CANR
WORK TITLE:
WORK NOTES:
PSEUDONYM(S):
BIRTHDATE:
WEBSITE:
CITY: Reading, Berkshire
STATE:
COUNTRY: United Kingdom
NATIONALITY: American
LAST VOLUME: CANR 227
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=44, http://www.reading.ac.uk/spirs/about/staff/c-s-gray.aspx
RESEARCHER NOTES:
PERSONAL
Born December 29, 1943, in Oxfordshire, England; died February 27, 2020.
EDUCATION:University of Manchester, B.A. (with honors), 1965; Lincoln College, Oxford, D.Phil., 1970.
ADDRESS
CAREER
Writer, educator. University of Reading, Reading, England, professor of international politics and strategic studies; has also taught at Lancaster University, Bailrigg, Lancaster, England; University of York, Toronto, Ontario, Canada; University of Hull, Hull, England; and University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, former executive secretary of the strategic studies commission; International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, England, former assistant director; Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, NY, former director of national security studies, beginning 1976; National Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax, VA, founding president and chair, beginning 1981; National Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax, senior fellow. Member of President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 1982-87; member of Panel of Experts, United Kingdom Strategic Defense Review, 1997-98; Force Development and Integration Center, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Arlington, VA, director, c. 2000. Former advisory panel member for the U.S. Army and Air Force, for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and for the U.S. Space Command; has also served as an advisor to the British Royal Navy.
AWARDS:Superior Public Service Award, U.S. Department of the Navy, 1987.
WRITINGS
Contributor to SALT II, Rest in Peace: A Roundtable Discussion: The Louis Lehrman Auditorium, the Heritage Foundation, March 28, 1985, Heritage Foundation (Washington, DC), 1985. Contributor to periodicals, including Wilson Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, Washington Quarterly, International Security, Foreign Policy, Survival, and the National Interest. Member of editorial board, Comparative Strategy, Naval War College Review, Journal of Strategic Studies, and the Journal of Terrorism and Organized Crime.
SIDELIGHTS
<para>A respected scholar of military history and strategy who, as a dual citizen of the United Kingdom and the United States, has served as an advisor to both countries' militaries, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Colin S. Gray was also a university professor and founding chair of the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. Mackubin Thomas Owens asserted in a 2006 <emphasis n=”1″>National Review</emphasis> article that “no one is more qualified to address the issue of future war than Gray, who has been the most consistently brilliant and prolific strategic thinker in the English-speaking world for the past three decades.” Regarded as a classical realist in his writings and lectures, Gray is among those military thinkers who “take their lead from the writings of Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and [Carl von] Clausewitz and calculate strategy in terms of power and geography, or geostrategy,” explained Mark T. Clark in a <emphasis n=”1″>Naval War College Review</emphasis> of <title><emphasis n=”1″>The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order.</emphasis></title> In many of his books, Gray emphasized that numerous students of the military and even political leaders fail to take lessons from history; they also tend to sacrifice solid military strategy for a faith in new technologies and outdated tactics against such threats as Muslim terrorism. Gray used both the past and present to advise his readers on strategies for today and the future of the military.</para>
(open new) <para>Gray died on February 27, 2020, after a long battle with cancer. He left behind a legacy of more than thirty books and numerous junior scholars whom he had mentored. A contributor on the website of the <emphasis n=”1″>Foreign Policy Research Center</emphasis> noted of this legacy: “Some of his books were complex if not dense, but his insights were invariably profound. He was insufferable to the unprepared and the ill-informed, yet invaluable to the curious student willing to work hard.” Writing on the <emphasis n=”1″>Modern War Institute</emphasis> website, M.L. Cavanagh felt that Gray “shaped strategic studies as much as anyone. … He loved ideas. He loved discussion and argument. He loved sharing his ideas, and had an endless capacity for gathering others and passing on what he knew in waterfalls of wise words.”</para> (close new)
<head n=”5″><emphasis n=”1″>War, Peace, and Victory</emphasis></head> <para>American leaders should not be overly impressed by their own military firepower, Gray warns in his 1990 book, <title><emphasis n=”1″>War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century.</emphasis></title> The work examines military strategies going back to ancient Greece and Rome, then explores the theories of Clausewitz and Alfred Mahan, two theorists upon whom Gray frequently relies in his writings, before continuing on to discuss the American mindset on tactics. Gray emphasizes, in a book published before the end of the Cold War, the need of military leaders to understand more completely the advantages and disadvantages of land versus sea power. It is Gray's assertion that, of the two, America's strength lies in its navy, as well as its air force, and so he protests Congress's efforts at the time to cut these branches while boosting land forces for combat in the Middle East. (This is a point he also makes in his books <title> <emphasis n=”1″>The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War</emphasis> </title> and <title><emphasis n=”1″>The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power.</emphasis></title>)</para>
<para>While Ralph De Toledano observed in the <emphasis n=”1″>National Review</emphasis> that many of Gray's arguments center on the U.S.- Soviet situation and that, therefore, “his theorems will involve different variables” if considered under different circumstances, the critic attested that his “postulates remain valid.” Genevieve Stuttaford, writing for <emphasis n=”1″>Publishers Weekly,</emphasis> called <title> <emphasis n=”1″>War, Peace, and Victory</emphasis></title> “impressively broad” and “authoritative.”</para>
<para>Some critics of Gray's work have found his positions controversial. For example, he has argued that a nuclear conflict can be winnable and not necessarily equate to a total annihilation of civilization. In a review of <title><emphasis n=”1″>War, Peace, and Victory,</emphasis></title> <emphasis n=”1″>Washington Monthly</emphasis> contributor Adam Yarmolinsky wondered why, “if Gray sees so little military utility in nuclear weapons, he is not more interested in reducing their numbers.” Indeed, although Gray has maintained that nuclear weapons caches are useful for deterrence, in most cases he argues that traditional military conflicts between warring states will continue to be a fact of life.</para>
<head n=”5″><emphasis n=”1″>Explorations in Strategy</emphasis> and <emphasis n=”1″>Modern Strategy</emphasis></head>
