Contemporary Authors

• Socializing Security: Progressive-era Economists and the Origins of American Social Policy Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA), 1996
• When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA), 2002
• A Concise Guide to Macroeconomics: What Managers, Executives, and Students Need to Know Harvard Business School Press (Boston, MA), 2007
• Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 2010
• Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 2014
• Democracy: A Case Study Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA), 2017

1. Democracy : a case study LCCN 2016020796 Type of material Book Personal name Moss, David A., 1964- author. Main title Democracy : a case study / David A. Moss. Published/Produced Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, [2017] Description viii, 773 pages ; 25 cm ISBN 9780674971455 (alk. paper) CALL NUMBER E183 .M876 2017 Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER E183 .M876 2017 CABIN BRANCH Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 2. A concise guide to macroeconomics : what managers, executives, and students need to know LCCN 2014018182 Type of material Book Personal name Moss, David A., 1964- Main title A concise guide to macroeconomics : what managers, executives, and students need to know / David A. Moss. Edition Second edition. Published/Produced Boston, Masschusetts : Harvard Business Review Press, [2014] Description x, 211 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm ISBN 9781625271969 (hardcover : acid-free paper) Shelf Location FLM2015 100048 CALL NUMBER HB172.5 .M68 2014 OVERFLOWJ34 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms (FLM2) 3. Preventing regulatory capture : special interest influence and how to limit it LCCN 2013008596 Type of material Book Main title Preventing regulatory capture : special interest influence and how to limit it / edited by Daniel Carpenter, Harvard University, David A. Moss, Harvard University. Published/Produced New York : Cambridge University Press, 2014. Description xxv, 501 pages ; 24 cm ISBN 9781107036086 (hardback) 9781107646704 (pbk.) Shelf Location FLM2014 008898 CALL NUMBER HD3616.U63 P74 2014 OVERFLOWA5S Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms (FLM1) 4. Government and markets : toward a new theory of regulation LCCN 2009037726 Type of material Book Main title Government and markets : toward a new theory of regulation / Edward J. Balleisen, David A. Moss. Published/Created Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010. Description xvi, 559 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ISBN 9780521118484 (hardback) 0521118484 (hardback) Links Cover image http://assets.cambridge.org/97805211/18484/cover/9780521118484.jpg CALL NUMBER HD3612 .G68 2010 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER HD3612 .G68 2010 FT MEADE Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 5. A concise guide to macroeconomics : what managers, executives, and students need to know LCCN 2006101612 Type of material Book Personal name Moss, David A., 1964- Main title A concise guide to macroeconomics : what managers, executives, and students need to know / David A. Moss. Published/Created Boston, Mass. : Harvard Business School Press, c2007. Description ix, 189 p. : ill. ; 25 cm. ISBN 9781422101797 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1422101797 Links Table of contents only http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip076/2006101612.html Contributor biographical information http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1306/2006101612-b.html Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1311/2006101612-d.html CALL NUMBER HB172.5 .M68 2007 LANDOVR Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE CALL NUMBER HB172.5 .M68 2007 LANDOVR Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 6. When all else fails : government as the ultimate risk manager LCCN 2002017111 Type of material Book Personal name Moss, David A., 1964- Main title When all else fails : government as the ultimate risk manager / David A. Moss. Published/Created Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2002. Description viii, 456 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ISBN 0674007573 CALL NUMBER HD61 .M63 2002 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms CALL NUMBER HD61 .M63 2002 LANDOVR Copy 2 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms - STORED OFFSITE 7. Socializing security : progressive-era economists and the origins of American social policy LCCN 95020652 Type of material Book Personal name Moss, David A., 1964- Main title Socializing security : progressive-era economists and the origins of American social policy / David A. Moss. Published/Created Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1996. Description 264 p. ; 24 cm. ISBN 0674815025 (alk. paper) CALL NUMBER HD7654 .M67 1996 Copy 1 Request in Jefferson or Adams Building Reading Rooms

• Harvard Buisness School - http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/profile.aspx?facId=6518

  David A. Moss
  Paul Whiton Cherington Professor of Business Administration

  David Moss is the Paul Whiton Cherington Professor at Harvard Business School, where he teaches in the Business, Government, and the International Economy (BGIE) unit. He earned his B.A. from Cornell University and his Ph.D. from Yale. In 1992-1993, he served as a senior economist at Abt Associates. He joined the Harvard Business School faculty in July 1993.

  Professor Moss’s early research focused on economic policy and especially the government’s role as a risk manager. He has published three books on these subjects: Socializing Security: Progressive-Era Economists and the Origins of American Social Policy (Harvard University Press, 1996), which traces the intellectual and institutional origins of the American welfare state; When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager (Harvard University Press, 2002), which explores the government’s pivotal role as a risk manager in policies ranging from limited liability law to federal disaster relief; and A Concise Guide to Macroeconomics: What Managers, Executives, and Students Need to Know (Harvard Business School Press, 2007), a primer on macroeconomics and macroeconomic policy. In addition to these books, he has authored numerous articles, book chapters, and case studies, mainly in the fields of institutional and policy history, financial history, political economy, and regulation.

