Project and content management for Contemporary Authors volumes
WORK TITLE: Red Team
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http://www.cfr.org/experts/national-security-conflict-prevention/micah-zenko/b15139 * http://www.cfr.org/experts/national-security-conflict-prevention/micah-zenko/b15139#publications
RESEARCHER NOTES:
PERSONAL
Male.
EDUCATION:Brandeis University, Ph.D.
ADDRESS
CAREER
Writer and researcher. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, worked at Kennedy School of Government; Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY, senior fellow. Also worked in Congressional Research Service, Brookings Institution, and U.S. Department of State Office of Policy Planning, all in Washington, DC.
WRITINGS
SIDELIGHTS
Micah Zenko is a writer and researcher with a Ph.D. in political science from Brandeis University. He works at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) as a senior fellow. Before joining CFR, Zenko served on the faculty of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. His previous employers include the Brookings Institution, the Office of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State, and the Congressional Research Service, all in Washington, DC. Zenko has written and cowritten several books, including Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action, Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World, Toward Deeper Reductions in U.S. and Russian Nuclear Weapons, Partners in Preventive Action: The United States and International Institutions, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation, and Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking like the Enemy.
Between Threats and War
Zenko analyzes thirty-six modern-day small-scale military actions in his 2011 book, Between Threats and War. The operations he examines occurred in nations that include Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Sudan. Zenko discovers that the operations were not very effective, achieving their goals about fifty percent of the time. However, they continue to be used because the public looks on them as favorable owing to their lower costs. In addition to examining discrete military operations that did occur, Zenko also looks into instances in which the U.S. government decided against using them. One of the instances occurred in 2002, when George W. Bush’s team decided not to attack a terrorist camp where Abu al Zarqawi was staying.
Writing in Choice: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, C. Potholm II suggested: “This is a fascinating subject whose timeliness is underscored by the increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles.” Curtis H. O’Sullivan, critic in Air Power History, commented: “The facts assembled here are in a different format and context than heretofore seen and are worth reading by anyone concerned with policy selection.”
Red Team
In Red Team, Zenko examines the concept of red teaming and explains how it is used in business and in the military. He begins the volume by discussing the origins of red teaming. Zenko notes that members of the Catholic Church were the first to utilize red teaming during the thirteenth century. They called those who employed red teaming Promotor Fidei (Promotor of the Faith) or Advocatus Diaboli (Devil’s Advocate). These Devil’s Advocates were assigned to analyze arguments in favor of a candidate for sainthood. In particular, they were expected to present counter-arguments. Devil’s Advocates still exist in the Catholic Church today. Zenko explains that red teaming involves looking at a plan, product, or concept from the perspective of an enemy organization or competitor. He notes that it has become popular in war gaming as well as in business. Zenko delves into war gaming, discussing its successful usage by the Prussians during the 1800s. The term red teaming emerged during the Cold War. The color red was associated with Russia at the time. In red teaming, one’s own group is called the blue team. Zenko discusses the three main types of red teaming. The first type involves acting as the red team to work against the blue team’s strategy in the hope of identifying weaknesses. The second is focused on physical or electronic vulnerabilities, while the third type entails the red team’s development of an alternative to the blue team’s plan.
Gary Anderson, critic on the Washington Times Web site, suggested: “Perhaps the weakest part of Mr. Zenko’s book is the chapter where the author lists six best red team practices. I am of the mind that every situation is different and calls for a unique approach. However, Mr. Zenko hits the most important point in red teaming; the boss (or customer) has to buy in. In reality, most people don’t want to be red teamed; they want to be affirmed.” Robert J. Bunker, writer on the Red Team Journal Web site, stated: “The publication of Red Team by Dr. Micah Zenko is an impressive accomplishment. It has allowed for a glimpse of the entire red teaming universe to be provided to the reader in one work.” Bunker continued: “As a reviewer, and someone who knows something about this discipline, I admittedly found myself learning quite a bit about red teaming applications with which I have not been associated in the past. What Dr. Peter Perla’s book The Art of Wargaming did 25 years ago to help mainstream an understanding of military wargaming, we can only hope Dr. Zenko’s new work will now do for the red teaming community.” Mary Whaley, reviewer in Booklist, described Red Team as an “excellent book.” “Zenko offers readers much to consider and an effective way to take action,” asserted a Publishers Weekly contributor. Writing in Choice, A. Dantes remarked: “Those interested in how alternative analyses impact organizations will want to read this volume.” Dantes also categorized the book as “highly recommended.”