<para>Gray's <title><emphasis n=”1″>Explorations in Strategy</emphasis> </title> discusses the importance of America's air force. While also acknowledging the usefulness of special forces, Gray continues to emphasize strategy over technology in terms of winning conflicts. As James A. Huston put it in his <emphasis n=”1″>Perspectives on Political Science</emphasis> review: “Gray recognizes that the ‘information war’ is a revolution in warfare, but the microchip is not the final stage any more than was the crossbow, gun powder, or the atomic bomb. Strategy must remain, as Clausewitz put it, the use of engagements for the object of the war.”</para> <para><title><emphasis n=”1″>Modern Strategy,</emphasis></title> <title> <emphasis n=”1″>Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History,</emphasis></title> and <title><emphasis n=”1″>Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice</emphasis></title> are more examples of Gray's continuing plea for an emphasis on strategy over mere military might and reliance on technology. The first title lays the groundwork of what Gray would contend in other books, as well: that while technology and politics might change, the basic art of warfare does not. Lamenting again the lack of strategic thinkers among America's politicians and even academics, Gray “describes the problem but offers no help in finding the solution,” criticized Glen C. Collins in a <emphasis n=”1″> Parameters</emphasis> review.</para>
<head n=”5″><emphasis n=”1″>Strategy for Chaos</emphasis> and <emphasis n=”1″> Strategy and History</emphasis></head>
<para><title><emphasis n=”1″>Strategy for Chaos</emphasis></title> reiterates Gray's warning against supplanting genuine strategy with impressive- seeming high-tech military devices. “Gray is right to condemn incautious assertions—even by American Secretaries of Defense—that precision munitions or cyberspace weapons are altering the nature of war or strategy,” commented Barry Watts in the <emphasis n=”1″>Joint Force Quarterly.</emphasis> Other advances, such as nuclear weapons and guided missiles, are also discussed. Although the critic described the book as “an uneven work with good intentions,” that “is not entirely successful in laying out either theory or evidence,” he concluded that it “will be of interest to those who follow the RMA [revolutions in military affairs] debate. The book is an invaluable goad for thoughtful readers to think beyond the RMA bumper stickers and slogans Gray rightly condemns and to determine their own positions on the subject.” <title> <emphasis n=”1″>Strategy and History</emphasis></title> makes Gray's case that strategists must learn military history, which is still relevant to today's conflicts. <emphasis n=”1″>Parameters</emphasis> critic Stephen J. Blank praised this title as a reflection of “Gray's independence of mind, intellectual rigor, and willingness to challenge the political correctness or conventional wisdom of the time.” Gray reiterated this position in his more recent <title><emphasis n=”1″>War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History.</emphasis> </title></para> <para>Much of the debate occurring at the national and international level in the early twenty-first century has involved the United States' role as the world's leading military power.</para>
<head n=”5″><emphasis n=”1″>The Sheriff</emphasis></head> <para>Two books by Gray that address this issue are <title> <emphasis n=”1″>The Sheriff</emphasis></title> and <title><emphasis n=”1″> Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare.</emphasis></title> In the former, the author asserts, as many others have, that the United States should be involved in international conflicts in order to help insure political stability in the world. “Gray explains that ‘sheriff is of course a metaphor. By its use I mean to argue that the United States will act on behalf of others, as well as itself, undertaking some of the tough jobs of international security that no other agent or agency is competent to perform,’” reported Clark. Clark went on to note that this has been the aim of U.S. policy for some time, but that the country lost its focus, “particularly during the years of the Clinton administration.”</para>
<para>Asserting that <title><emphasis n=”1″>The Sheriff</emphasis></title> “does not acknowledge that there are compelling arguments against a global sheriff,” <emphasis n=”1″>Air Power History</emphasis> critic John L. Cirafici wrote: “It is not that Gray is incorrect when he argues that America has a leading role to play in maintaining global stability. He may have missed the point, however, by not recognizing that stability arises from collective wisdom and global commitment to the ideal.” Despite disagreeing with Gray's position, Cirafici recommended the book “for no other reason than [to understand] its perspective.” Damon Coletta, writing in <emphasis n=”1″> Parameters,</emphasis> felt that Gray's classical realism approach “can take us only so far” in understanding the current role of America's military, but concluded: “Taken as a whole, <title> <emphasis n=”1″>The Sheriff</emphasis></title> effectively demonstrates why traditional realism, geopolitics, and the cyclical view of history, after 2,500 years, retain their relevance.”</para>
<head n=”5″><emphasis n=”1″>Another Bloody Century</emphasis></head> <para><title><emphasis n=”1″>Another Bloody Century</emphasis></title> offers Gray's look into the future of warfare, and he concludes that classic notions of war will remain applicable. “This is not to say that there is nothing new out there waiting for us. Quite on the contrary, <emphasis n=”1″> strategic surprise</emphasis> is more than likely to occur. Strategic history is cyclical, but it does not repeat itself with high fidelity,” explained a contributor to the Center for Security and International Studies Web site.</para>
<para>The critic continued: “One of the central theses of Colin Gray's book is that <emphasis n=”1″>irregular warfare,</emphasis> in the sense it is understood today, as the Global War on Terrorism for instance, or largely against low-intensity conflicts that spur <emphasis n=”1″> within</emphasis> states <emphasis n=”1″>is not the future of warfare.</emphasis> In fact, Gray argues that irregular warfare has a healthy future, but not as we imagine it today. His predictions indicate that terrorism is a faint threat that will run its course in the next two decades at the most, and then will see its decline.” While disagreeing with “Gray's claim that war can only be controlled indirectly,” such as through international law, the reviewer recommended <title> <emphasis n=”1″>Another Bloody Century</emphasis></title> as “definitely a ‘must read’ for any serious student or scholar of strategic and security studies, but it should also be remembered that no theory is without fallacy and that Gray's has some, too.”</para>