  More recently, Professor Moss has devoted increasing attention to questions pertaining to government regulation, economic inequality, and democratic governance. One notable article from 2009, “An Ounce of Prevention: Financial Regulation, Moral Hazard, and the End of ‘Too Big to Fail’” (Harvard Magazine, Sept-Oct 2009), grew out of his research on financial regulation for the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel. He has also co-edited three volumes on economic regulation since 2009, including most recently Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It, co-edited with Daniel Carpenter (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

  Professor Moss has created both a financial history course in the second year of the Harvard MBA program (“Creating the Modern Financial System”) and a newer course on democratic governance ("History of American Democracy") for Harvard undergraduates and MBA students.

  Professor Moss is the founder of the Tobin Project, a nonprofit research organization that has received the MacArthur Award for Creative and Effective Institutions. He is also a member of the National Academy of Social Insurance. Honors include the Robert F. Greenhill Award, the Editors’ Prize from the American Bankruptcy Law Journal, the Student Association Faculty Award for outstanding teaching at the Harvard Business School (eight times), and the American Risk and Insurance Association’s Annual Kulp-Wright Book Award for the “most influential text published on the economics of risk management and insurance.”

• Harvard Buisness School - http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/m/Pages/profile.aspx?facId=6518

  David A. Moss
  PAUL WHITON CHERINGTON PROFESSOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

  Business, Government and the International Economy
  +1 (617) 495-6762
  →Send Email

  David Moss is the Paul Whiton Cherington Professor at Harvard Business School, where he teaches in the Business, Government, and the International Economy (BGIE) unit. He earned his B.A. from Cornell University and his Ph.D. from Yale. In 1992-1993, he served as a senior economist at Abt Associates. He joined the Harvard Business School faculty in July 1993.

  Professor Moss’s early research focused on economic policy and especially the government’s role as a risk manager. He has published three books on these subjects: Socializing Security: Progressive-Era Economists and the Origins of American Social Policy (Harvard University Press, 1996), which traces the intellectual and institutional origins of the American welfare state; When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager (Harvard University Press, 2002), which explores the government’s pivotal role as a risk manager in policies ranging from limited liability law to federal disaster relief; and A Concise Guide to Macroeconomics: What Managers, Executives, and Students Need to Know (Harvard Business School Press, 2007), a primer on macroeconomics and macroeconomic policy. In addition to these books, he has authored numerous articles, book chapters, and case studies, mainly in the fields of institutional and policy history, financial history, political economy, and regulation.

  More recently, Professor Moss has devoted increasing attention to questions pertaining to government regulation, economic inequality, and democratic governance. One notable article from 2009, “An Ounce of Prevention: Financial Regulation, Moral Hazard, and the End of ‘Too Big to Fail’” (Harvard Magazine, Sept-Oct 2009), grew out of his research on financial regulation for the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel. He has also co-edited three volumes on economic regulation since 2009, including most recently Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It, co-edited with Daniel Carpenter (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

  Professor Moss has created both a financial history course in the second year of the Harvard MBA program (“Creating the Modern Financial System”) and a newer course on democratic governance ("History of American Democracy") for Harvard undergraduates and MBA students.

  Professor Moss is the founder of the Tobin Project, a nonprofit research organization that has received the MacArthur Award for Creative and Effective Institutions. He is also a member of the National Academy of Social Insurance. Honors include the Robert F. Greenhill Award, the Editors’ Prize from the American Bankruptcy Law Journal, the Student Association Faculty Award for outstanding teaching at the Harvard Business School (eight times), and the American Risk and Insurance Association’s Annual Kulp-Wright Book Award for the “most influential text published on the economics of risk management and insurance.”

• Harvard Magazine - http://harvardmagazine.com/2012/09/the-other-commons

  FEATURES
  The Other Commons
  “Political dysfunction may well be an important part of the problem.”
  SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2012

  David A. Moss
  David A. Moss
  Photograph by Stu Rosner

  MAIN ARTICLE
  Can America Compete?

  An interview with David A. Moss, McLean professor of business administration and founder of the Tobin Project. Read the complete article, “Can America Compete?” (September-October 2012)

  Harvard Magazine: The competitiveness project’s survey research shows that managers and business leaders are concerned about the political system—it looks messy and dysfunctional.

  David Moss: Yes, this seems like a new twist on the competitiveness debate. Of course, worries about the economic health of the country are nothing new. In the 1950s, there was great fear that the Soviet Union would eventually outproduce the U.S. Then there was a good deal of worry about Japan in the 1980s—that Japan was an economic juggernaut, and the U.S. couldn’t possibly keep up. Both fears turned out to be overblown.

  Perhaps my favorite example relates to late eighteenth-century Britain, when skeptics were saying the country was in decline—that its public debt was too big and its products were no longer of high quality. But Adam Smith said the pessimists were wrong, and we now know he was absolutely correct—Britain was on the verge of an economic takeoff. The rationale Smith offered in 1776 is especially interesting. He suggested that in a dynamic economy, the biggest (and thus most visible) industries are frequently in decline, and the newest, most vibrant ones aren’t yet visible. This is why a country could have a very promising economic future yet still appear to be in decline.

  The lesson here is that we need to be cautious about our economic pessimism. It’s easy to get carried away. So as we think about some of the political challenges America faces today, we need to be equally cautious.