BIOCRIT
PERIODICALS
Air Power History, winter, 2011, Curtis H. O’Sullivan, review of Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World, p. 53.
Booklist, October 15, 2015, Mary Whaley, review of Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking like the Enemy, p. 8.
Choice: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, March, 2011, C. Potholm II, review of Between Threats and War, p. 1379; April, 2016, A. Dantes, review of Red Team, p. 1206.
Publishers Weekly, September 28, 2015, review of Red Team, p. 83.
ONLINE
Council on Foreign Relations Web site, http://www.cfr.org/ (March 20, 2017), author profile.
Red Team Journal, http://redteamjournal.com/ (December 28, 2015), Robert J. Bunker, review of Red Team.
Washington Times Online, http://www.washingtontimes.com/ (January 25, 2016), Gary Anderson, review of Red Team.
Micah Zenko
Senior Fellow
Expertise
Conflict prevention; U.S. national security policy; military planning and operations; nuclear weapons policy
Programs
Roundtable Series on New Approaches to National Security
BioProjectsPublicationsBlogEventsPress
Bio
Micah Zenko is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning.
Zenko has published on a range of national security issues, including articles in Foreign Affairs, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Defense and Security Analysis, and Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, and op-eds in the Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, and the New York Times. He writes the blog Politics, Power, and Preventive Action, which covers U.S. national security policy, international security, and conflict prevention, and also has a column on ForeignPolicy.com. He tweets at @MicahZenko.
He is the author or coauthor of five Council Special Reports: Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies; Partners in Preventive Action: The United States and International Institutions; Toward Deeper Reductions in U.S. and Russian Nuclear Weapons; and Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action. He is the author of Red Team: How to Succeed By Thinking Like the Enemy (Basic Books, 2015) and Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World (Stanford University Press, 2010).
QUOTED: "excellent book."
Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking like the
Enemy
Mary Whaley
Booklist.
112.4 (Oct. 15, 2015): p8.
COPYRIGHT 2015 American Library Association
http://www.ala.org/ala/aboutala/offices/publishing/booklist_publications/booklist/booklist.cfm
Full Text:
Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking like the Enemy.
By Micah Zenko.
Nov. 2015.336p. Basic, $26.99 (9780465048946); ebook (9780465073955). 658.4.
Foreignrelations expert Zenko explains red teams for government, military, and business leaders, stating, "An
astonishing number of senior leaders are systemically incapable of identifying their organization's most glaring and
dangerous shortcomings." Evaluating one's own judgments and actions under uncertain conditions is inherently
difficult, and the institution's culture leads employees to adopt preferences of their bosses and workplace. "Red teaming
is a structured process that seeks to better understand the interests, intentions, and capabilities of an institutionor a
potential competitor"with methods including Vulnerability Probes and Simulations. Vulnerability Probes can use red
teams as "surrogate adversaries," testing the reliability of a targeted institutions defense systems to identify weaknesses.
In Simulations, red teams can serve as consultants to institutions developing, testing, and refining their strategies by
modeling how they could work in unforeseen situationse.g., the 2011 U.S. Navy SEAL mission that killed Osama bin
Laden was perfect because the crash of one of the two transport helicopters was a contingency for which they planned
and trained. Excellent book.Mary Whaley
Whaley, Mary
Source Citation (MLA 8
th Edition)
Whaley, Mary. "Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking like the Enemy." Booklist, 15 Oct. 2015, p. 8. General
OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA433202080&it=r&asid=c70cdcb2d1ea7be418474906571b1b14.
Accessed 5 Mar. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A433202080
QUOTED: "Zenko offers readers much to consider and an effective way to take action."