<head n=”5″><emphasis n=”1″>War, Peace, and International Relations</emphasis> and <emphasis n=”1″>Fighting Talk</emphasis></head> <para>Gray's book, <title><emphasis n=”1″>War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History,</emphasis></title> is one of two published in 2007, and is an examination of the last two centuries of strategic history, covering all the major wars during that time. Arguing that these wars have been transformative events in world history, Gray explores three major themes: the factors in strategy that have changed over the years and those that have not; the connection between war and politics; and finally the difference between tactical and strategic conduct of war. Once again, Gray “takes an unabashedly Clauzewitzian or slightly amended Clauzewitzian point of view with regard to strategy; the use or threat of force for achieving the ends of policy, as one of its main theses,” as <emphasis n=”1″>Parameters</emphasis> contributor Stephen J. Blank noted. Some of the conflicts Gray examines are the Napoleonic wars, World War I and World War II, as well as the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. “This book bears all the hallmarks of his labors in the field: immense erudition, an appealing and no-nonsense style which pulls no punches and does not equivocate, and a strong authorial voice,” noted Blank.</para>
<para>Gray's second book from 2007, <title><emphasis n=”1″>Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy,</emphasis></title> was inspired and once again informed by the thoughts of military strategist Carl von Clausewitz. Here Gray provides forty rules or maxims that cover most of the basics of strategy, along with accompanying explanatory essays for each maxim. These rules are laid out in parts dealing with topics from war and peace to warfare and military policy, security and insecurity, strategy, and history and the future. For example, the first ten maxims fall into the “war and peace” category, and discuss the various perspectives that different players bring to this relationship. On the one hand there are those concerned in a practical manner in such questions, including politicians and the military, and those involved at a more theoretical level, such as strategists. In the section on strategy, the ten maxims deal with the transformation of political will into military action. A major focus of this lengthy section is a discussion of three writers on war who Gray considers the essential thinkers on strategy: Clausewitz and his <emphasis n=”1″>On War,</emphasis> Sun-tzu and <emphasis n=”1″>Art of War,</emphasis> and Thucydides, and <emphasis n=”1″> Peloponnesian War.</emphasis> Gray's fourteenth maxim is, in fact: “If Thucydides, Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz did not say it, it probably is not worth saying.” Todd Manyx, writing in <emphasis n=”1″>Joint Force Quarterly,</emphasis> felt that “Gray's attempt to shed light on the nature of war, peace, and strategy is a great success.” According to Manyx, <title><emphasis n=”1″>Fighting Talk</emphasis></title> “serves as a primer on topics relating to strategic policy that will help interested parties at all levels understand that behind political jargon and rhetoric, more than an invisible hand is guiding a strategist's counsel.”</para>
<head n=”5″><emphasis n=”1″>National Security Dilemmas</emphasis></head> <para>In his 2009 work, <title><emphasis n=”1″>National Security Dilemmas: Challenges and Opportunities,</emphasis></title> Gray presents a primer for the most pressing contemporary issues facing the U.S. in regards to national security. Here he “provides a sound argument for the need for a coherent and inclusive national strategy that orchestrates power and political aims,” according to <emphasis n=”1″>Military Review</emphasis> contributor Matthew Eberhart. Gray examines, among other topics, the policy of deterrence; the need to transform the military to changing needs and enemies, especially those who wage an irregular war; the use of new technologies in warfare; and the difficulties posed for U.S. policy in waging defensive versus preemptive wars.</para>
<para>For Douglas Peifer, writing in <emphasis n=”1″>Joint Force Quarterly,</emphasis> <title><emphasis n=”1″>National Security Dilemmas</emphasis></title> “brings together eight thought-provoking essays by one of today's leading scholar-strategists.” Peifer further noted: “This eclectic collection offers a Clausewitzean, realist examination of security dilemmas from deterrence to irregular warfare, combining broad macro-analysis with specific recommendations and critiques. This collection should prove most useful for those unfamiliar with Gray's work or in search of a convenient, single-volume collection of his contributions to the Strategic Studies Institute over the past seven years.” Similarly, Eberhart felt that the study “provides a complete view of the roadblocks to crafting an effective, coherent strategy in light of current challenges and discusses how the challenges may be met.” Further praise for the work came from <emphasis n=”1″> Parameters</emphasis> contributor Robert Bateman, who felt that Gray's “writing is clear, strong, and admirably lacking in the high-sounding mucky buzzwords-of-the-day that often grip so many writers working at the strategic level.” Bateman added: “Each chapter is a standalone feast for the mind.”</para>
(open new) <head n=”5″><emphasis n=”1″>Perspectives on Strategy</emphasis> and <emphasis n=”1″>The Future of Strategy</emphasis> </head>
<para>In his 2013 work, <title><emphasis n=”1″>Perspectives on Strategy,</emphasis></title> Gray looks closely at strategic thought and behavior from five different perspectives: intellect, morality, culture, geography, and technology. Gray argues that these various perspectives can be understood only when looked at in context, the “whole house of war” philosophy advocated by T. E. Lawrence. Each chapter examines a different perspective as Gray asks pertinent and difficult questions about the value of each. “If all this sounds rather dense, then it is an accurate reflection of <title><emphasis n=”1″>Perspectives on Strategy,</emphasis></title> which is quite a feat, given that it is a slim volume,” noted Julia Muravska in <emphasis n=”1″>London School of Economics and Political Science</emphasis> website. Muravsaka added: “Yet it demands sustained acute concentration of the reader in order to unlock its intellectual treasure chest. And the gems contained therein are certainly worth the effort, and no less than may be expected from a scholar of Gray’s formidable stature. … In sum, anyone wishing to have a truly firm grounding in questions of war and strategy cannot do without Colin S. Gray, and <title><emphasis n=”1″>Perspectives on Strategy</emphasis></title> is no exception.” </para>
<para>In <title><emphasis n=”1″>The Future of Strategy,</emphasis></title> Gray offers an extended essay on the meaning of strategy and why it is so important for both the military and politicians in terms of gaining desired outcomes in very uncertain and often complex situations. Gray fills the work with examples from history: from the Peloponnesian War to modern warfare in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The author examines how military thinkers in the past dealt with strategy in its cultural, ideological, and political context. <emphasis n=”1″>Choice</emphasis> contributor D. N. Nelson had praise for this work, noting: “This is a short book with a brief index and a long list of references, often to Gray’s own works. Read with companion literature from other schools of international relations, this will be a useful graduate student and professional volume.”</para> (close new)
BIOCRIT
PERIODICALS
Air Power History, fall, 2006, John L. Cirafici, review of The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order.