  Library of Congress
  Adam Smith, author of The Wealth of Nations, was prescient about dynamic economies in preindustrial Britain. Might he caution against excessive economic and political pessimism in the United States today?
  That said, in past discussions of America’s economic health, the focus was predominantly on economic and business factors: interest rates, tax rates, labor costs, supply chains. Now it seems we also need to pay close attention to the political system. One has a sense that it’s increasingly dysfunctional. In fact, when our HBS alumni were surveyed about strengths and weaknesses in the American economy, they identified the political system as the biggest weakness going forward. It appears Standard & Poor’s came to a similar conclusion during the debate over the debt ceiling last year. When S&P downgraded the nation’s credit rating, there wasn’t any serious question about the country’s capacity to repay its federal debt. The U.S. had (and has) plenty of GDP. The real question the rating agency raised—the basis for its downgrade—was whether the nation’s political system is reliable enough to ensure continued repayment. The extreme political brinksmanship that characterized the debt-ceiling fight was profoundly unsettling for S&P’s analysts—and perhaps rightly so.

  Putting these pieces together, I think there’s reason to worry about the long-term economic health of the country. I remain optimistic—but nervously optimistic. Although we’ve seen GDP growth over the past few decades, it’s been highly concentrated among top earners—most Americans haven’t seen nearly as much income growth as past generations have. Will broad-based growth return in the future? I sure hope so. But we need to think hard about what’s causing the problem.

  I’m not sure the traditional explanations work so well. For example, I don’t think the fundamental problem relates to the way our firms are managed or the nature of our trade infrastructure (though we still have to work on both). In my view, political dysfunction is likely a more serious impediment to a healthy economy. Are we doing what we need to do in terms of developing our human capital? Clearly not. Whether from the right or the left, do we have an energy policy that makes sense? Not really. People can debate the individual healthcare mandate, but the ultimate question is, can we continue to afford spending over 17 percent of GDP on a healthcare system that appears less productive—less effective, in many cases—than those of other rich, industrial countries? In terms of our fiscal position, the federal government is spending about 24 percent of GDP while taking in about 16 percent of GDP in revenues. It’s obvious that we need to cut spending and raise taxes over the long term—yet the political system can’t deliver that. In fact, it’s having trouble addressing any of these major challenges in a coherent way. So political dysfunction may well be an important part of the problem.

  HM: You have found periods when Americans, though skeptical about government, have agreed on steps to reduce debt and pay for public services. Does that context inform the present?

  DM: Yes, absolutely. But first we have to ask: is there something different about the problems facing the political system today? After all, in nearly every generation, Americans have complained about how their political system “doesn’t work as well as it used to.” Although the same may be true today, I think we do face some distinctive political challenges. Consider the research that Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal—three superb scholars—have put together on political polarization in Congress. Their data show it is at or near an all-time high. We’re seeing more distance between the parties and less ability to compromise than we have in a long, long time.

  In fact, the issue of compromise is itself interesting, and starts to get us back to your question. Many people think of compromise as meeting in the middle: I give a little, you give a little, and in this way we reach a solution. But there’s another form of compromise that we sometimes forget about: instead of meeting in the middle, each party gets what it most wants. If one person wants to visit Miami and the other New York, they could settle for Washington, D.C.—or they could agree to go to Miami this year and New York the next. Some of the most important political accommodations in American history have involved the latter sort of compromise—choosing the best from column A and the best from column B.

  Since the days of Jefferson and Hamilton, Americans have harbored profound disagreements about the proper role of government. One side sees government as the problem and seeks to limit it and get it out of our lives; the other believes government can be harnessed to solve important problems, particularly those that individuals have trouble solving on their own. Both views have been enormously productive over the course of the nation’s history: in fact, one key to American economic success is that the nation’s governance has long been rooted in two great philosophies of government, not just one. And reconciling the two has not always involved meeting in the middle.

  Consider the extraordinary thing that happened in the mid nineteenth century, when many states introduced strong budget rules that sharply limited public borrowing—something the Europeans should look at very closely today. Back then, the push for fiscal responsibility, often rooted in state constitutional provisions, came mainly from small-government conservatives. In New York, for example, the group that secured a constitutional amendment to limit borrowing, the Barnburners, in some ways was very similar to the Tea Party today. One important difference is that the Barnburners were more allergic to debt than to taxes—and even willing to raise taxes to bring down debt, where necessary. But they were deeply upset about fiscal excess, and went to great lengths to bring the state budget under control.

  Now, at virtually the same moment, there was another strong push—from the other end of the political spectrum—for free public education at the state level (financed by taxes, rather than private tuition charges). This represented a radical development at the time, the virtual socialization of an industry. It was enormously controversial. Ultimately, though, the rise of public education constituted a powerful competitive advantage because it moved the United States far ahead of most other countries in terms of education and human capital development.

  What’s especially remarkable is that many states put both in place nearly simultaneously: strong legal provisions for limiting deficit spending and public education financed by new taxes. Two powerful ideas from two very different parts of the political spectrum. In this case, as in so many others, progress was achieved not by meeting in the middle, but rather by adopting the best of both sides.

  I think this is an important example for us in 2012. We need to think about how to get our federal budget into long-term balance—perhaps through some sort of balanced-budget provisions with appropriate escape hatches—and, simultaneously, how to invest more effectively in human-capital development. That is the type of compromise we should be aiming for: the best of both.