3/5/2017 General OneFile Saved Articles
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/marklist.do?actionCmd=GET_MARK_LIST&userGroupName=schlager&inPS=true&prodId=ITOF&ts=1488769304796 2/5
Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking like the
Enemy
Publishers Weekly.
262.39 (Sept. 28, 2015): p83.
COPYRIGHT 2015 PWxyz, LLC
http://www.publishersweekly.com/
Full Text:
Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking like the Enemy
Micah Zenko. Basic, $26.99 (336p) ISBN 9780465048946
Zenko, a security expert and fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, explains, in absorbing detail, the value of red
teams, groups formed to act as devil's advocates. While red teams are frequently used by the U.S. military, they are
relatively new to the corporate world. Zenko shows just how these practices can help companies improve performance
and identify failings. He advocates three specific techniques: simulations, vulnerability probes, and alternative analyses.
He goes on to identify six redteaming best practices (such as "have a big bag of tricks" and "be willing to hear bad
news and act on it"). Zenko provides interesting examples of how U.S. intelligence agencies have used redteaming,
notably for topics related to homeland security. Shifting focus from the government and the military, Zenko looks at
predatory competitive practices in a chapter that will hit home with every executive. From business war gaming to
physical and cyber penetration testing, he shows just how vulnerable corporations are. He closes with a look at realistic
outcomes and pitfalls to avoid. Armed with case studies ranging from the discovery of vulnerabilities in the Verizon
network to the hunt for Osama bin Laden, Zenko offers readers much tp consider and an effective way to take action.
Agent: Geri Thoma, Writers House. (Nov.)
Source Citation (MLA 8
th Edition)
"Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking like the Enemy." Publishers Weekly, 28 Sept. 2015, p. 83. General OneFile,
go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA430498281&it=r&asid=933a8b1415a63f6e61ead34641ed89bd.
Accessed 5 Mar. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A430498281
QUOTED: "Those interested in how alternative analyses impact organizations will want to read this volume."
"highly recommended."
3/5/2017 General OneFile Saved Articles
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/marklist.do?actionCmd=GET_MARK_LIST&userGroupName=schlager&inPS=true&prodId=ITOF&ts=1488769304796 3/5
Zenko, Micah. Red team: how to succeed by
thinking like the enemy
A. Dantes
CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries.
53.8 (Apr. 2016): p1206.
COPYRIGHT 2016 American Library Association CHOICE
http://www.ala.org/acrl/choice/about
Full Text:
Zenko, Micah. Red team: how to succeed by thinking like the enemy. Basic Books, 2015. 298p index ISBN
9780465048946 cloth, $26.99; ISBN 9780465073955 ebook, contact publisher for price
533575
HF5386
201515268 CIP
Red teaming is a process that involves a team of outsiders, or specialized insiders in an organization, going through
alternative analyses of scenarios, problems, or situations that would otherwise be ignored or never discovered by inside
managers and other decision makers. Red teaming takes different forms in different organizations, and this stellar book
talks about those many forms with an eye toward finding consistent themes that undergird successful applications of the
process. Zenko (senior fellow, Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations) exposes the successes
and failures of red teams (throughout the military, government, and private sector) and describes ways to ensure that
alternative analyses aid decision making so as to avoid disaster. The author goes through the CIA's Red Cell and Team
B, Sandia Labs's IDART (i.e., Information Design Assurance Red Team), business wargaming, penetration testing, and
many other notable examples of successful and unsuccessful efforts. He describes in vivid detail the ways red teams
discovered catastrophic errors or how ignored analyses led to calamity. Those interested in how alternative analyses
impact organizations will want to read this volume. Summing Up: *** Highly recommended. Upperdivision
undergraduates through faculty and professionals; general readers.A. Dantes, Florida International University
Dantes, A.
Source Citation (MLA 8
th Edition)
Dantes, A. "Zenko, Micah. Red team: how to succeed by thinking like the enemy." CHOICE: Current Reviews for
Academic Libraries, Apr. 2016, p. 1206. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA449661706&it=r&asid=b2bbd2af24281ff1fd929fff4f5dbe28.
Accessed 5 Mar. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A449661706
QUOTED: "This is a fascinating subject whose timeliness is underscored by the increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles."