Air & Space Power Journal, winter, 2003, Gilles Van Nederveen, review of Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History.
American Political Science Review, September, 1991, John P. Lovell, review of War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century, p. 1084; March, 2000, Gregory Paul Domin, review of The Second Nuclear Age, p. 239.
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May, 1984, “Strategic Studies and Public Policy,” p. 193.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December, 1983, “Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience,” p. 42.
California Bookwatch, June, 2006, review of Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare.
Choice, March, 1993, R.A. Strong, review of House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail, p. 1238; June, 1993, A.N. Sabrosky, review of Weapons Don’t Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology, p. 1705; December, 1996, review of Explorations in Strategy, p. 688; January, 2000, D. McIntosh, review of The Second Nuclear Age , p. 1010; February, 2003, M.A. Morris, review of Strategy for Chaos, p. 1055; February, 2005, A.C. Tuttle, review of The Sheriff, p. 1094; March, 2016. D.N. Nelson, The Future of Strategy, p. 1082.
Comparative Strategy, January 1, 2005, C. Dale Walton, review of The Sheriff, p. 99; December, 2005, Stephen J. Cimbala, review of Another Bloody Century, p. 439.
Current History, May, 1983, “Strategic Studies and Public Policy,” p. 220.
Emory International Law Review, spring, 1993, Bernard L. McNamee, review of House of Cards.
Encounter, June, 1988, review of The Geopolitics of Super Power, p. 57.
Ethics, October, 1983, “Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment,” p. 185.
Foreign Affairs, spring, 1984, “American Military Space Policy”; fall, 1988, Gregory F. Treverton, review of The Geopolitics of Super Power; summer, 1990, Lucy Edwards Despard, review of War, Peace, and Victory; summer, 1993, Eliot A. Cohen, review of Weapons Don’t Make War; January, 2003, review of Strategy for Chaos, p. 163.
Historian, fall, 2005, Lorraine M. Lees, review of The Sheriff.
International Affairs, spring, 1989, “The Geo-Politics of Superpower”; January, 1994, Theo Farrell, review of Weapons Don’t Make War, p. 134; July, 1995, Eric Grove, review of The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power, p. 601; May, 2003, Paul Hirst, review of Strategy for Chaos, p. 652.
International History Review, May, 1996, Richard D. Challener, review of The Navy in the Post-Cold War World, p. 491; December, 2003, Geoffrey Blainey, review of Strategy for Chaos, p. 995.
International Journal, summer, 1993, review of The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War.
Joint Force Quarterly, July, 2005, Barry Watts, review of Strategy for Chaos, p. 109; July, 2008, Todd Manyx, review of Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy, p. 141; October, 2009, Douglas Peifer, review of National Security Dilemmas: Challenges and Opportunities, p. 169.
Journal of American History, June, 1989, review of The Geopolitics of Super Power, p. 313.
Journal of American Studies, August, 1989, review of The Geopolitics of Super Power, pp. 329-330; December, 2005, Patrick Fagan, review of The Sheriff, p. 556.
Journal of Military History, October, 1990, Dean C. Allard, review of Seapower and Strategy, p. 491; January, 1992, William H. McNeill, review of War, Peace, and Victory, p. 123; October, 1993, Kenneth P. Werrell, review of Weapons Don’t Make War, p. 749; October, 1995, Malcolm Muir, review of The Navy in the Post-Cold War World, p. 745.
Journal of Politics, May, 1989, review of The Geopolitics of Super Power, p. 456.
Library Journal, June 15, 1990, Richard Weitz, review of War, Peace, and Victory, p. 124; November 1, 1992, Harold N. Boyer, review of The Leverage of Sea Power, p. 102.
Military Law Review, spring, 1987, “Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West.”
Military Review, January, 2010, Matthew Eberhart, review of National Security Dilemmas.
National Interest, winter, 1992, Gideon Rose, review of House of Cards.
National Review, January 28, 1991, Ralph De Toledano, review of War, Peace, and Victory, p. 55; April 10, 2006, “A Brutal Constant,” p. 48.
New Republic, September 29, 1986, Paul Kennedy, review of Nuclear Strategy and National Style, p. 38.
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, fall, 1989, review of The Geopolitics of Super Power; spring, 1992, David Soskin, review of War, Peace, and Victory.
Orbis, spring, 1993, Bruce D. Berkowitz, review of House of Cards; spring, 1997, Michael P. Noonan, review of Explorations in Strategy.
Parameters, winter, 2000, Glen C. Collins, review of Modern Strategy; summer, 2005, Damon Coletta, review of The Sheriff; summer, 2007, Stephen J. Blank, review of Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice; spring, 2009, Stephen J. Blank, review of War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, p. 111; winter, 2009, Robert Bateman, review of National Security Dilemmas, p. 146.
Perspectives on Political Science, summer, 1997, James A. Huston, review of Explorations in Strategy.
Policy Review, winter, 1989, review of Nuclear Strategy and National Style.
Political Science Quarterly, fall, 1993, James J. Wirtz, review of Weapons Don’t Make War; winter, 1995, Edward Rhodes, review of The Navy in the Post-Cold War World.
Political Studies, June, 2000, Tarak Barkawi, review of Modern Strategy, p. 668.
Prairie Schooner, fall, 1993, review of Weapons Don’t Make War; winter, 1995, review of The Navy in the Post-Cold War World.
Publishers Weekly, May 18, 1990, Genevieve Stuttaford, review of War, Peace, and Victory, p. 72; May 24, 1991, review of War, Peace, and Victory, p. 56; October 12, 1992, review of The Leverage of Sea Power, p. 60.
Reference & Research Book News, February, 1990, review of Seapower and Strategy, p. 41; August, 1993, review of House of Cards, p. 26; November, 1999, review of The Second Nuclear Age, p. 206; February, 2000, review of Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy, p. 111; February, 2003, review of Strategy for Chaos, p. 240; August, 2007, review of Fighting Talk; August, 2007, review of War, Peace and International Relations.