  Which brings us back to the question of ideology. Some observers look at the paralysis in our political system and assume that ideological divisions are the cause. I don’t see it that way. As I’ve said, these sorts of divisions have been around for a very long time in America. Instead, I believe that the central source of weakness in our political system today is an absolutist view of politics (and political tactics)—where any success for the other side is seen as a devastating loss for your side. A good friend at MIT, Stephen Van Evera, refers to this as a Leninist orientation—thinking of politics as war, where winning is everything and compromise is a dirty word. I would say this Leninist approach is profoundly inconsistent with sustaining a healthy democracy. This is the piece of American politics that’s dysfunctional. We can have different views of government—that’s as American as apple pie—but we need to get back to a place where it’s possible to govern on the basis of both perspectives—and get the best of both, rather than fall into a cycle of unending political warfare and paralysis. The problem isn’t ideology. It’s politics as war, and that’s what Americans need to reject when they go to the voting booth.

  HM: Do politicians who approach governing as a fight to the finish fundamentally differ from business leaders, who make pragmatic decisions as they adjust and adapt operations?

  DM: That’s a great question. The business sensibility tends to be highly pragmatic: problems come at you, and you need to try to solve them. That said, if you develop a better product, it might put your competitors out of business. It’s hard to be too upset about this, because we all benefit as consumers from the introduction of better products. That’s business.

  I’m not sure the same logic entirely applies in politics. If one political party could destroy the other, the country would be poorer, not richer, as result. That’s because there’s an important shared element to our political system. Whatever side you’re on, you need the other side to be healthy or the democracy will break down. In politics, in other words, we have to be especially careful in thinking about the integrity of the system as a whole. Individual politicians often have a greater responsibility in this regard than they realize.

  HM: Do today’s CEOs differ from their predecessors? They’re measured and compensated in a shorter-term way. If they run global enterprises, they are less locally rooted. They have strong incentives to lobby for short-term benefits, like tax loopholes. Have their ties to a functioning democracy weakened?

  DM: One theme my colleagues on the competitiveness project have emphasized relates to the broader business environment—the “commons”—and whether business support for the commons at local and national levels has diminished as the economy has globalized. If we are underinvesting in human capital, physical infrastructure, and other elements of the business environment as a result of such neglect, this certainly requires attention.

  I wonder if much the same thing may be going on with respect to the political system—that is, whether the political “commons” has been increasingly neglected. The integrity and health of the nation’s democracy are of incalculable benefit to everyone who lives and does business in the United States. This is true even strictly in economic terms. Think about all the elements of the business environment that are products of political decisionmaking—from rule of law and property rights to a stable monetary system and even protection from foreign foes. Just as good governance is essential for high-performing firms, good governance is essential for high-performing countries. So I think this idea about the commons is certainly applicable in the political sphere. If we allow our political institutions to atrophy, the economic health of the country will falter in time. So we need to be vigilant about this.

  Now, returning to CEOs, if it’s true that they are less focused on the business commons than they used to be (given the forces of globalization, for example), then perhaps they are also somewhat less attentive to the state of the political commons than they used to be. Is this the case? I don’t know. But it’s an intriguing question.

  Certainly, we all need to think about our own responsibilities as members of a democracy. We all need to vote, to think carefully about the issues, to formulate our own opinions and be respectful of others’. In the same way, CEOs have a responsibility to think about their role in sustaining and strengthening the democracy, and sometimes this could involve forgoing opportunities for short-term political victories. It may seem idealistic—even naive—to speak in these terms, but I believe this sense of responsibility is absolutely essential if we want to ensure the long-term health of our political system.

  HM: What can business leaders do?

  DM: Let me talk about what all of us can do. We need to work as hard as we can to preserve and strengthen our culture of democracy. That means, in part, rejecting “politics as war,” which is so inconsistent with healthy democratic governance. But it also means making certain investments—in education, for example. There has been discussion recently about civics in the classroom. To a large extent, it has disappeared; and even in states that still have civics programs, the curricula are often out of date and not especially exciting. If we could revive civics—or, more broadly, the study of democracy—in high school and college in a truly effective and engaging way, that by itself could have a very positive effect over time. In fact, we should be thinking about how best to do this here at Harvard and at other colleges and universities. (Full disclosure: I’m currently developing a case-based course on the history of American democracy, which I hope will help serve this role.)

  Business leaders could certainly help push this agenda along as well. A number are already speaking out about the critical importance of improving reading, writing, math, and science skills in primary and secondary education. The fact that we’re at or below the median on international tests is almost unforgivable in a country that helped invent public education. But I want to emphasize that while skill-building is enormously important, it shouldn’t be the only objective as we think about educational reform. One principal reason for creating public schools in America in the nineteenth century was to help ensure and develop a capable electorate. So as we imagine new ways to strengthen our educational system, we shouldn’t lose sight of how important it is to foster good citizenship and to deepen understanding of the democracy and its history. Thoughtful business leaders could certainly play a valuable role in reminding us of this.

  Too often, I’m afraid, the health of the political system is seen as someone else’s problem—not appropriate for the CEO to be worrying about. But when Harvard Business School alumni tell us that the biggest problem with the American business environment is the political system, that should make things abundantly clear. It is absolutely in the interest of American business to help ensure a strong and healthy culture of democracy in the United States. CEOs and other business leaders could make a difference—they could help strengthen the political commons—by making clear to their stakeholders and to the broader public that a healthy political environment is vital to a healthy business environment and a healthy economy, and that treating politics as war (however attractive in the short run) is a sure-fire way to weaken the political system (and the economy) in the long run. If we are going to strengthen and revitalize our democracy, all of us—including the nation’s business leaders—have an important role to play in making this happen. 