3/5/2017 General OneFile Saved Articles
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/marklist.do?actionCmd=GET_MARK_LIST&userGroupName=schlager&inPS=true&prodId=ITOF&ts=1488769304796 4/5
Zenko, Micah. Between threats and war: U.S.
discrete military operations in the postCold War
world
C. Potholm, II
CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries.
48.7 (Mar. 2011): p1379.
COPYRIGHT 2011 American Library Association CHOICE
http://www.ala.org/acrl/choice/about
Full Text:
484143 UA23 201011549 CIP
Zenko, Micah. Between threats and war: U.S. discrete military operations in the postCold War world. Stanford, 2010.
228p index ISBN 9780804771900, $60.00; ISBN 9780804771917 pbk, $22.95
Focusing on discrete military operations (DMOs), military actions that lie between threats and true warfare, Zenko
(fellow, Council on Foreign Relations) examines 36 recent situations in which the US used limited military force in
order to try to achieve limited goals. From attacks with cruise missiles in Sudan (1998), Afghanistan (1998), and
Yemen (2002), to enforcing a nofly zone over Iraq (19912003), these case studies lead him to assert that DMOs have
been effective only about half of the time. Despite this, and somewhat ironically, their use has been favored more by
civilian than military authorities because of their perceived low cost. Perhaps the most intriguing dimension of the book
is the examination of the Bush administration's decision in 2002 not to use a DMO against the Ansar alIslam terrorist
camp at Kurmal, Iraq, where Abu al Zarqawi was then located and where there is now evidence that toxic agents were
being tested. This is a fascinating subject whose timeliness is underscored by the increasing use of unmanned aerial
vehicles, which have become weapons of choice in a number of contemporary arenas as Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.
Summing Up: Recommended. ** Graduate, research, and professional collections.C. Potholm II, Bowdoin College
Potholm, C., II
Source Citation (MLA 8
th Edition)
Potholm, C., II. "Zenko, Micah. Between threats and war: U.S. discrete military operations in the postCold War
world." CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, Mar. 2011, p. 1379. General OneFile,
go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA252088082&it=r&asid=e49f7e04d895258f72e57f93aeff9d4d.
Accessed 5 Mar. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A252088082
QUOTED: "The facts assembled here are in a different format and context that heretofore seen and are worth reading by anyone concerned with policy selection."
3/5/2017 General OneFile Saved Articles
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/marklist.do?actionCmd=GET_MARK_LIST&userGroupName=schlager&inPS=true&prodId=ITOF&ts=1488769304796 5/5
Between Threat and War: U.S. Discrete Military
Operations in the PostCold War Period
Curtis H. O'Sullivan
Air Power History.
58.4 (Winter 2011): p53.
COPYRIGHT 2011 Air Force Historical Foundation
http://home.earthlink.net/~afhf
Full Text:
Between Threat and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the PostCold War Period. By Micah Zenko. Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Appendices. Index. Pp.xii, 228. $14.00 paperback
ISBN: 9780804771917
Despite the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the U.S. under the socalled Presidential authorization, has continued to
engage in various levels of military operation without Congressional approval. When there are foreign threats that can't
be resolved by economic or political measures, the country's leaders resort to military force. This book uses the term
"discrete military operation" (DMO). The word "discrete" could be confused with "discreet," but is clearly used here in
the sense of being distinct, separate, or apart.
Zenko has identified thirtysix DMOs between 1991 and 2009, and fourteen cases of nonuse. Though he names only
three of the latter, there were probably many more times when a military option was considered at the highest levels.
Some were not adopted because a decision was reached of nonfeasibility due to such things as the loss of surprise
often because of media leaks. All these overlap with another bucket of worms, covert operations by the CIA, which
may never be reported.
The main part of the book is four case studies of DMOs that explore selected incidents in depth. The final chapter has
conclusions and policy recommendations. More important than the success or failure of specific operations is the
discussion of how alternatives such as these can be used in the implementation of foreign policy. It's reassuring that this
part of the spectrum of choice is used.
There are supposedly fortyeight different war plans on the shelf for possible contingencies. Some readers may recall
the Color Plans of an earlier era. At one time, the War College was rumored to have made a plan for Patagonia.