Science Books & Films, September, 1984, review of American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapon Systems, and Arms Control, p. 11; July, 2000, review of The Second Nuclear Age, p. 156.
Survival, spring, 1994, Ivo H. Daalder, review of House of Cards.
Times Literary Supplement, March 9, 2001, Adam Roberts, review of Modern Strategy, p. 26; September 23, 2005, “After the Peace,” p. 10.
Virginia Quarterly Review, winter, 1989, review of The Geopolitics of Super Power; summer, 2000, review of Modern Strategy.
Washington Monthly, July 1, 1990, Adam Yarmolinsky, review of War, Peace, and Victory, p. 58.
ONLINE
Center for Security and International Studies website, http://www.csis.ro/ (February 2, 2008), review of Another Bloody Century.
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory website, http://www.jhuapl.edu/ (February 2, 2008), faculty profile of Colin S. Gray.
London School of Economics and Political Science website, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk (November 11h, 2013), Julia Muravska, review of Perspectives on Strategy
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College website, http:// www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ (February 2, 2008), brief biography of Colin S. Gray.
United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute website, http:// www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ (July 12, 2011), “Colin S. Gray.”
University of Reading Department of Politics and International Relations website, http:// www.spirs.reading.ac.uk/ (February 2, 2008), faculty profile of Colin S. Gray.
University of Reading, School of Politics and International Relations website, http:// www.reading.ac.uk/ (July 12, 2011), “Colin S. Gray.”
OBITUARIES
Foreign Policy Research Institute website, https://www.fpri.org/ (March 2, 2020), Frank G. Hoffman, “‘Fifty Shades of Gray’: A Tribute to Colin S. Gray (1943-2020).”
Modern War Institute website, https://mwi.usma.edu/ (March 2, 2020), M.L. Cavanaugh, “War Books: Colin Gray’s Enduring Contribution.”
Colin S. Gray
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Colin S. Gray (December 29, 1943 – February 27, 2020) was a British-American writer on geopolitics and professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he was the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies.[1] In addition, he was a Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy.
Gray was educated at the University of Manchester and the University of Oxford. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute, before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He also served as a defence adviser both to the British and U.S. governments. Gray served from 1982 until 1987 in the Reagan Administration's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament.[2] He taught at the University of Hull, the University of Lancaster, York University, the University of Toronto and the University of British Columbia.[3] Gray published 30 books on military history and strategic studies, as well as numerous articles.
Gray was criticized by Alex Marshall of the University of Glasgow for his attempt to elevate Harry S. Truman's reputation to "a level of adulation far higher than the historical record could ever objectively sustain", as well as for Gray's silence on Truman's intellectual mediocrity and role in bringing about the Cold War.[4]
Bibliography
Canadian Defence Policy: A Question of Priorities (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1972).
The Soviet-American Arms Race (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1976).
The MX ICBM and National Security (New York: Praeger, 1981).
Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982).
Strategic Studies and Public Policy:The American Experience (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1982).
American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapon Systems, and Arms Control (Cambridge, MA:Abt, 1983).
Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986)
The Geopolitics of Super Power (Lexington, KY:University Press of Kentucky, 1988).
War, Peace, and Victory:Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).
House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).
The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (New York: The Free Press, 1992).
Weapons Don't Make War:Policy, Strategy, and Technology (Lawrence, KS:University Press of Kansas, 1993).
The Navy in the Post-Cold War World:The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1994).
Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996; 1998 sec. ed. pb [Praeger]).
The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).
Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and Other Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004).
Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005)
Strategy and History:Essays on Theory and Practice (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006).
War, Peace, and International Relations. An Introduction to Strategic History (Abingdon, UK:Routledge, 2007).
The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford, UK; Oxford University Press, 2010)
Airpower for Strategic Effect (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2012).
Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty (Oxford University Press, 2014).
QUOTE:
“Some of his books were complex if not dense, but his insights were invariably profound. He was insufferable to the unprepared and the ill-informed, yet invaluable to the curious student willing to work hard.”
Colin S. Gray, a prolific Anglo-American scholar and strategist, died last week after a decades-long contest with cancer. A renowned scholar of geopolitics and nuclear strategy, Professor Gray worked in the United States and the United Kingdom and retired from academia after years at the University of Reading. He authored 30 books and mentored many junior scholars, including myself. Some of his books were complex if not dense, but his insights were invariably profound. He was insufferable to the unprepared and the ill-informed, yet invaluable to the curious student willing to work hard and answer his incessant challenge, “So what?” Undoubtedly, St. Peter has now met his match and been treated to a lecture by Dr. Gray on improving strategic theory inside Heaven’s gates. His scholarship, penetrating mind, and sly wit will long be remembered.
Dr. Hoffman delivered the below remarks at the University of Reading in 2013 at a conference commemorating Dr. Colin Gray’s career and scholarly contributions. An extended version of his remarks was published as “Grand Strategy: Fundamental Considerations,” Orbis (Fall 2014).
My presentation today is titled “50 Shades of Gray.” My selection of this title is not simply to stimulate your attention or our honored guest, as I trust this audience finds the subject of strategy exciting enough. I did so because Professor Gray has impressed upon me a crucial lesson––that strategy is created and conducted in a world of ambiguity, deception and uncertainty; all shades of gray.
My title is also an indirect tribute to Colin and his peculiar propensity to create useful lists, including his noted “17 dimensions of strategy” and my favorite book Fighting Talk: 40 Maxims on Strategy. I sincerely wish that Dr. Gray’s books were as commercially successful as the best-selling E. L. James’s series. There was not a bookstore in London or a train station on my trip that did not prominently display one of her popular volumes. Had Dr. Gray spiced up his theories, he could have retired much earlier. More importantly, we would all be much safer if our civilian leaders had a level of strategic literacy gained by Dr. Gray’s products on the best seller lists. But, alas, the strategic theory is too dry to seduce the general public and our strategy priesthood too cloistered to generate the attention strategy deserves.