Democracy on the brink: protecting the republic
in Trump's America
Suzanne Mettler
Foreign Affairs.
96.3 (May-June 2017): p121.
COPYRIGHT 2017 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
http://www.foreignaffairs.org
Full Text: 
Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government
BY CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN AND LARRY M. BARTELS. Princeton University Press, 2016, 390 pp.
Democracy: A Case Study
BY DAVID A. MOSS. Harvard University Press, 2017, 742 pp.
American democracy has always been a work in progress. What Abraham Lincoln called "the unfinished work" of
ensuring "government of the people, by the people, for the people" has suffered its share of setbacks. For decades,
Americans' trust in government has been declining, signaling that not all was well. Yet until recently, democracy seemed
secure in the United States.
No longer. President Donald Trump has unleashed a barrage of attacks on the underpinnings of democratic governance,
threatening checks and balances, civil liberties, civil rights, and long-established norms. During last year's presidential
campaign, Trump discarded the notion of facts as necessary anchors of political discourse and challenged the legitimacy
of his political opponent, threatening to "lock her up" if he won. Since his inauguration, he has castigated sections of the
mainstream media as "fake news" and called them "the enemy of the American people," attacked the judiciary, and
claimed--without evidence--that electoral fraud cost him victory in the popular vote. These displays of illiberalism
suggest that the American project of self-governance, which Americans have long taken for granted, may be in a more
precarious condition than most assumed.
How did the United States come to this point? And how can it revitalize its democracy? Two new books offer useful
guidance. Democracy for Realists, by the political scientists Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels, helps explain the
roots of the current crisis. And Democracy, by the historian David Moss, reveals how Americans have overcome
political divisions in the past.
The authors of both books make clear that political conflicts in the United States are nothing new. Today, Americans
face serious threats to their country's democracy, but they can draw on a long tradition of conflict resolution. They
should relearn how to use the institutions and tools--leadership, negotiation, and compromise--that have sustained
American democracy in the past.
FALLING APART
In Democracy for Realists, Achen and Bartels explain that deep-seated social identities and group affiliations motivate
political action far more than individual rationality does. They convincingly debunk what they term the "folk theory" of
electoral democracy, an idealized view in which informed voters assess candidates on the basis of their own policy
preferences or ideology and the leaders they elect then respond to the wishes of the majority, producing public policies
that meet voters' demands. Drawing on a vast literature, Achen and Bartels argue that, in fact, most people are
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uninterested in politics and poorly informed about issues. So they act not primarily on the basis of individual preferences
or rational choices but rather on the basis of "emotional attachments that transcend thinking."
Achen and Bartels argue that people's group affiliations tend to precede their values. They note that "partisanship, like
religious identification, tends to be inherited, durable, and not about ideology and theology." Political affiliations
typically form in childhood, endure even when people's circumstances change, and can be transmitted across
generations. "Most people make their party choices based on who they are, not what they think," Achen and Bartels
conclude.
This theory helps illuminate contemporary U.S. politics. Over the past few decades, the United States has witnessed
growing polarization. This has manifested itself in everything from increasing partisan bias in presidential approval
ratings to the fact that, on topics from climate change to the safety of vaccines, voters routinely discount evidence solely
because someone on the other side of the aisle supplied it. Polarization's effects have even gone beyond politics. The
political scientist Lynn Vavreck has found that in the 1950s, 72 percent of Americans surveyed told pollsters that it did
not matter to them whether their daughter married a Democrat or a Republican. By 2016, only 45 percent were
noncommittal; the rest expressed a clear preference.
Strong party affiliation proved crucial in last year's election. Many pundits assumed that after several Republican Party
elites distanced themselves from Trump, he was doomed to defeat. When that proved untrue, talking heads and
columnists assured their audiences that voters would not choose a candidate who openly denigrated ethnic and religious
groups and that social conservatives would not condone someone who had bragged about groping women. Yet some
political scientists predicted that most Republican voters would eventually drop their reservations and come home to the
party--and indeed they did.
The election tested Achen and Bartels' argument. Trump's presidency has gotten off to a rocky start and may test it
again. Will anything Trump does cause his approval ratings, already low among Democrats and independents, to fall
among Republicans? So far, the percentage of Republicans who approve of Trump's job performance is similar to the
percentage of Democrats who approved of Barack Obama's and the percentage of Republicans who approved of George
W. Bush's at the same juncture in their presidencies.
Although Achen and Bartels' central claim that "human life is group life" explains a fair amount about contemporary
politics, it doesn't tell the whole story. Consider the fact that most people have several social identities but only some of
those identities become politicized. Latinos today have a highly politically significant identity; German or Japanese
ancestry mattered politically in the 1940s but no longer does. Evangelical Christians and Muslims each have a
politicized religious identity; Episcopalians and agnostics do not.
What's missing here, in part, is attention to how politics and policy can shape, give meaning to, or even create identities.
Take, for example, the white working-class voters in Rust Belt states who proved pivotal in Trump's victory. In past
years, many of these same people would have belonged to labor unions and looked to union leaders for information on
which candidate would best represent their interests. But union membership has been falling for years. Large numbers of
manufacturing jobs--the traditional base for unions--have disappeared, presidents since Ronald Reagan have withdrawn
their support for organized labor, and Congress has for decades failed to update the moribund National Labor Relations
Act, from which unions derive much of their power. In recent years, conservative legislators and governors in Michigan
and Wisconsin, two states in which Trump scored surprise victories, have hastened the decline of unions by passing
right-to-work laws, which prevent unions from requiring employees of unionized firms to pay dues. In the absence of
strong unions, politicians, including Trump, have appealed to other identities among the white working class, such as
race, geography, and religion.
People's experiences of public policies can create politicized groups, which parties or candidates can then mobilize.
Recipients of Social Security and Medicare, for example, are keen to protect their benefits. During last year's campaign,
Trump cemented his support among older voters when he defied the current Republican orthodoxy and assured them that
he would protect those programs. Veterans may feel kinship with one another because of their shared experience of
military service, businesspeople may unite around their frustration with regulations, and the rich may commiserate over
the intricacies of the tax code. Achen and Bartels overlook the role that government policies play in forging such shared
identities.
Examining only contemporary group affiliations, moreover, obscures how specific policies created or destroyed the
bonds between parties and certain demographic groups. Although Achen and Bartels review some of the relevant
history, a deeper look might have affected their conclusions. Take the case of white southerners, who defected from the
Democratic Party to the Republican Party in the middle of the twentieth century. Achen and Bartels refute the idea that it
was primarily Democratic leaders' endorsement of civil rights in the 1960s that drove white southerners away. As they
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show, the shift in partisanship had begun earlier. Yet they miss the policy developments on other issues that precipitated
the transition. The political scientist Eric Schickler has shown that white southerners began to defect from the
Democratic Party soon after the passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. That law empowered the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, a union federation, which promoted civil rights and prompted the GOP to embrace
states' rights in defense of white interests. Richard Valelly, another political scientist, has highlighted how in the 1950s,
Republican leaders appealed to white southerners' social conservatism, particularly regarding gay rights.
Tracing the emergence of group affiliations also reveals that ideas serve as a greater driving force than Achen and
Bartels acknowledge. They claim that people who grew up together typically share political views. But as anyone from a
large family can attest, political diversity among close relatives is not uncommon. Children may gravitate to a different
party than their parents do. According to the political scientists Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Schickler, the
association between parents' partisan identity and that of their adult children is "not trivial, but neither is it
overwhelming." The emotional distress many reported experiencing at Thanksgiving dinner tables after the 2016
election indicates that people can find themselves politically distanced even from those they have known all their lives
and love dearly.
HOW TO PERFECT YOUR UNION
Throughout the United States' history, Americans have had to deal with factionalism. In Democracy, Moss observes that
charges of democratic dysfunction are "as old as the republic itself." In fact, discord is to be expected: democracy does
not function like a machine, with neatly humming checks and balances. It is "more like a living, breathing organism"--
and a fragile one, at that, constantly prone to "fragmentation, breakdown and decay." Americans, Moss argues, should
not fear conflict but rather embrace it: handled properly, it permits the best ideas to win out, guards against the tyranny
of the majority, and helps prevent special interest groups from gaining too much power.
Moss makes this argument in his brilliant introductory and concluding chapters, while the core of the book consists of
19 cases from throughout U.S. history that exemplify the complexity of political conflict. Moss, a professor at Harvard
Business School, brings the case-study teaching method to history. He challenges readers to imagine themselves as
participants in the historical cases he uses, to better understand the deliberative and decision-making skills necessary for
self-governance. The cases span a wide range. Moss tells the story of the debate at the Constitutional Convention, in
1787, over James Madison's proposal that Congress should have the power to veto state laws (the convention rejected
the idea). He presents the decision Martin Luther King, Jr., faced in 1965: whether to defy a federal court order and lead
some 2,000 protesters across the Edmund Pettus Bridge, in Selma, Alabama (King decided to turn the marchers back; 12
days later, after a higher court lifted the order, they set out over the bridge to Montgomery).
Moss presents each case in rich detail so that readers can grapple with the tough choices that the people at the time faced
and decide how they themselves would have proceeded. Readers can take on the roles of New York State legislators in
1851, deciding whether to require school districts to levy taxes to pay for public education (they produced a weak
compromise measure with one-time funding, but the principle of free schools prevailed and became law in 1867). They
may imagine they are Florida lawmakers in 1982, charged with ratifying or rejecting the Equal Rights Amendment (they
voted it down). Moss wisely presents each case without the outcome; for that, readers must turn to the appendix.
Together, these cases convey that Americans today have inherited not only a set of governing institutions but also a
tradition of conflict resolution that both relies on democratic norms and strengthens them through practice. Tensions are
a constant throughout U.S. political history. The crucial question is whether citizens can resolve them constructively.
Moss suggests that Americans have lost sight of what's needed: a fundamental commitment to the democratic principles
of self-government.
COMING TOGETHER
Both books point out that the American founders anticipated challenges much like those the United States faces today.
As Achen and Bartels acknowledge, their emphasis on how groups matter in politics is not new. Madison argued, in The
Federalist Papers, no. 10, that humans are all too likely to form "factions"--groups that possess "a zeal for different
opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points." That zeal, he wrote, had "divided
mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress
each other than to co-operate for the common good."
As Madison knew, it is fruitless to try to remove the "causes of faction," which are "sown in the nature of man"; people
can only aim to control its effects. The best way of doing so, he argued, is through representative democracy. As Moss
reminds readers, for democracy to succeed, it requires not only strong institutions, with checks and balances, but also
norms, principles, and the capacity to work across differences to get things done.
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In this moment of intense political division, it's important to distinguish the events that are part of the normal, if deeply
partisan, course of politics from those that threaten the basis of democracy itself. Trump's nomination of Judge Neil
Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, for example, is a normal political action, aimed at satisfying Trump's conservative base.
This holds for his cabinet nominees as well, even though the lack of government experience among several of them
makes them unorthodox choices. On the other hand, Trump's disregard for facts, his repudiation of the role of the
mainstream media, his criticism of judges, and his disregard for political opposition all degrade democratic norms.
Citizens need to assess Trump's actions through this lens, distinguishing standard partisan moves from those that
undermine self-government and threaten authoritarianism.
On the same day that the Second Continental Congress ratified the Declaration of Independence, Moss reminds readers,
it charged Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson with coming up with an emblem for the new nation.
They arrived at a motto: E pluribus unum (Out of many, one). In 1782, Congress adopted it as part of the seal of the
United States. At the time, it symbolized the challenge of bringing 13 colonies together in the shared project of selfgovernance.
Since then, the principle it conveys has enabled Americans across nearly two and a half centuries to work
though conflicts and to preserve democracy. "Our differences as Americans are in fact a profound source of strength, not
weakness," Moss writes, "but only so long as we find enough in common to see ourselves as one nation." The
predecessors of today's Americans gave them the tools to manage, mitigate, and transcend their current deep divisions, if
they can proudly reaffirm what they share: their system of government.
SUZANNE METTLER is Clinton Rossiter Professor of American Institutions at Cornell University. Follow her on
Twitter @SuzanneMettler1.
Caption: Too close for comfort? Trump at a rally in Tampa, Florida, October 2016
Source Citation   (MLA 8th
Edition)
Mettler, Suzanne. "Democracy on the brink: protecting the republic in Trump's America." Foreign Affairs, May-June
2017, p. 121+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA491038233&it=r&asid=4656d7b8294081e9b7695b0877554250.
Accessed 13 Aug. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A491038233