Unfortunately, none was prepared for Grenada.
Micah Zenko is a fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations. He
provides no bibliography, but the voluminous notes give a good idea of the sources and the extensive research done.
The facts assembled here are in a different format and context that heretofore seen and are worth reading by anyone
concerned with policy selection.
Brig. Gen. Curtis H. O'Sullivan, ARNG (Ret), Salida, California
O'Sullivan, Curtis H.
Source Citation (MLA 8
th Edition)
O'Sullivan, Curtis H. "Between Threat and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the PostCold War Period."
Air Power History, vol. 58, no. 4, 2011, p. 53. General OneFile, go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
p=ITOF&sw=w&u=schlager&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CA276891431&it=r&asid=ee6b8f327ac2828d002938805b60b295.
Accessed 5 Mar. 2017.
Gale Document Number: GALE|A276891431
QUOTED: "Perhaps the weakest part of Mr. Zenko’s book is the chapter where the author lists six best red team practices. I am of the mind that every situation is different and calls for a unique approach. However, Mr. Zenko hits the most important point in red teaming; the boss (or customer) has to buy in. In reality, most people don’t want to be red teamed; they want to be affirmed."
BOOK REVIEW: ‘Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy’
View Comments Print
By Gary Anderson - - Monday, January 25, 2016
ANALYSIS/OPINION:
RED TEAM: HOW TO SUCCEED BY THINKING LIKE THE ENEMY
By Micah Zenko
Basic Books, $26.99, 336 pages
As author Micah Zenko points out, the concept of red teaming started out with an effort by the Roman Catholic Church in the 13th century to thoroughly investigate candidates for sainthood and debunk false claims; the clergymen who held this title were informally called “Devil’s Advocates.” The name stuck and the function still exists in the church today. We Americans call it “red team,” and it can be used both as a noun and a verb. To red team something means to test a concept, product, plan or tactic from the perspective of a potential enemy or competitor with an eye toward finding any fatal flaws or correcting weaknesses before the product is let loose in the cruel world. Red teaming is a vital part of war gaming which, in turn, is an integral part of the military planning process, but as Mr. Zenko points out, it is being increasingly used in business and civilian policymaking.
Mr. Zenko, who is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, gives an overview of the history of red teaming and war gaming. The Prussians invented modern formal war gaming in the 19th century as a bloodless way of planning and preparing for real war, and when they attributed it as a key to their spectacular success in the Wars of German Unification, war gaming was adopted by other armies, including that of the United States. In the run up to World War II, the adversary in American war games was orange (Japan); red came along during the Cold War when the Russians represented themselves with red icons in their games. Blue has been the traditional color for the American side, and green generally represents allies or neutrals.
Mr. Zenko goes on to explain three basic kinds of red teaming. The most well-known is to play the bad guy in conflict simulations (war games) where the red team tries to take advantage of weakness in blue’s plan or approach. Vulnerability analysis occurs when the red team tries to find holes in an organization’s physical or cybersecurity. A third is alternative analysis when the red team examines a plan or concept and develops an alternative view, usually from the standpoint of a potential adversary. In any case, a good red teaming effort will result in a better plan or concept because the flaws and any poor assumptions have been identified or fixed before product gets into live fire in the real world. That is why red teams that come from within the organization are always suspect; there is a tendency to grade your own work and be intimidated by the senior guys who came up with the idea.
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Perhaps the weakest part of Mr. Zenko’s book is the chapter where the author lists six best red team practices. I am of the mind that every situation is different and calls for a unique approach. However, Mr. Zenko hits the most important point in red teaming; the boss (or customer) has to buy in. In reality, most people don’t want to be red teamed; they want to be affirmed. Mr. Zenko cites a number of case studies where red teaming has been used well or misused; the cause of most failures was lack of client buy-in. Mr. Zenko’s best example of a misused red teaming effort was a military war game titled “Millennium Challenge 02” where the client ignored the results of what the red team found and falsely declared the concepts being tested to be a success. When the whistle got blown, the organization never recovered; it no longer exists.