Fear not, I do not intend to discuss my amalgamation of Colin’s lists, all 50 shades of gray that make strategy so difficult. Instead I will limit these remarks to eight considerations in the making and employment of grand or national strategy. These considerations represent critical components that both Clausewitz and Colin Gray have sought to teach aspiring strategists as they struggle to obtain their nation’s policy and security interests. It is these eight elements that collectively comprise a holistic understanding of strategy, something our honored colleague has always endeavored to help us appreciate.
1. Context and Culture. The first and principal consideration is a firm grasp of the strategic environment and context in which one’s strategy is to be conducted. Professor Gray has appropriately referred to the sovereignty of context, to highlight its importance. Our comprehension of the strategic context frames our understanding of our adversary and the particular environment in which strategy will operate within. I think it goes without detailed explanation that shortfalls in strategic performance over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan partially comes from shortfalls in our comprehension of the particular context and culture we sought to change. As Bernard Brodie noted two generations ago, good strategy presumes good sociology and anthropology. Both are apparently in short supply today.
2. Compromise and Councils of War. This consideration deals with the development of strategies, and the essence of strategy as a process. What Eliot Cohen once called the “Unequal Dialogue” occurs in these councils. It also addresses the proverbial strategy bridge function in which policy aims and operational options are integrated. The discourse required to create and refine strategies are generally achieved by committees or councils of war. Ultimately policymakers “must weigh imponderables through structured debates that pare away personal, organizational, and national illusions and conceits.” They must squarely face the parochial interests of bureaucracy, accurately discern strategic options, and make choices with imperfect information.
Military strategists must also accept, as Clausewitz stressed with emphasis, that politics more than intrudes in strategy and war. The strategist, who holds the proverbial bridge between policy and military means, must accept the historical fact that purely rational methods are not the norm in crafting strategy. Strategy’s natural spawning grounds are the confluence of politics, complexity, uncertainty, and constraints. As Colin notes in his lucid definition, national strategies are developed to support the attainment of “policy as determined by politics.” This is the best definition as politics influences policy and thus impacts strategy as well.
3. Competitive Strategies. Strategy must be competitive. This is a consideration that Andrew Marshall and others like Dr. Gay have argued for. To be Competitive means that the strategist recognizes that any strategy operates in an interactive and adversarial setting or at least in an environment in which other parties seek their own interests. A competitive strategy respects the choices and options that the opponent can pose. It reflects the reality that war is a reciprocal duel, an interactive exercise of action, response, counteraction. This consideration is the part of strategy making where one considers the relative strengths and weaknesses of one’s self as well as one’s opponent. American strategies do not always give credit to this consideration. Future U.S. national strategies will have to seek relevant and enduring competitive advantages under constrained resources.
4. Coherence. This is the essence of the strategy function, whereby the strategist exploits the comprehension generated from context and cognitively creates a strategic concept and logic that promises to attain policy ends within the means allocated and the constraints laid upon him or her. A good strategy must have an internal logic that ties policy to both ways and means to create desired strategic effects. That logic is a continuous thread of thinking that provides strategic intent and informs ways, and creates linkages in strategic design that then drives operations. Creating and sustaining coherence is the art of strategic practice where the strategist earns his keep and applies his/her creativity and experience.
Coherence reflects the balance and internal logic in the enduring formula of ends/ways/means. Adapting one part automatically alters the logic of that “formula” and the resultant strategy. In another direction, coherence must be sustained across all instruments of national power. The strategic concept divined by the strategist should establish this logic and coherence, and he or she must strive mightily to keep them connected. Colin rightfully calls this the heroic duty of the strategist.
5. Constraints. Strategy is made and executed in the real world, an environment that ultimately deals with constraints. The most obvious of these are time, information and resoruces. War in general, and operations more particularly, are competitive and decisions have to be made in a context that rewards timely decisions and actions relative to the opponent. There are advantages to getting strategy good enough, as Colin would put it, and fast enough to outcycle one’s opponent in the temporal dimension of strategy. By anticipating, deciding and acting with time as the most precious resource, one can create and sustain advantage.
The same is true with information, strategy relies upon intelligence and knowledge of the other side, but as our honoree has stressed the future is not foreseeable and strategy is laid on a foundation of assumption, guesses and genius. The essence of strategy is the resolution of choices, tradeoffs and risks produced by uncertainty.
6. Contingency. This consideration reflects the role of chance in human affairs. We do not fight inanimate objects and real people with ideas and will of their own. I do not need to belabor Clausewitz’s emphasis on friction with this audience, but it exists at more than the operational and tactical level. It exists at all levels, and thus Colin Gray’s emphasis on the need for prudence in risk taking and for adaptability in strategic thinking cannot be overestimated.
Recall the words from another Anglo-American with a strategic flair:
Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The Statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events. Antiquated War Offices, weak, incompetent or arrogant Commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant Fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations—all take their seats at the Council Board on the morrow of a declaration of war.
Since we have an MP here, it should not go unnoticed that he failed to list “poorly educated civilian policymakers” in that list, but he was certainly the all too rare Statesman that was deeply read in history and statecraft.
7. Communication. Several speakers have mentioned the importance of narratives in explaining national purpose, myths and goals. It is fairly well understood that creating and sustaining support for a national or grand strategy is fairly well recognized. Strategies need to be sustained by support, and to be sustained, they must be explained. A good strategy is an inspiring document, painting a compelling narrative of a better future and how to get there.
Even if it looks too far out in range or is too airy, it should inspire the subordinate agencies and instruments of power to develop the next more detailed level of sub-strategy. But one of its critical purposes is to establish a narrative that resonates and motivates its principal audience. It is also critical, especially in a democracy, to be able to explain and justify the application of the nation’s purse to gain the strategy’s goals. If you cannot explain a strategy, you cannot sustain it over time.
8. Continuous Assessment and Adaptation. The confluence of contingency and competitiveness produces the need for an additional component—that of constant
evaluation of ongoing operations and continuous measurement of progress. Since strategy is an evolving contact sport, one should avoid what Lord Salisbury called the most common error, “sticking to the carcass of dead policy.” Thus, strategies should be thought of as adaptive in nature. As Henry Mintzberg has stressed, the making of strategy is an iterative exercise that is dynamic, irregular, discontinuous, with learning and synthesis. Likewise, Professor Gray stresses the role of adaptability to deal with uncertainty.