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Democracy: A Case Study
Publishers Weekly.
263.50 (Dec. 5, 2016): p61.
COPYRIGHT 2016 PWxyz, LLC
http://www.publishersweekly.com/
Full Text: 
Democracy: A Case Study
David A. Moss. Belknap, $35 (752p) ISBN 978 0-674-97145-5
It's hard to imagine a timelier book, given America's tumultous 2016 elections, than this eminently readable survey of
political disputes by Moss (Preventing Regulatory Capture), a Harvard professor of business administration. Moss
believes that "American democracy has survived" not through agreement but "conflict-- sometimes intense conflict--
mediated, generally, by shared ideals." He supports his belief with 19 examples, ranging from the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 up through the Supreme Court's controversial 2010 Citizens United decision. The 19 case; are the
basis of a course he teaches to both undergraduates and graduates, and he offers his readers an opportunity to engagf in
critical thinking themselves by leaving each section unresolved, so that they can come to their own decisions as to which
side of a particular controversy they come down on. (An appendix reveals the eventual decision reached in each case.)
The examples have been carefully chosen to illustrate a range of issues, from hot-button ones, such as voting rights, to
the less noted, such as the role of administrative agencies in meat safety inspection. Moss concludes by offering some
interesting suggestions "for revitalizing democratic engagement and commitment," based on his historical analyses.
(Feb.)
Source Citation   (MLA 8th
Edition)
"Democracy: A Case Study." Publishers Weekly, 5 Dec. 2016, p. 61. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA475224893&it=r&asid=454e28163a7576cc1358c2b17948e9f9.
Accessed 13 Aug. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A475224893