I have a suggestion for strengthening version 2.0 of the book. It should emphasize that red teaming doesn’t generally predict anything, but war games do identify issues. If something actually gets predicted, it is a plus.
In the post-Cold War chaos, we have increasingly found that allies and partners (green) should be considered as should any known competing factions in red. As we found out in Iraq and Afghanistan, your partners and allies can impact your plans as much as red. If your partner has his own agenda he may undermine a good plan; those factors should be war gamed. One of our big successes in Iraq was to turn one red faction green.
I teach red teaming and I would recommend this book to my students. The purpose of the class is not to teach students to be red teamers, but to teach them how to use war games and red teams when they become senior leaders.
• Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps colonel He was senior member of the Defense Adaptive Red Team and teaches a graduate class on Red Teaming at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
QUOTED: "The publication of Red Team by Dr. Micah Zenko is an impressive accomplishment. It has allowed for a glimpse of the entire red teaming universe to be provided to the reader in one work. As a reviewer, and someone who knows something about this discipline, I admittedly found myself learning quite a bit about red teaming applications with which I have not been associated in the past. What Dr. Peter Perla’s book The Art of Wargaming14 did 25 years ago to help mainstream an understanding of military wargaming, we can only hope Dr. Zenko’s new work will now do for the red teaming community."
Review of Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy
Robert J. Bunker December 28, 2015
The work reviewed is Red Team1 by Dr. Micah Zenko, a Senior Fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations. Zenko has an impressive pedigree via years spent in Washington D.C with Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and the Brookings Institution and his expertise related to American drone use, counterterrorism, and related national security foci. This important book represents a five year effort that includes over 200 interviews with red teamers, the immersion of the author in red teaming courses and exercises, an analysis of over 150 pertinent documents, and the direct support of multiple research associates. This significant research endeavor—supported by foundation and other resources—easily had a project budget well into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. The time, intellectual effort, and monies allocated to the project were well spent, for the work is likely to become a significant milestone for the discipline. Red teaming is now poised to be widely introduced to mainstream American business and current affairs readership.
The introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the position of the Promotor Fidei (Promoter of the Faith)—more universally known as the Advocatus Diaboli (Devil’s Advocate)—utilized by the Catholic Church over the course of numerous centuries to challenge nominees for sainthood.2 It then goes on to cover red team thinking related to Al Kibar, the location of a Syrian nuclear facility bombed by the Israelis in 2007. (Ibid., pp. xii–xv.) after which it discusses organizational constraints and biases related to red teaming.3 How red teams function—via simulations, vulnerability probes, and alternative analyses—is then touched upon4 as well as red team success and failure.5 The final section of the introduction6 outlines the rest of the work with a brief sketch of what the book’s following chapters will focus upon.
Chapter 1 of the work provides an overview of best practices in red teaming: (a) “The Boss Must Buy In”; (b) “Outside and Objective, While Inside and Aware”; (c) “Fearless Skeptics with Finesse”; (d) “Have a Big Bag of Tricks”; (e) “Be Willing to Hear Bad News and Act on It”; and (f) “Red Team Just Enough, But No More.”7 Furthermore, though unnumbered, “ … to be flexible in the approaches or techniques applied” was considered the overarching best practice.8 The work then provides 17 mini-case studies spanning military, intelligence community, homeland security, and private sector red teaming in chapters 2 through 6. Each of these chapters typically begins with an introduction into a type of red teaming application, discusses a number of case studies, and then provides a short concluding summary, as follows:
Military (chapter 2)
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS)—”Red Team University”;
U.S. Marine Corps Red Teaming;
Millennium Challenge 2002;
Israel Defense Force’s red team;
UK Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) red team;
NATO Allied Command Transformation AltA cell;
Intelligence Community (chapter 3)
Team B Soviet National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Review (1976);
Al Shifa, Sudan Pharmaceutical Bombing (1998);
CIA Red Cell (Post-9/11);
Osama bin Laden’s Compound, Pakistan Raid (2011);
Homeland Security (chapter 4)
FAA Red Team (Pre-9/11);
DHS MANPADS Vulnerability Assessments, pp. 127;
NYPD Tabletop Exercises;
Information Design Assurance Red Team (IDART);
Private Sector (chapter 5)
White Hackers—Cyber Penetration Tests;
iSec Partners Hacking Verizon (via Femtocells);
Physical Penetration Tests.