I think that this framework provides the gist of the holistic grasp of strategy that I have learned over the years from Professor Gray. These are the essentials passed on from his prodigious study, with some insistence and urging. The set of eight elements offers a useful guide as well as a set of criteria by which one might critique the formulation of U.S. strategy over the last decade. We have been well advised by our noted and shared Anglo-American strategist, and while I think we’ve been diligent students we might appear to be Sorcerer’s Apprentices in the real arena where strategic performance is all that counts.
The design and use of strategy is rarely a clean cut case of rational choice. It is messy and as Colin stressed often all too difficult. Yet it must be done, but just better and faster than our opponents. As Clausewitz said, in war the simple is not clear or easy. The same is true for strategy. The ability to challenge conventional wisdom, to see through the chaffe and discern the essence of a problem, to uncover illusion or conceit, and craft a strategy that advances security is real work. But it is the best antidote for strategic poverty and the best insurance against catastrophe.
These 8 considerations, what might be irreverently termed the Curmudgeon’s Catechism, provide an overview of what is needed to best design and apply a national strategy. All of these elements are the fundamental considerations I have learned from Professor Gray’s many erudite studies. A proper appreciation of these components will increase the likelihood that national level strategies will have a better chance of success in the coming years.
QUOTE: “shaped strategic studies as much as anyone. … He loved ideas. He loved discussion and argument. He loved sharing his ideas, and had an endless capacity for gathering others and passing on what he knew in waterfalls of wise words.&rdquo
Colin Gray—who shaped strategic studies as much as anyone—died last week. And as difficult as it is to know he’s gone, he left us with a body of work that will live on in the minds of strategic practitioners for generations to come.
I knew him well late in his life. In 2013 I had just finished a two-year master’s program at Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand, and desperately wanted to continue work toward a PhD. American graduate schools wouldn’t accept my time in New Zealand as a stepping stone to the doctorate, so I cold-emailed Colin at the University of Reading in the UK. Surprisingly, he responded quickly that he liked my proposed topic, and so began five years of study under him (as well as Professor Beatrice Heuser, now at the University of Glasgow). Along the way, Colin retired from Reading, but continued as my advisor in his “Professor Emeritus” status. It’s possible I was his final PhD student.
Colin was as much a writer as he was a thinker. That’s what drew me to him in the first place, and I suspect it’s the same for others. Arguably, nobody’s been so prolific a writer in strategic studies. His contributions are everywhere, and because much of it predates our digital age, much keeps popping up.
Some of his many fans may not know about a couple collections of his in the United States. For many years he wrote an annual manuscript for the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. And, as of last year, the Modern War Institute at West Point houses his personal library. An email Colin wrote to me on the matter said he hoped his “written comments in the books add spice” to our debates and discussions. (While I brokered the transfer, then-MWI deputy director Rick Montcalm and the rest of the staff deserves all the credit for safeguarding this precious set.)
In person, Colin was relatively short in a way you wouldn’t expect from seeing so many back-of-book author photos. When I knew him, he bore an uncanny resemblance to the English actor Sir Ian Holm (that is, when Sir Ian wasn’t wearing a “Bilbo Baggins” costume). His office and home were filled from floor to ceiling with books—books on top of books, books propping up books, books stuffed under tables, and littler books stacked atop bigger books.
He loved ideas. He loved discussion and argument. He loved sharing his ideas, and had an endless capacity for gathering others and passing on what he knew in waterfalls of wise words.
Colin wrote everything by hand, with a simple, elegant, black Mont Blanc pen. Ballpoint, blue ink. When he completed a draft (which, on occasion, could be difficult to decipher!), he then engaged a typist to convert the handwritten version to manuscript.
He delighted in hearing I was a fellow pen geek, and on the occasion of my dissertation completion he sent me a pen—a beautiful Mont Blanc.
While I’ll miss Colin as a person, he does leave us well-stocked with his books, thoughts, and ideas. What follows are just a few that impacted me the most and why they were so impactful. They just scratch the surface and so I encourage others to explore more.
QUOTE:“This is a short book with a brief index and a long list of references, often to Gray's own works. Read with companion literature from other schools of international relations, this will be a useful graduate student and professional volume.”
Gray, Colin S. The future of strategy. Polity, 2015. 150p index afp ISBN 9780745687933 cloth, $45.95
53-3252
U162
2015-3035 CIP
Gray's extended essay qua Polity book is a short summation of much he has written since the early 1970s--a synopsis of his ideas on the timelessness of strategy, its core in politics, and its implementation via military means. Gray is a fan of Thucydides and echoes of the Peloponnesian War and other seminal battles and wars occur throughout this treatise. Because the enduring nature of the human condition requires strategic thinking, historical references run the gamut in Gray's writings from one war and century to another, and such an encyclopedic background is among his strengths. Among Gray's many useful observations, however, is the ominous conclusion that there is no silver bullet through strategic thinking about the intersection of politics and power; challenges and dilemmas will always arise to confront political and military strategists. Fair warning to devotees of human security issues--Gray is a lifelong "realist" who focuses solely on states, power, and interests, and readers will find nothing about broader security threats or social and economic capacities. This is a short book with a brief index and a long list of references, often to Gray's own works. Read with companion literature from other schools of international relations, this will be a useful graduate student and professional volume. Summing Up: ** Recommended. Graduate collections and above.--D. N. Nelson, Center for Arms Control & Nonproliferation
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2016 American Library Association CHOICE
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Nelson, D.N. "Gray, Colin S.: The future of strategy." CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, vol. 53, no. 7, Mar. 2016, p. 1082. Gale General OneFile, https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A445735672/ITOF?u=schlager&sid=ITOF&xid=d7052d46. Accessed 7 Apr. 2020.