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Moss, David A.: DEMOCRACY
Kirkus Reviews.
(Nov. 15, 2016):
COPYRIGHT 2016 Kirkus Media LLC
http://www.kirkusreviews.com/
Full Text: 
Moss, David A. DEMOCRACY Belknap/Harvard Univ. (Adult Nonfiction) $35.00 2, 1 ISBN: 978-0-674-97145-5
A vigorous civics lesson of 19 case studies that illustrate America's evolving democratic processes and
institutions.Based on a course at Harvard Business School taught by Moss (A Concise Guide to Macroeconomics, 2007,
etc.), this set of well-documented, accessible essays presents the prickly challenges facing the rapidly changing
American democracy, for lawmakers and citizens alike. The author aims to give readers an immediate sense of whether
these conflicts provided constructive or destructive forces to the republic. The lively debate over the making of the
Constitution and the states' bruising battle for ratification showcase the first important challenge to the new nation. It's a
well-worn piece of American history, but the author's third essay, about the arguments for and against Cherokee
Removal (1836), is less trod, and he shows how it divided lawmakers and Native Americans alike over the issue of
sovereignty. No doubt reflecting Moss' areas of expertise, several of these fascinating cases involve the banking system,
and not just Alexander Hamilton's push to establish a national bank. The author also examines banking and political
reforms in New York (1838) and the issue of debt at the New York Constitutional Convention of 1846, and he surveys
the evolution of the Federal Reserve, culminating in the crisis of 2007-2009. Moss emphasizes the dramatic changes that
have taken place at the state and local levels, such as the struggle over public education and its funding in early America
(1851). However, as he points out, since the late 18th century, there has been "far less expansion of formal popular
influence at the federal level." The author also delineates the reform of the jury system in terms of racial equality, the
adoption of the secret ballot, the influence of muckraking journalism on the abuses of big government (e.g., Upton
Sinclair's The Jungle, 1906), and the dire ramifications of allowing First Amendment rights for corporations (Citizens
United, 2010), among other compelling cases. A sterling educational tool that offers a fresh presentation of how
"democracy in America has always been a contact sport."
Source Citation   (MLA 8th
Edition)
"Moss, David A.: DEMOCRACY." Kirkus Reviews, 15 Nov. 2016. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA469865801&it=r&asid=74a66696c1d9522799137a03a8f555f6.
Accessed 13 Aug. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A469865801