The concluding chapter of the book, chapter 6, reads very much like an after-action assessment, here blanketed by an introduction containing interesting facts and impressions and ending with some thoughts on the future of red teaming bundled with the reiterated best practices (from pp. 1–22.). The lessons learned begin with red teaming being analyzed from an applied perspective. From such a perspective, red teaming is said to always achieve one of two possible outcomes: either “ … it delivers some new finding or insight that otherwise could not have been self-generated within the walls of the targeted institution”9 or “ … when red teaming fails to have a demonstrable impact on a targeted institution, it reveals something about the though processes and values of that institution.”10 This chapter then goes on to highlight five misimpressions and misuses of red teaming: (1) Ad hoc devil’s advocate; (2) mistaking red team findings for policy; (3) freelance red teaming; (4) shooting the messenger; and (5) red teams should inform, not decide.11 Five recommendations for U.S. government red teams are then provided: (1) red team the biggest decisions; 2) compile US government red team efforts; (3) expand red team instruction; (4) review military red team instruction efforts; and (5) make red teaming meaningful, not a rubber stamp.12 Acknowledgements, notes, and an index round out the final sections of the work.
Besides the 17 mini-case studies highlighted in this work that focus on the organizations and applications of red teaming, the individuals that have left a mark on it due to their pioneering efforts and years of study and application are spotlighted. Of these many dedicated individuals, I was personally gratified that the early exploits of Dr. Stephen Sloan and his wife Dr. Roberta Sloan, beginning in the mid-1970s, were discussed related to their pioneering efforts in terrorist simulation. Seeing an account of Lt.Gen. Paul Van Riper’s exploits during Millennium Challenge 2002 was also satisfying as was seeing Dr. Mark Mateski, RTJ’s founder, singled out for his ongoing contribution to red teaming via this journal, his past work with IDART, and his present Watermark Institute activities. The historical 1970s Team B section, related to the Soviet strategic threat, the NIE, and the politicization of the analytical process also made for fascinating reading. From one perspective it raises larger questions related to compromising analytical neutrality for the needs of the strategic policy of a future presidential administration, though this is outside the scope of the work. It does reinforce, however, the reality that red teaming almost never exists in a sterile environment devoid of some form of local or higher level of politics existing. For this reviewer—given my associations—the most valuable aspect of the work dealt with the recommendations related to U.S. governmental red teaming efforts. These represent reasonable and studied policy inputs and should not be taken lightly. Of the five suggestions, two of them—compile U.S. government red team efforts and review military red team instruction efforts—should be given priority before attempting to implement the other three that have been provided.
The only demerit related to the work, and a very minor one at that, is related to the Devil’s Advocate discussion. Upon a reading of the work, the origins of this Vatican position is given as the 13th century.13 However, the book jacket lists this as the 11th century and the press release list it as the 16th century. This faux pas, however, did not take place on the author’s watch and squarely falls on marketing’s non-attention to detail. Some concerns could also be raised about the occasional use of anecdotal information but this is essentially a non-issue. The author has had far more access to the entire red teaming community than the majority of red teaming professionals themselves due to his ability to cross between application boundaries (for example, military, intelligence, homeland security, and corporate). Given the secretive (literally U.S. classified) and proprietary (non-disclosure statement as in “you will be sued by our lawyers”) nature of many of these activities, his ability to even gain anecdotal information at times is an amazing feat in itself.
In summation, the publication of Red Team by Dr. Micah Zenko is an impressive accomplishment. It has allowed for a glimpse of the entire red teaming universe to be provided to the reader in one work. As a reviewer, and someone who knows something about this discipline, I admittedly found myself learning quite a bit about red teaming applications with which I have not been associated in the past. What Dr. Peter Perla’s book The Art of Wargaming14 did 25 years ago to help mainstream an understanding of military wargaming, we can only hope Dr. Zenko’s new work will now do for the red teaming community.