QUOTE: “If all this sounds rather dense, then it is an accurate reflection of
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Anyone wishing to have a truly firm grounding in questions of war and strategy cannot do without Colin S. Gray, and Perspectives on Strategy is no exception, writes Julia Muravska. Gray’s latest book aims to examine in depth five aspects of strategy – intellect, morality, culture, geography, and technology – and poses important questions around technology, geography, and ethics.
Perspectives on Strategy. Colin S. Gray. Oxford University Press. March 2013.
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It is perhaps a familiar pattern in which tribulations of the present prompt an unearthing of history’s lessons, forgotten or ignored, it is argued, to general peril. The bruised record of Western military interventions during the 21st century as well as the “international community’s” response to the current Arab Awakening, often judged clueless, confused, or calamitous, are no exception. These events have prompted a rediscovery of Sun Tzu’s genius, Machiavelli’s pragmatism, and now the strategic acumen of T. E. Lawrence. Lawrence of Arabia, as the British soldier, scholar and adventurer of WWI fame was widely known, spoke about the “whole house of war,” and this concept of inclusivity, complexity, and unity is the anchor for Colin S. Gray’s examination of the “whole house of strategy” in the renowned scholar’s latest work, Perspectives on Strategy (p. 191).
Gray’s purpose, however, is “strictly educational” and never policy-prescriptive, and the perspectives in question are conceptual, ethical, cultural, geographical and technological (p. 198). Through these five distinct yet interacting and co-influential “windows,” the scholar undertakes to advance a holistic understanding of “strategic phenomena” (p. 198; 6). At this point, definitions beg to be introduced, as the term strategy, by Gray’s own admission, is notorious for being misapplied, overused, and poorly understood. Thus, Perspectives is in theory about (neutral) strategy as “direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to achieve desired ends;” grand strategy as “the direction and use made of any and all among the total assets of a security community for the purposes of policy as decided by politics;” and military strategy as “the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy and decided by politics,” although in practice the work really concerns the last of these (p. 2).
If all this sounds rather dense, then it is an accurate reflection of Perspectives on Strategy, which is quite a feat, given that it is a slim volume. Yet it demands sustained acute concentration of the reader in order to unlock its intellectual treasure chest. And the gems contained therein are certainly worth the effort, and no less than may be expected from a scholar of Gray’s formidable stature, “untroubled” as he self-admittedly is by “Victorian grammatical prejudice,” but also, it appears, by stylistic clarity and syntactic elegance. The reader must be prepared to devote time and energy to comprehend the incisive, rigorous, and intellectually stimulating substance of this work, which may really be summarised as mature reflections of a brilliant mind on its beloved subject. Specifically, we would need to swallow constant reminders of our failure to see the truth of Gray’s argument (“obviously true;” “common sense affirms that…”) and to grapple with sentences peppered with interjections that are a tad too many and adverb-adjective sequences a bit too lengthy (“scarcely less essential”), not to mention paragraphs constructed on an edifice of logic that is implicit rather than explicitly stated.
If such hurdles are successfully scaled, the reward is (much enhanced) understanding of why and how military strategy and—by flexing the mental muscle a bit more—war are not only, but are also about ethics, culture, geography and technology. Again, an enviable feat, and, again, Colin Gray’s venerable input into the “scholarly controversy” surrounding each perspective (p. 7). Thus, the chapter on culture takes aim at the “cultural turn” currently en vogue in strategic and war studies, and not least at one of its founding fathers, the late Sir John Keegan. It is Gray’s contention that, contrary to the arguments of scholars in the “cultural” tradition, “although strategy is cultural, it is so only to a variable degree because there is far more to strategy than culture (on any plausible definition” (p. 83). In addition, claims that strategy and war are inherently and/or fundamentally cultural are demonstrated to be methodologically problematic (“where does culture end and its influence begin and how does one know?”), conceptually unsound (“if culture is everywhere, it might as well be nowhere, because it cannot be distinguished from its contexts”) and empirically flawed (there are a number of sub-cultures even within one “national strategic culture;” “history shows that belligerents can win despite being culturally ignorant;” and “historical reality is usually one of some cultural learning on the part of all rivals).
Far be it from Gray’s scholarly spirit to discredit arguments without engaging with their more sophisticated versions, reifying them, or advancing his own. For instance, he acknowledges that “culture is important to the understanding of strategies because it directs attention to the customs, beliefs, and behaviours that persist” (p. 83). The “values and customary practices” of a society, in turn, “carry over to its strategic thought and behavior,” meaning that if we are to understand strategy we must pay attention to its cultural aspects (p. 107). Indeed, Gray goes further by specifying a number of precise ways in which culture “matters,” such as being at heart of what has, over time, come to be regarded by nations as strategically advantageous.
Perspectives employs a similar tactic with regard to technology, a similarly sexy topic in this field. Firstly, it patiently explains that “technology is everywhere, all the time, but it does not directly move history onwards,” while its influence is elusive, variable, and shared with a number of competitors, with physical constraints and values being just two (p. 174). Next, Gray demonstrates how available technology is able to “drive tactics, shape operations, and enable strategy” (p. 170).
These are complex arguments, and obviously flow from a distinguished career of scholarship and extensive knowledge. And for this reason, the reader cannot help but crave a more frequent and detailed use of empirical illustrations, particularly of the contemporary variety. This would have been especially useful, as a number of Gray’s perspectives speak to controversies (re)sparked by wars of the late 20th and early 21st century, although extensive footnoting and the caveat that this work is conceived as a complement to Gray’s comprehensive The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice partly assuages this dearth.
In sum, anyone wishing to have a truly firm grounding in questions of war and strategy cannot do without Colin S. Gray, and Perspectives on Strategy is no exception. Reading it is no walk in the park, but, then again, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu were not exactly known for clear writing and quickly-grasped concepts, either.
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Julia Muravska is a PhD student at the LSE’s International Relations Department. Her doctoral research examines the emergence of the defence equipment market in the EU. Previously, Julia worked for the Defence and Security Programme of Transparency International UK, with a focus on counter-corruption in defence procurement and defence corporate initiatives. She holds an MSc in International Relations from the LSE and an Honours BA from the University of Toronto, also in International Relations. Read more reviews by Julia.