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Where the buck stops; The riskholder of last
resort
The Economist.
363.8272 (May 11, 2002):
COPYRIGHT 2002 Economist Intelligence Unit N.A. Incorporated
http://store.eiu.com/
Full Text: 
DAVID MOSS, an associate professor at the Harvard Business School, offers a novel perspective on the extraordinary
expansion of government. Where once it confined its remit to the bare essentials of defence, internal security and the
enforcement of private-property rights, today's leviathan spreads into every corner of national life, not just by taxing and
spending but also by regulating. Much of the growth, Mr Moss argues, has come from the state's unique ability to
reallocate risk. Government has expanded its reach because it is the ultimate risk manager.
In a rich blend of legal, business and economic history, Mr Moss identifies three phases in the American government's
expanding role in managing risk. In the 19th century, the government typically intervened in order to assist businessmen
in the development of an industrial economy through measures like bankruptcy law to reduce risk for entrepreneurs. In
the first half of the 20th century, the provision of greater income security for workers and pensioners came to the fore. In
the third phase, after the second world war, government extended its role as risk manager still further to help consumers,
to act as insurer of last resort for disaster victims and to remedy environmental blight.
In some instances, government achieved its aim by shifting risk within the private sector. For example, the legislation of
the early 19th century which allowed companies to be set up with limited liability shifted a portion of default risk from
shareholders to creditors. A small change, you might think, but one that allowed the mobilisation of capital to finance
America's industrial revolution. In 1911, Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of Columbia University, claimed that the
limited liability company outweighed even electricity as "the greatest single discovery of modern times".
A very different example of risk-shifting occurred in the 1960s, when product liability was shifted from the consumer to
the manufacturer. A legal revolution made by judges rather than politicians sought not just to shift but to reduce risk, by
spurring manufacturers to make their products safer. The cost of any remaining risk to consumers from defective goods
would be spread through higher prices across all buyers.
However, the characteristic form of government risk management in modern times has been to assume risk itself and
thereby spread it across the entire population (of taxpayers at any rate). Mr Moss contrasts the response to two floods of
the Mississippi in the last century. In 1927, the American National Red Cross carried most of the financial burden of
disaster relief. In 1993, by contrast, there were few dissenting voices in Congress to a huge programme of federal
assistance.
One grumbler argued, "We're basically telling people, 'We want you to buy insurance, but if you don't, we'll bail you out
anyway.'" This encapsulates one of the main reasons to be more sceptical than Mr Moss about the desirability of
governments acting as insurers: moral hazard. The author appreciates that people who are insured tend to behave in a
riskier manner, thus increasing risk rather than reducing it. However, he argues that government is well placed to
minimise moral hazard through its powers to monitor and police individuals' behaviour. In his view, the advantages of
government riskmanagement greatly outweigh itsdisadvantages.
Mr Moss's account of the state's emerging role as risk manager is also open to the accusation that it embodies a version
of the Whig interpretation of history: whatever occurs in public policy must have been a good answer reached by rightminded
people. Even if legislators do get it right, what was once a solution can become a problem. A case in point is
American Social Security which certainly solved the problem of pensioner poverty but has expanded beyond the
imagination of its creators, generating a $9 trillion implicit debt for today's and tomorrow's working generations.
Government may be the ultimate risk manager, but that very capability is riskier than this enlightening
bookacknowledges.
When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager.
By David A. Moss.
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Source Citation   (MLA 8th
Edition)
"Where the buck stops; The riskholder of last resort." The Economist, 11 May 2002. General OneFile,
go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA87432961&it=r&asid=de4e4e2f338407318728f28256fe0902.
Accessed 13 Aug. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A87432961

Mettler, Suzanne. "Democracy on the brink: protecting the republic in Trump's America." Foreign Affairs, May-June 2017, p. 121+. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do? p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA491038233&it=r. Accessed 13 Aug. 2017. "Democracy: A Case Study." Publishers Weekly, 5 Dec. 2016, p. 61. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA475224893&it=r. Accessed 13 Aug. 2017. "Moss, David A.: DEMOCRACY." Kirkus Reviews, 15 Nov. 2016. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA469865801&it=r. Accessed 13 Aug. 2017. "Where the buck stops; The riskholder of last resort." The Economist, 11 May 2002. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA87432961&it=r. Accessed 13 Aug. 2017.

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