matamoros, on the Mexican side of the river. The US could not legally blockade a neutral port, nor could it even maintain a constant naval presence at the river’s mouth, owing to inadequate logistical support, and commercial interests from Europe—especially Great Britain—and also from New York and Boston capitalized on the fact. The trade infuriated Northern officials, in particular Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, and led to repeated seizures of merchant vessels on the grounds of carrying contraband of war or anchoring in US waters. Many of these seizures, especially those of British vessels, generated diplomatic furors between the US and foreign countries and led to protracted adjudication. Browning provides a succinct overview of the situation at Matamoros and its legal and foreign-policy ramifications in the course of his larger survey.
He also deals extensively with the unglamorous but essential topic of logistics. Maintaining a steam-powered blockading force over such an expanse of coastline was not simply daunting: it turned out to be impossible. The main repair facility from 1863 onward, Pensacola, was situated near the command’s eastern limit, and was thus poorly-placed to serve as a supply base for warships operating along the Texas coast. A major coal and provisions depot was established at Ship Island, off the coast of Mississippi, and the capture of New Orleans gave the navy access to its shipyards and shore-side infrastructure, but these facilities were also too far from the western extremities of the command to provide dependable support. David Farragut, commander-in-chief of the squadron from January 1862 to November 1864, had therefore to rely to a large extent on sailing vessels to patrol southwest of Galveston, with predictable consequences for the blockade’s efficacy.
Nor does Browning neglect the human dimension. He examines the living conditions, recreations, food and other aspects of the squadron’s seamen, as well as the squadron’s chronic manpower shortage, a situation that led to the large-scale recruitment of African-Americans. Likewise, he assesses the quality of the squadron’s leadership. Farragut, not surprisingly, gets high marks for his energy, resourcefulness, leadership, strategic vision, and ability to work harmoniously with the Union Army, although not for his administrative acumen (510-11). By contrast, David Dixon Porter comes off as a glory-hungry braggart, back-stabbing subordinate, and chronic liar (128, 142).
On the downside, the book would have benefited from more careful editing. A good deal of repetition could have been eliminated thereby. For instance, a 24 December 1861 encounter between the USS Hunstville and a Confederate gunboat off Mobile is described on page 21 and again on page 39; the capture of the blockade runner Magnolia is mentioned on pages 10, 15, and 37, and that of the Caroline recounted on page 208 and again on page 241. Other examples could be adduced. More attention to presentation would have made for a smoother and easier read.
Furthermore, some of the figures should have been checked for accuracy. Browning offers a table on page 514 detailing by year the amount of southern cotton reaching New York from 1861 to 1865. Adding together the four yearly figures produces a total of 605,151 bales, but the text states the total figure to have been 808,151 bales. Likewise, a table in the endnotes giving the numbers of merchant vessels attempting to and successfully running the blockade year by year contains several errors of calculation and lacks any figures for 1865 (647-48).
While Browning’s judgments are by and large sound, a few can be queried. His verdict on the blockade’s effectiveness is an especially noteworthy case in point. Given that more than 80 percent of the attempts to run the blockade were successful, his remark that it leaked “like a sieve” is unexceptionable (513). Yet the claim that the squadron’s “efforts to curtail blockade running failed” is contradicted by his own evidence (513). 1,723 attempts to run the blockade were made in 1861. The number dropped to 428 in both 1862 and 1863, to 108 in 1864 (647-48). While much of the decline doubtless owed to the capture of New Orleans and, later, the seizure of Mobile Bay, the fact remains that there were 758 more attempts to run the blockade in 1861 than in 1862-64 combined. As James McPherson, William Roberts, and others have argued, the blockade’s effectiveness is best measured not by the number of ships that managed to run it, but by the number that did not try, coupled with the fact that those that did typically had limited carrying capacity. In this regard Browning’s analysis seems wide of the mark, as does his statement that “[t]he South was able to export almost half of its cotton crop through the blockade” (514).
A few other small criticisms can be made. Maps are essential to a work of this sort, and while those supplied are serviceable, readers would be helped by a general map of the entire command as well as greater detail on the sectional maps. In regard to the latter deficiency, Berwick Bay, on the Atchafalaya River, is repeatedly mentioned in the text—it is listed thirteen times in the index— but is not identified on the relevant map of the Louisiana coast and interior west of New Orleans (26). And here and there Browning could have been more careful in his choice of words: “skylarking,” for instance, is closer in meaning to “frolicking” or “horse-playing” than it is to “roughhousing” (388).
These, however, are minor quibbles. On the whole, Lincoln’s Trident is a multi-faceted examination of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron’s activities, actors, and achievements. It may not constitute the last word on the subject, but is unlikely to be superseded by a more comprehensive work. Browning’s research ranges far beyond the documents printed in the ORN, encompassing the private correspondence of many participants both famous and obscure, as well as public records. He consulted collections housed in no fewer than forty-six archives. The fruits of his research efforts are manifest in the 133 pages of endnotes and twenty-eight pages of bibliography. For all but Civil War naval specialists, this will be the only work on the squadron’s doings that one need consult.
John Beeler is Professor of History at the University of Alabama, where he specializes in European and Military and Naval history.